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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation I attempt to accomplish three goals. The first goal is to develop a narrative 
account of argumentation. I show that storytelling serves as a legitimate mode of argumentation. 
Further, I develop an account of narrative argument based on generalized features of narrative 
and a conception of argument that is rhetorical and in line with Charles Willard’s notion of 
argument as an interaction (1989). I identify features of narrative argument that enable narrative 
to function as an argument and thus to provide reasons for a claim in the context of 
disagreement. As a result, I synthesize literatures on narrative and argumentation to provide a 
definition of narrative argument. 
The second goal of the dissertation is to argue for maintaining the narrative as a process 
without reconstructing the narrative into the dominant model of argument, the Critical-Logical 
Model. In this part of the dissertation, I further elaborate on the definition of narrative argument 
and argue that narrative argument must be understood as a process, and not as a product of 
argument. While the product view focuses on the form and structure of an argument as being 
linear, explicit, and containing premises and a conclusion, and thus treats arguments as things, 
the process view focuses on the whole act of arguing, thus highlighting the importance of the 
context of argumentation and the people involved. In support of this thesis, I show that reducing 
the narrative into premises and a conclusion is problematic because it deprives it of some of its 
persuasive force. As such, I argue against the reductionist approach to narrative argument that 
seeks to extract premises and a conclusion from a narrative, because I contend that the whole act 
of storytelling is an argument. Reducing the narrative into a product removes the real argument—
part of which is implicit—from its context, its unique situation, and its complex social setting.  
The third goal of this dissertation is to develop an account of argument evaluation that is 
suitable for narrative argument understood as a process. I offer an account of how to evaluate 
narratives using ‘the virtuous audience,’ a novel evaluative method that combines theories of 
virtue argumentation and rhetorical audiences.  
In sum, this dissertation provides a definition of narrative argument, stipulates the 
conditions of narrative arguments that make them successful, and offers ways of evaluating the 
narrative while maintaining its form as a process.  
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General Introduction 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation defends narratives and storytelling as a legitimate mode of argumentation by 
showing how narrative can function as an argument and provide reasons for a claim. This 
account is by no means complete, but it provides the starting point for thinking about narrative 
arguments. Although narrative arguments are an integral component of argumentation theory, 
they have not received serious attention. As it stands, standard accounts of argumentation reject 
narrative reasoning. That is, the traditional and standard model of argumentation only accepts 
claims, premises and conclusions set out in an explicit and linear fashion as an argument. Adding 
to Michael Gilbert’s view that there is a dominant accepted mode of speaking (the logical mode) 
which is exclusive of the different modes people use when arguing, such as the emotional, 
visceral, and kisceral, I argue that in addition to these modes of reasoning there is a fifth 
excluded mode of argumentation: narrative. 
An exploration of narrative argumentation contributes to the current debates in 
argumentation theory over the exclusionary practices of dominant argumentation, the boundaries 
and limitation of the definition of argument and the importance of the role of narrative in 
argumentation.  
This project is motivated in part by feminist concerns with the dominant model of 
argumentation. Feminist critiques of argumentation are generally concerned with three main 
problems: 1. The hostile and adversarial practice of argumentation, 2. The exclusionary concept 
of arguing which only accepts modes of arguing that are linear, explicit and devoid of emotions 
and contextual information, and 3. Whether there exist gender differences in reasoning and 
arguing that hinder women and minority groups from full participation in the argumentation 
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arena. Many argumentation scholars, including Michael Gilbert, Phyllis Rooney, Andrea Nye, 
and Maryann Ayim, have rejected the traditional (critical-logical) model of argumentation, as it 
ignores the social and personal aspects of argumentation and fails to address the ethical concerns 
that come with arguing. Because this model of argumentation excludes non-standard modes of 
reasoning, such as emotional and narrative reasoning, women and other disenfranchised groups 
are denied access to power due to their linguistic practices. Women’s voices often are not heard 
or taken seriously, resulting in false denials of their authority. This problem is also likely to 
affect other minorities whose linguistic habits differ from the logico-deductive model, such as 
Native Canadians, thus reducing the likelihood of genuinely effective cross-cultural 
communication.  
This dissertation is consistent with feminist critiques of argumentation, as it challenges 
exclusionary conceptions of argumentation.  By broadening the conception of argument, we 
make the practice of argumentation more inclusive and less hostile to those silenced by the 
traditional model of argumentation.   
 
Preliminary Definitions 
 
I will briefly define several terms that I will be using in the thesis. 
Narrative. A narrative contains a sequence of events which are chronologically 
connected and happen over a period of time; it usually includes a beginning and an end. A 
chronological story, however, does not mean that it is necessarily linear; it can be both 
fragmented and disjunctive, and still be chronological.  All narratives have some sort of order 
and are placed within temporal and spatial patterns. All definitions of narrative emphasize the 
temporally ordered sequence of events.  
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Broadly speaking, a narrative generally contains these five features: (1) One or more events 
presented in a logical sequence, (2) movement through time and space, (3) plot, (4) Characters, 
and (5) a teller and an audience. All these features of narrative will be explained in more details 
later in the dissertation. 
Product. Throughout the thesis I will use the word product. In the field of argumentation, 
product is the idea that an argument is an artifact, which is not necessarily located in time and 
space.  Hence, the same argument as product can be used in different places but still mean the 
same thing. Furthermore, argument as product focuses on the form and structure of an argument 
as being linear, explicit and containing premises and a conclusion, where arguments are treated 
as things. 
Virtue. I use the term virtue to refer to the general idea of character traits. I rely on a 
basic definition of virtue as an excellent trait of character. And so, virtues are qualities that make 
a person excellent (Battaly, 2010, p.3). Linda Zagzebski (1996) defines virtue as an excellence 
and a deep trait of a person (p. 89). Further, virtue of character generally refers to a well- 
entrenched disposition, that is deeply embedded in a person. As such, possessing a virtuous 
character is essentially having a certain type of personality and mindset that is cultivated over 
time.  In this dissertation, I focus on virtue argumentation and what it means to argue virtuously 
with a good character, namely a character that respects others and is open to criticism and having 
a willingness to change one's beliefs. 
Character. A narrative typically has one or more characters, who are the people or 
persons referred to in the story. Characters can play major roles such as protagonists or 
antagonists.  The meaning and significance of the concept of character in stories is contested in 
narrative theory. However, for my account of narrative argumentation, I rely on a general 
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concept of character in storytelling. That is, all stories have characters (people), whether real, 
fictional or hypothetical. And, as such, characters can also be understood as participants in the 
story world. Further, the character types in the story must map onto our shared understanding of 
human nature. To understand characters, the audience resorts to their knowledge of real people 
(Jannidis, 2009, p.16). The ethos of the characters (i.e. their credibility) is what makes the story 
plausible and believable. The ethos of these characters, their nature and role can vary from 
narrative to narrative.  
 
Chapter Break Down 
Chapter one of this dissertation introduces argumentation theory and provides a history of the 
different strands of argumentation theory, focusing on the three main approaches:  informal 
logic, pragma dialectic and rhetoric and communication theory. 
Chapter two discusses feminist critiques of argumentation and situates narrative argument 
within this feminist debate. Feminist critiques highlight the importance of broadening the 
concept of arguments, of acknowledging the different ways of arguing, and of changing existing 
argumentation practices that are adversarial and harmful to women and minority groups.  
In chapter three, I proceed to develop an account of narrative argument based on 
generalized features of narrative and a conception of argument that is rhetorical and in line with 
Willard’s notion of argument as an interaction. In this chapter, I provide a detailed description of 
how narrative functions in an argument setting, presenting conditions for when narrative can 
function as argument.  Chapter three will establish the conditions that enable narrative to 
function as arguments.  I begin this chapter by explaining the basic conditions for a 
comprehensible story: namely that the story must be 1.) coherent (things fit together) 2.) follows 
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a sequence of events, and 3. have a beginning and an end. Further, using Charles Arthur 
Willard’s rhetorical theory of argumentation (1989), I propose that some of the conditions for 
narrative to count as argument are as follows: 
 (1) The speaker’s intention is relevant. 
(2) The context and the background information that are shared amongst speakers (a 
point also made by Gilbert). 
On my view, it is the context of the situation, specifically, the shared background knowledge 
between speakers and the intention of speakers that enables narratives to function as arguments. 
The purpose and meaning of argument cannot be abstracted away from the perspective of 
arguers; that is, an argument is (its goal and purpose) whatever the arguer intends it to be.  
In the following chapter, I further elaborate on the definition of narrative argument and 
argue that narrative argument must be understood as a process, and not as a product of argument. 
While argument as product focuses on the form and structure of an argument as being linear, 
explicit and containing premises and a conclusion, where arguments are treated as things, 
argument as a process focuses on the whole act of arguing thus highlighting the importance of 
the context of argumentation and argument as involving people. 
In chapter five, I develop an account of the virtuous audience as a method for evaluating 
narrative arguments. Borrowing from rhetorical and virtue accounts of argumentation, I show 
that narrative arguments can be evaluated using a process account. Traditionally, argument 
evaluation focuses on the product of argument while ignoring that the process of arguing must 
also be accounted for in order to produce good argumentation. This chapter demonstrates that the 
practices of argumentation are just as important as the product of argumentation and that the 
practices of argumentation must also be virtuous for the argument to be acceptable.  
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 Traditional theories of argument evaluation are thus inadequate for narrative argument 
because they focus on the content and product of arguments. In focusing on the product, 
traditional argumentation theorists distort and reduce narratives in their analysis of them. A 
complete theory of argument evaluation, I contend, must consider the process of arguing and not 
just the product.  
  
 7 
Chapter One: History Of Argumentation Theory 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will first give a brief history of argumentation theory and offer an explanation of 
the different theories of argumentation. Second, I will give an overview of the recent interest in 
narrative argumentation. 
 
History Of Argumentation Theory 
The study of argumentation was originally part of the art of rhetoric in ancient Greece (Athens) 
and the Island of Sicily which is the birthplace of the Western tradition of persuasion. While the 
study of argumentation has been part of the field of philosophy ever since Aristotle where 
argumentation was studied in terms of formal and deductive logic, argumentation theory is 
nevertheless a new field that developed in the 1950s (Gilbert, 1997, p. 3). Argumentation theory 
is an interdisciplinary field which draws attention from a wide range of disciplines and scholars 
such as philosophers, logicians, computer scientists, linguists, legal scholars and speech 
communication theorists. As Joseph Wenzel notes in “Perspectives on Argument,” there is no 
single answer to the question of what is an argument, and the answer varies depending on the 
unique approach taken by the diverse scholars on argumentation (Wenzel, 1992, p. 121). 
Two of the main scholars who pioneered the study of argumentation are Chaim Perelman 
and Stephen Toulmin. Until the late seventies, argumentation theory was still dominated by the 
work of Toulmin (1958) and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). Both Toulmin and 
Perelman attack formal logic for being artificial and irrelevant to the natural and everyday 
language of argumentation.  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric and Toulmin’s 
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The Uses of Argument are an attempt to offer an alternative to formal logic that is more suitable 
and useful for analyzing and dealing with everyday interactive argumentation in ordinary 
language. And both theorists argue that there is a difference between the artificial language of 
logic and the natural language of argument, and that logic by itself is not sufficient for analyzing 
natural arguments. This rejection of logic for analyzing and understanding everyday language 
became the mainstream perspective during the 1970’s (L. Benoit, J. Benoit and Hample, 1992, p. 
7).  
 
Stephen Toulmin. The two main significant contributions that Toulmin made to the study 
of argumentation are the idea of field-dependence and the layouts of arguments. In the Uses of 
Argument (1958), Toulmin presents a model of the various components that constitute an argument 
(such as the claim, data, warrant, backing, etc.). He created a model that’s interactive, and mapped 
the natural process of argument that was not based on formal logic. He created a model that, he 
argued, mirrored how people really argue in everyday life.  
Another important and influential aspect of Toulmin’s theory of argumentation is the 
notion of argument fields. Toulmin argues that some aspects of an argument will be the same 
across all fields of knowledge, and are the same everywhere, which he calls field-invariant 
because they do not change from field to field, while others are different from setting to setting 
and are field-dependent; i.e., their acceptability will vary from field to field (such as law, 
medicine, politics, etc.) (William L. Benoit, 1992, p. 61). Each field of knowledge and argument 
will appeal to unique standards of assessments where the use of warrants, data and backing will 
vary from field to field. The problem that Toulmin found with formal logic in relation to 
argumentation is that the criteria used by formal logic are field-invariant and cannot deal with the 
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differences that exist from field to field (Tindale, 1999, p. 25).  For example, the field of business 
relies on a cost benefit analysis whereas religious arguments require different evaluations and 
justifications. Another example would be the field of physics and mathematics that rely on 
mathematical theorems and formulas that is different than the legal idea of proof.  
 
Chaim Perelman. Like Toulmin, Perelman became dissatisfied with formal logic as a 
method for evaluating everyday language. Perelman believed that the standards of necessity and 
certainty play no role in argumentation or deliberation because according to Perelman no one 
argues or deliberates about that which is known or self-evident. The goal of argumentation for 
Perelman is not the deduction of conclusions from premises (as is the case with demonstration) 
or simply the resolution of disputes, but rather the creation and or strengthening of the adherence 
of the minds of the audience (particular and universal) to the claims put forward (Tindale, 1999, 
p. 17). The domain of argumentation for Perelman, thus, concerns that which is probable and 
plausible, as opposed to that which is necessary or self-evident as is the case with formal logic 
(Perelman, 1963, p. 134). Perelman’s rhetorical model of argumentation is based on adherence 
and not self-evident truths. As noted by Caroll C. Arnold , Perleman’s independent study of what 
people actually do when they argue confirmed the ancients’ belief that when one’s premises are 
disputable, the best method is to refer back to accepted opinions (Arnold, 1982, Viii). In his 
attempt to find common ground for agreement, Perelman developed the universal audience, 
which can be described as the premises and arguments adhered and agreed upon by rational 
people. And so, for Perelman, argumentation is a social undertaking characterized by the nature 
of audience.  The development of argumentation is essentially the function of the audience who 
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validate and accept the arguments, and it is precisely for this reason that the speaker is obliged to 
adapt himself to the audience (Perelman, 1982, p. 13).   
This adaptation means that the speaker must begin his starting point of arguments with 
theses accepted by the audience. The speaker should aim for the transfer of adherence from the 
premises to the conclusion. And if the premises happen to be rejected then the speaker should 
first try to reinforce them before he delves into his argument/conclusion. The audience will not 
accept the conclusion of an argument whose premises they reject or doubt (Perelman, 1982, 
p.21). As such, adapting to the audience requires the speaker to choose premises that the speaker 
holds (Perelman, 1982, p.23). This adherence, writes Perelman, never comes out of thin air for it 
supposes a meeting of minds between the speaker and his/her audience whom all agree on the 
starting points of argument (Perelman, 1982, p. 9).  Perelman’s rhetorical model of 
argumentation relies primarily on the audience for the acceptance and rejection of arguments. 
The speaker can only develop his argument by linking it to these accepted by his audience, and 
as such the development of argumentation depends on what is accepted, acknowledged as true, 
normal, probable and valid (Perelman, 1963, p. 156). Hence, the standard of argumentation for 
Perelman is the audience. Perelman argues that there are two types of audiences that exist in the 
domain of argumentation, the particular (or specific) audience that exists in the actual situation, 
and the universal audience that is composed or extracted out of the particular audience. Perelman 
developed these two audiences as a way to address the demand for a specific criteria of 
evaluation as well as to overcome the threat of relativism. The particular audience offers a 
specific criterion relevant to the situation whereas the universal audience offers an objective 
criterion that avoids relativism (Tindale, 1999, p. 17).  
A major contribution of The New Rhetoric is that the majority of the claims we make in 
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arguing are not self-evident, cannot be proved completely, and are only judged to be reasonable 
by the audience that validates them (Arnold, 1982, p. xi). According to Perelman, there is no 
criterion of objective or absolute truth that “shines forth from true statements and is lacking in 
false ones” (Gilbert, 1997, p. 6). Argumentation is the only method we have for reaching 
consensus, and we cannot appeal to universal truth, for it is only through arguing that we can 
come to agreement. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) reject the view that convincing an 
audience means that the view adopted is the right one, for they do not believe in truth, rather, the 
goal of argumentation is the adherence of the minds of the audience through reason and 
argument (Gilbert, 1997, p. 6). And because Perelman rejected self-evident truths, adherence 
became central to his rhetorical model of argumentation. That is, since our arguments cannot be 
proved completely, we must submit them to the judgment of those for whom it is directed, 
namely the audience (Tindale, 1999, p. 40). Perelman argues firmly that argumentation can only 
settle matters when the audience it addresses reaches a consensus on the issue discussed 
(Perelman, 1982, p. xvi). My project will rely on Perelman’s notion of audience and adherence 
for the assessment and acceptance of narrative arguments.  That is, we would assess stories the 
way we would assess arguments through the adherence and agreement of the audience or those 
engaged in storytelling.  
Further, it must be noted that not all argumentation theorists rejected formal logic or 
denied its merits; for example, the Pragma Dialecticians do not reject validity or deductive logic, 
but rather what was being questioned is, 1. The usefulness of formal logic for everyday 
argumentation, and 2. The conflation of logic with rationalism. This essentially means that there 
are other ways to be rational (without being logical or valid) and that an argument can be good 
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without being formally valid. Hence, what was being challenged by many argumentation 
scholars is the idea that to be rational is to be logical.  
Since the early 1990s, new approaches to argumentation emerged that tried to build on 
the work of Perelman’s and Toulmin’s models of argumentation. These new approaches include 
the Rhetoric, Formal Dialectics, Pragma Dialectics, Informal Logic and Formal Analysis of 
Fallacies. Although this list is not exhaustive, these six approaches roughly represent the current 
state of argumentation theory. Starting in the late seventies, argumentation has become a focus of 
interest from scholars in different fields including communication theorists and philosophers. For 
the sake of brevity, I will explain the three major approaches, Informal logic, pragma dialectic 
and communication and rhetorical approaches as these approaches map into the three 
perspectives noted by Brockriede, the product, procedure and process of arguing.  
 
Informal Logic. Informal logic developed in the 1970’s as an education reform 
movement that stemmed from students’ dissatisfaction with and criticism of the way 
argument/logic was taught, as it did not reflect the way students used reason in their daily lives. 
At that time, textbooks on logic did not provide students with a method to assess or analyze 
everyday arguments; hence, informal logic emerged out of a movement that sought to 
revolutionize the way logic was taught (using Howard Kahane’s book Logic and Contemporary 
Rhetoric (1971)) and recreate the logic course, a course that would be relevant to everyday 
reasoning. Thus, informal logic presents an alternative to the limitation of formal logic. Informal 
logic emerged out of the student revolt of the late 1960s, where students demanded that 
everything in their education be relevant to their everyday lives. 
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Notable scholars who pioneered the informal logic movement include Michael Scriven, 
Michael Gilbert, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Perry Weddle, John Woods, Ralph H. 
Johnson, J. Anthony Blair, Robert C. Pinto, and Douglas Walton. Unlike other theoretical 
approaches to argumentation, such as pragma-dialectics, informal logic was not created by 
speech communication theorists, debate theorists, rhetoricians, or linguists but rather by 
philosophers trained in the analytic tradition (Blair, 2011, p. 1). It should also be noted that the 
term informal logic does not refer to one specific approach; rather, the term encompasses a 
collection of attempts to develop a method of analyzing and evaluating natural language 
arguments that are not based on formal logic (Van Eemeren, Garssen, Krabbe, Henkemans, 
Verheij & Wagemans, 2014, p. 374); that is, the disenchantment with formal logic to provide a 
theory of reasoning applicable to everyday argumentation has resulted in many initiatives to 
develop a theory of identifying, analyzing, and evaluating arguments that do not rely on formal 
logic (p.13). Some of these approaches include the pioneering work of Chaim Perelman and 
Stephen Toulmin, as well as other approaches, such as informal logic and pragma-dialectics.  
Formal logic, although valuable, does not prove useful to everyday argumentation. The 
major critique of formal logic is that it is unable to provide standards of good reasoning in 
relation to everyday argumentation. Also, an additional problem with formal logic is that neither 
the notion of valid form, sound argument, or the criteria for inductive strength captures the form 
of arguments found in the natural language of everyday arguments (Govier, 2014, p. 6). Thus, 
the requirement that arguments must be valid and have true premises is problematic for the 
evaluation of real life arguments, because the truth of premises is often either not known or not a 
clear-cut matter (Van Eemeren, 2014, p. 377); in light of this, informal logic seeks to free 
argument from the notion that it is a proof (p. 377). Informal logic, as noted by Perelman, is “the 
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end of deductivism—the idea that all implications are either deductive or defective” (Van 
Eemeren, 2014, p. 377). The pedagogical goal that led to the development of informal logic later 
transformed into a theoretical matter of interest as to how to teach students to assess and analyze 
everyday arguments. Also, the other goal of informal logic is to “provide a complete theory of 
reasoning that goes beyond formal deductive and inductive logic” (Johnson, 2014, p. 11). The 
main focus of informal logic is arguments in natural language as opposed to the artificial 
language of formal logic (Govier, 2014, p. 6). 
Proponents of informal logic, particularly Johnson and Blair, do not adopt an oral 
paradigm and do not focus on oral arguing. According to Johnson, the primary object for 
argument analysis is written text, because a written argument is more stable and fixed than an 
oral one (Govier, 2014, p. 3).  Further, according to informal logicians, in order to evaluate the 
argument, the premises and conclusion must be identified and missing premises and/or 
conclusions must be formulated (Johnson, 2014, p. 25). In terms of narrative argument, informal 
logicians do not necessarily reject that a narrative can function as an argument, as they claim that 
it has to be reformulated to fit into the structure of a premise and a conclusion. 
In terms of argument evaluation, arguments are tested by their strength using the RSA 
criteria of Relevance, Sufficiency, and Acceptability (Johnson & Blair, 1977, p. 55). The 
relevance criterion examines whether the contents of the premises have a strong relation to the 
conclusion, sufficiency relates to whether the premises, taken together, are sufficient to support 
and give enough evidence to the conclusion, and acceptability requires that the premises are 
acceptable ((Johnson & Blair, 1977, p. 55). Accordingly, the acceptability requirement demands 
that an argument must be acceptable to the arguer, the audience presented with the argument and 
to the larger and critical community where argumentation is taking place (Van Eemeren, 
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Grootendorst, & Henkemans, 1996, p. 179). An argument must satisfy these three criteria, and 
when it fails to satisfy one or more of these requirements, it is then considered fallacious. The 
term fallacy refers to patterns of argumentation that are frequently committed (Johnson & Blair, 
1994, p. 54).  
According to Johnson, argument evaluation has two aspects: 1) the illative core of an 
argument which relates to the structure and relationship between the premise and conclusion 
(RSA); and 2) the dialectical tier which deals with the extent to which an argument deals 
adequately with alternative views and objections (Johnson, 2000, p. 166). In relation to the 
dialectical tier, Blair and Johnson believe that an argument is incomplete if common and known 
objections to the premises or conclusion are not considered. It is the interlocutors who decide 
what needs considering (Govier, 2014, p. 7).  
Blair and Johnson reject the claim of traditional logicians that premises must be true 
because arguments in natural language often fall into a gray area, and their acceptability depends 
on a host of factors; accordingly, there can be good reasons for and good arguments against a 
given thesis (Johnson, 2000, p. 141). Further, as noted by Blair (2011) the informal logic 
approach abandoned the “assumption that the only criterion of logical merit in arguments is 
deductive validity” (p. 9). Thus, informal logicians focus on identifying premises and 
conclusions in order to assess whether an argument satisfies the RSA standards, in turn, premise 
identification and argument reformulation comprise integral parts of what informal logicians do.  
 
Pragma Dialectics. Pragma-Dialectics was initiated at the University of Amsterdam by 
Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst in the 1970’s and continued to develop over the years. 
Pragma dialectics has its roots in linguistics and discourse analysis, particularly the speech act 
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theory of J. L. Austin and John Searle (Johnson, 2000, p. 309). This argumentation approach 
focuses on the actual practices and assertions of arguers and concerns two or more people 
arguing as opposed to the product of arguing. The meaning of the name pragma-dialectics refers 
to the practical role of arguing as suggested by the word (pragmatic) and it is dialectical because 
it is concerned with the dialogical act of arguing, that is with argument as a social activity taking 
place between two or more people. Some of the characteristics of the pragma-dialectic approach 
include an emphasis on the verbal activity of argumentation (Eemeren, Grootendorst, & 
Henkemans, 1996, p. 2). Second, argumentation is seen as a social activity where two or more 
individuals who have a difference of opinion try to arrive at an agreement (Eemeren et al., 1996, 
p. 277). Third, argumentation is an activity of reason where arguers give rational accounts of 
their positions (Eemeren et al., 1996, p.  2). And fourth, argumentation is an activity in which 
arguers intend to justify their standpoints and resolve disagreements (Eemeren et al., 1996, p.  4). 
Hence, the pragma-dialectical approach is indeed a process account of arguing because it 
is dialogical, oral and social. The critical discussion developed by the pragma-dialectical 
approach is a constrained and bounded style of arguing because it has very well delineated 
parameters of how arguing should take place. And so while the pragma-dialectical approach is a 
process account of argument since a critical discussion is procedural, it still retains a formalism 
as it focuses on formalized rules and structure (as with a critical discussion) which can be rigid 
and exclusive of alternative models of arguing. The pragma-dialectical approach treats 
argumentation as a rational means of resolving a difference of opinion through a critical 
discussion. A critical discussion aimed at resolving difference of opinion goes through four 
stages.  In the confrontation stage, the arguers establish that they have a difference of opinion 
and verbalize their disagreement; the second stage the opening stage is where participants decide 
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to resolve their difference of opinion and begin assigning roles of protagonist and antagonist and 
agree on the starting points and on the rules of discussion (Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans, 
2002, p. 25). In the third stage, the argumentation stage, arguers put forward their arguments and 
defend their positions, answer objections and criticize the interlocutor. In the final stage, the 
concluding stage, the participants assess whether and how the difference of opinion has been 
resolved and in whose favor (Eemeren et al., 2002, p. 25). There are ten rules that discussants 
must follow for a critical discussion to be successful. When the rules are violated, this results in a 
fallacy. The pragma dialectics define fallacy as violation of the rules of the critical discussion 
that hinder the resolution of a difference of opinion (Eemeren et al., 2002, p. 109). 
Both the pragma dialectic and informal logic approaches see argumentation as serving the 
goal of rationality, hence ignoring the multiplicity and richness of argument goals that do not 
focus on truth or rationality. Further, both approaches retain the traditional idea that an argument 
has to have the premise-conclusion structure, and both approaches discuss the role of fallacies in 
the evaluation of arguments (Johnson, 2000, p. 319). The problem with both the informal logic 
and Pragma-dialectic approach is that argument is being forced into a rigid and formulated 
understanding, either into a critical discussion or products; neither of these two accounts are 
comprehensive nor do they allow room for alternative modes of arguing that are neither verbal or 
discursive. For example, pragma dialectics’ commitment to the verbalization of arguments states 
that only arguments that are verbally and explicitly stated count as arguments, while visual or 
emotional arguments are discredited. As stated by the pragma-dialectic philosophers 
commitment to externalization, “the study of argumentation should not concentrate on the 
psychological dispositions of the people involved in an argumentation, but on their externalized-
or externalizable-commitments” (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans, 1996, p. 277). 
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Further, traditional argumentation such as informal logic and pragma-dialectics both ignore 
contextual features of argument that cannot be reconstructed. In this frame, contextual, relational, 
personal and social factors are ignored.  As pragma-dialectic philosophers put it: “That is not to 
say that emotions cannot play a part in adopting a position, but that these internal motives, which 
have been assimilated in the discourse, are not directly relevant as such” (Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, Henkemans, 1996, p. 2).  
 
Rhetoric And Communication Studies. Rhetoric and communication studies of 
argumentation also offered critiques of formal logic. Communication and rhetoric theorists also 
criticized the rigidity and limits of formal logic in studying and analyzing everyday arguments. 
Rhetoric and communication studies developed in the early twentieth century as a result of a 
growing interest in the practical skills of debating and public speaking. Much like the informal 
logic movement, communication studies and rhetoric was also first developed with a pedagogical 
concern for finding better ways to teach practical skills in debating and public speaking (Van 
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans, 2014, p. 426). The American tradition of communication 
studies and rhetoric encompasses different types of approaches to the study of argumentation, 
including rhetorical theorists, conversational analysts, negotiation facilitators, debaters, and 
interpersonal communication theorists (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans, 1996, p. 190). 
Communication theory of argumentation can be characterized by an emphasis on the 
descriptive rather than on the normative aspect of argumentation (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 
Henkemans, 1996, p. 197).  Charles Willard’s (1989) work pursues a focus on the descriptive 
side of argumentation. Instead of focusing on an ideal of argumentation, he argues, 
communication theorists sought to study argumentation as it is. Communication and rhetoric 
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theorists also focus on everyday interaction among ordinary people (p. 197). That is, a sub area 
of communication theory, discourse analysis looks at actual conversations and analyzes the rules 
and procedures followed by participants (Jackson and Jacobs) (Gilbert, 1997, p. 23). Further, 
there was an emphasis on studying argumentation empirically. For instance, Jacobs and Jackson 
analyze naturally occurring arguments using data analysis by examining “concrete instances of 
argument as they occur in everyday conversation” (Jacobs & Jackson, 1981, p. 118).  
Willard, along with other communication and rhetorical theorists, provide a much 
broader conception of argument than informal logic. There are two features of argument that are 
important for Willard: argument as a type of communication/interaction and argument as 
emergent. Much like an interaction, arguments are emergent because they are not static and they 
develop and evolve over time. Willard developed a constructivist/interactionist approach to 
argumentation which is the view that argument and meaning is constructed through the process, 
relationship and interaction of arguers. Further, a constructivist/interactionist account of 
argumentation is the view that argumentation is best understood in terms of a communication 
theory that combines “cognitive processes (interpretation and inference), social processes 
(interactions and communal practices), and the similarities, differences, and relationships among 
communication practices (messages production and audience adaptation)” (Willard, 1989, p. 15). 
According to Willard, communication theory, rather than logic, provides the best foundation for 
a theory of argumentation (Willard, 1989, p. 12). It must be noted that Willard’s position is 
considered on the radical side because most argumentation theorists have a more rigid and less 
flexible view of argument. 
This view of argument as interactive and emergent (Willard’s view) challenged the overt 
reasons view of argument (Johnson, 2000, p. 322). Willard’s theory of argumentation is a 
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rejection of the priority of both discursiveness and formal structures of argumentation. In 
rejecting these formal structures, Willard rejects a product account of argument because 
arguments are not found only in “implicatures among statements” (Willard, 1989, p. 8) but in 
encounters between people. He therefore has a broader conception of arguing which includes 
verbal, non-verbal, implicit, explicit, discursive and non-discursive modes of arguing. 
Accordingly, anything can become an argument if it is used as such in the context of dissensus 
(Willard, 1989, p. 8).  
Brockriede’s (1972) work also falls into the rhetoric and communication approach. 
Brockriede argues that the nature and relationship of people who argue is an essential variable in 
understanding and evaluating the processes and outcomes of an argument (1972, p.1). This is 
different than the logical position (and also the product account) because the arguer is recognized 
as having an important role in the argument.  And so,  
the coarguer response may be influenced by who he is, who the arguer is, and what their 
relationship is. Perhaps as good a way as any to distinguish the study of logic from the 
study of argument is to understand that logicians can safely ignore the influence of people 
on the transaction; arguers cannot. (1972, p.1)  
This detached position still resonates today where for the most part argumentation scholars 
ignore the arguer (except for Willard’s and Gilbert’s account) and the argument is understood 
and assessed without considering who the arguer is and how they relate to one another. The role 
of arguers and their relationships to each other still does not receive the attention it deserves. 
Brockriede distinguishes between types of relationships arguers enter, one of which is 
unilateral and is characterized as rape where arguers coerce each other into assent and treat each 
other as objects and inferior human beings.  This relationship is also adversarial in nature. 
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Another type of relationship is that of the seducer where an arguer may coerce someone by 
charm and deceit (p. 4). And the third type of relationship is characterized by love and it is the 
one that Brockriede endorses. Lovers are distinguished from the rapists and seducers (in 
argument) in three important ways: 
1. Arguers as lovers see the relationship of arguing as equal and as such, “Lovers also 
differ radically from rapists and seducers in their intentions. Whereas the rapist and 
seducer seek to establish a position of superior power, the lover wants power parity” 
(p.5). 
2. Arguers as lovers do not rely on the adversary method and do not argue against an 
opponent, instead, they argue with their peers.  
3. The arguer as lover “is willing to risk his very self in his attempt to establish a bilateral 
relationship...the lover-arguer cares enough about what he is arguing about to feel the 
tensions of risking himself, but he cares enough about his co arguers to avoid the 
fanaticism that might induce him to commit rape or seduction” (p.5). 
4. While the rapist and seducer treats other arguers as an object or as a victim, “the lover 
looks at the other person as a person” (p.5). 
Arguing as lovers, Brockriede asserts, fulfills an important “function as important as any 
intellectual creation of the "truth" of a situation, and that is the personal function of influencing 
the fulfillment and growth of the selves of the people in the transaction” (Brockriede, 1972, p. 9). 
Brockriede’s work is important because it puts emphasis on the fluidity and process of arguing. 
In “Where is argument” Brockriede (1992) highlights some of the important features of 
argumentation: 1. Arguments are not in statements, but are to be found in the vicinity of people 
(1992, p. 72), 2. An argument is not an argument until someone “perceives what is happening as 
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an argument” (1992, p. 72), 3. Since arguing is a human activity imbued with complexity and 
richness, the concept of argument, as such, is an open concept.  
Further, Tindale and Gilbert also adhere to the communication/rhetoric approach. 
Gilbert’s Coalescent Argumentation provides one of the earliest accounts of multimodal 
argumentation, and he is one of the few argumentation scholars who develops an inclusive 
account of argumentation (as will be explained below). Gilbert’s work is important because it 
respects and defends the legitimacy of the different types of arguers (modes of arguing) and 
acknowledges and incorporates the multiplicity of goals in arguing. 
The definitions of argument and the methodology and procedure of argumentation varies 
from one approach to another.  The traditional methodology of argumentation sees that an 
argument is based on deductive logic. The common understanding of argument among scholars 
is that an argument has to be explicit, linear, with premises and a conclusion. Recently the 
boundaries of what constitutes an argument have been broadened, and more attention has been 
paid to the role of interpersonal argumentation and context as evident by Michael A. Gilbert’s 
work in Coalescent Argumentation. As noted by Wayne Brockriede in 1992 there was no 
concept of an argument viewed as an interpersonal interactive process (Brockriede, 1992, p. 37). 
This has changed and the definition and the recent amalgamation of argumentation scholars have 
broadened this conception of argument.  The domain of argumentation is continually being 
pushed, remodeled, and hopefully improved. 
As such, there are four major developments in the study of argumentation since the 
1950’s: 1. A widening interest in the study of argumentation across a wide range of disciplines; 
2. A growing acceptance of diverse methods for studying and analyzing argument; 3. An 
expansion of the concept of argument beyond the public sphere and an acceptance of 
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interpersonal argumentation and of the interpersonal and contextual elements in argumentation; 
4. Dissatisfaction with formal logic for studying argument and a search for alternative ways of 
examining arguments. In my dissertation, I will continue this line of criticism of what constitutes 
an argument by broadening the conception of argument to include narrative. My critique of the 
traditional and predominate style of argumentation will rely on the existing feminist critique of 
argumentation which will be discussed in the next chapter. Below I will explain the recent 
interest in narrative argumentation. 
 
Narrative Argumentation 
In the 1970s more and more scholars started using narratological methods in their research. By 
the end of the 1980s narratology became integrated and studied everywhere (Czarniawska, 2013, 
p.58). Narrative theory is an interdisciplinary field and has been studied from the perspective of  
literary theory, cultural theory, education and psychology. “Within these domains, narratives are 
discussed as a way of making sense of life, a phenomenon, a method and a result (product) of 
this method (e.g. Carr 1991, Carter 1993, Ricoeur 1984, Taylor 2000).” (Kverndokk, 2003, p.1). 
The narrative turn in the humanities and social science was legitimated by the recognition that 
narrative is a legitimate form of knowledge (Czarniawska, 2013, p. 58). The attention to 
narrative by researchers and scholars in the social sciences was prompted by four turns in the 
social sciences that include “attention to relationships among participants, the move to words as 
data, the focus on the particular, and the recognition of blurred genres of knowing” (Pinnegar 
and Daynes, 2007, p.3). 
As the result of this narrative turn, narrative was investigated as a mode of knowledge, 
i.e., ‘narrative knowing’ as defended by Polkinghorne (1988) and Bruner (1987), who argue for 
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the two ways of knowing in the human sciences, the narrative type of knowing and the 
traditional positivistic, scientific-logical mode (or ‘paradigmatic knowing’) (Pinnegar and 
Daynes, p. 6). The realist perspective of knowledge in the social sciences treats social facts as 
things. Prior to the narrative turn, the object of study in the social sciences, such as human 
relationships, interactions, dispositions and culture, were treated as though they were physical 
things (Pinnegar and Daynes, p. 9). That is, the researcher/social scientist stood apart from the 
subjects and it was assumed that research was a neutral activity. The realist conception of 
knowledge is founded on the assumption that what we study has an “independent, object like 
experience with no intrinsic meaning” (Pinnegar and Daynes, p. 29). The logical scientific mode 
focuses on how to find the truth (attainment of truth) and searches for universal truth conditions, 
whereas the narrative mode seeks particular conditions and focuses on the broader question of 
the meaning of experience (Lyons, 2007, p. 614). And so, the fundamental difference between 
the narrative turn and scientific objectivity is that the narrative turn is characterized by an 
understanding that knowing other people and their interactions is a relational process (Pinnegar 
and Daynes, 2007, p. 29). 
Narrative inquiry is the celebration and recognition of the interactive and contextual 
quality of knowing. The narrative turn in the human sciences is characterized by a change from 
the general and universal to the particular, specific, local and personal (Lyons, 2007, p. 7). With 
regards to epistemological concerns, the narrative turn in research is a move away from the 
objective, realist and positivist accounts of knowledge towards knowledge grounded in 
interpretation and understanding of meaning (Lyons, p. 9). 
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Recent Development Of Narrative Arguments 
Narrative arguments is a largely unexplored area that in recent years has received more attention 
from argumentation scholars. The idea of narrative argument is controversial and has only 
recently garnered interest. Some of the issues being explored in recent years include the  
characteristics, structure and assessment of narrative arguments (Olmos, 2017, p. 1). The 
literature on narrative arguments is a diverse and focuses on types of narrative arguments, 
particularly novels and parables. Currently, there is no general theory of narrative arguments, 
only an exploration of types of narrative arguments. Some scholars focus on narrative arguments 
as presented in parables, while others explore the argumentative merit of novels. My focus will 
be on neither of those types of narrative arguments, but rather on how narrative is used in oral, 
interpersonal settings, and as such, mine is more of a general account of narrative as a mode of 
arguing. It does not fixate on particular types of narrative argument but instead treats all narrative 
arguments as story-telling processes with more or less persuasive force. 
Argumentation scholars who have extensively researched the topic of narrative and 
arguments include Paula Olmos (2014, 2015, 2016) and Gilbert Plumer (2015, 2017). Olmos has 
researched the characteristics and assessment of types of narratives such as fables as well as the 
importance of narratives in or as practical arguments in the realm of public discourse. Olmos has 
also discussed the similarity and relationship between thought experiments (in both philosophy 
and science) and classical fables. On the other hand, Plumer focuses on novels as arguments and 
looks at how we can analyze the argumentative character of novels. Plumer argues that novels 
exhibit the structure of transcendental arguments as opposed to analogical arguments. An 
analogical argument, usually an inductive argument, uses accepted similarities between two 
things to draw a conclusion that some further similarity exists. As explained by Plumer (2015), 
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the structure of an analogical argument is usually as follows: “X and Y have certain properties in 
common, X has some further property, so Y has the further property as well” (p. 494). Further, 
Plumer’s argument includes the clarification that the arguments of a novel cannot be overt 
arguments (argument explicitly stated and having the form of premises and conclusion). This is 
also true of my account of narrative arguments in interpersonal interactions. That is, narrative 
arguments on my view do not follow the traditional logical model of premises followed by a 
conclusion, and the arguments they exhibit are indirect. As noted by Plumer, there is unanimity 
about the indirectness of narrative in exhibiting the argument (2017, p. 66). 
In recent years more scholars have started to pay attention to the important role of 
narrative in argumentation, including Christopher Tindale, Trudy Govier, Tone Kvernbekk. 
Ayer (2010) identifies two distinct senses that a narrative argument might have, (1) a story that 
offers an argument and (2) a distinctive argument form or structure. In regards to the second 
distinction, it is rare for scholars to identify a distinctive narrative form. This is because most 
scholars interested in narrative arguments, such as Olmos (2014), Govier and Ayer (2012), 
Walton (2012) and Lester H. Hunt (2009), hold that narrative arguments have the structure of 
analogical arguments, in which similarities are used to infer a certain conclusion. Others such as 
Plumer argue that narrative arguments (particularly novels) exhibit the structure of a kind of a 
transcendental argument. Transcendental arguments, as explained by Mark Sacks (2005), start 
from 
… premisses that are so rudimentary and indisputable that the interlocutor, and 
specifically the sceptic, cannot fail to accept them, then by a series of valid moves they 
yield a conclusion that is precisely of the sort that the sceptic did question. Thus the 
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sceptic must concede that the sceptical possibility turns out to be incompatible with other 
commitments that the sceptic cannot but hold. (pp.439-440) 
As for my dissertation, because I argue that narrative arguments are not based on the traditional 
model and are not linear, direct or explicit, and as such do exhibit a unique argumentative form 
(which is that of story), I reject the claim that narratives can be collapsed into existing modes of 
argumentation. Rather, I hold that narrative argument is a unique and irreducible form of 
argument, which is inherently different from other modes of argument (e.g., analogical, 
transcendental). Govier and Ayer (2012) argue that if a narrative is to function as argument, of 
course after being reduced to premise and conclusion, then it would function as an argument 
from analogy. That is, they argue that parables exhibit the structure of argument from analogy 
which is the view also taken by Hunt (2009) and Douglas Walton (2012). Olmos notes that some 
of the widely acknowledged argument types where narrative is involved include “arguments 
from example”, “argument from analogy” and “practical reasoning from analogy” as shown by 
Douglas Walton 2008 (2017, p. 189). And so most of the literature on narrative arguments has 
focused on the similarities between narrative reasoning and analogical arguments, although not 
always using the same concept of analogy (Olmos, 2014, 190). For example, Floris Bex and 
Tevor Bench Capon’s (2017 and 2014) rely on previous work by Walton (2012) and Govier and 
Ayers (2012) to show that stories function as arguments based on relations of similarity and 
analogical reasoning. In their work, Bex and Bench Capon (2017 and 2014) also attempt to 
computationally model the connection between stories and argumentation in analogical 
reasoning. And so Bex and Bench Capon present a formal, computational framework for 
modelling stories that is based on analogical reasoning (2017, p. 40). And so narrative arguments 
have been explored in both informal and formal models of argumentation and reasoning. 
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While scholars have noted that the analogical view is helpful in understanding how 
narratives may be argumentative, other approaches see narratives as exhibiting the structure of 
suppositional argument, and understanding them as exhibiting the structure of a kind of 
transcendental argument (an account that Plumer develops 2015 and 2016). Plumer offers a 
model of “transcendental argument” as a way of making sense of how novels as arguments can 
yield epistemic results (Olmos, p.3). Other scholars interested in narrative argumentation address 
the epistemological role of narrative fiction (Mitchell Green, 2017), and the cognitive processing 
of parabolic stories (Eduardo De Bustos, 2017). That is, Green in “Narrative Fiction as a source 
of Knowledge” (2017) gives an epistemological analysis of literary fiction that relies on literary 
cognitivism. 
As such, there has been some exploration of narrative-based argument schemes as well as 
an examination of narrative itself as argument, which is the more controversial claim and one 
that I take up in my dissertation. There are two main approaches taken in relation to narrative 
arguments. One approach argues that the definition of argument should be broadened to include 
narrative, as argued by argumentation scholar Christopher Tindale (2017). Tindale argues for the 
broadening of the concept of argument to accommodate different ways of arguing and giving 
reasons. Another approach argues that narrative argument should be modified, and reduced into 
argumentative parts, to fit the traditional account of argument which fits narratives into 
analogical based argument schemes. Fitting narrative into an argument scheme requires that the 
narrative be reconstructed. This approach suggests that current argumentation theory can 
accommodate narrative arguments without modifying or broadening the concept of argument as 
defended by Tindale, and myself in my dissertation. While this approach is a valuable tool and 
an important exploration, it is not an approach I favor for my account of narrative arguments 
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because it requires the reconstruction of narrative. My dissertation argues, with Tindale, that the 
concept of argument should be redefined to include narrative along with other different ways of 
giving reasons. I show that narrative arguments are distinct, and challenge the classic, linear, and 
reductive mode of argumentation.  
 
Rejecting Narrative As Arguments. Other scholars who have explored the possibility of 
narrative arguments either reject narrative arguments altogether or propose strict requirements 
for narratives to function as arguments. For example, Tone Kvernbekk (2003) argues that a 
narrative cannot function as an argument because a narrative does not have the required premise-
conclusion relation, which, according to Kvernbekk is the core issue for deciding whether a 
narrative can be considered an argument or not (2003, p.1). Kvernbekk also rejects narratives as 
arguments because she argues that in a narrative the conclusion is known beforehand whereas the 
role of an argument is to take an audience to a conclusion that is not yet known (Tindale, 2017, 
p. 13). According to Kvernbekk, since the role of arguments is to justify the conclusion, 
narratives cannot function as arguments because no justification takes place, as the narrator 
already knows the conclusion. Kvernbekk argues that when a narrator tells a story, he/she 
already knows the end result, conclusion and/or the event which the story is supposed to lead up 
to (Tindale, p.6). However, as Tindale points out, even if the narrator knows the end and the 
conclusion, the audience does not. And “even if the outcome is available to the audience, present 
in their cognitive environment, it may not have been activated for them” (Tindale, 2017, p.13). 
And so the narrative would prompt and encourage the activation of the outcome of the story or 
the argument that is intended. The conclusion makes the information given in the story present or 
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intelligible in a way that the audience did not recognize before, and allows them to understand 
differently what they already know. 
 
Issues With Narrative Arguments. Further, Trudy Govier and Lowell Ayer (2012) also 
problematize the argumentative role of parables as arguments. They do not dismiss that parables 
can function as arguments but they are concerned with whether parables can provide good 
reasons for what they argue. And so the approach taken by Govier and Ayer is one where, from 
the narrative, the premises and conclusion are extracted and made to fit into a traditional form of 
argument (p.3). After the argument is broken down into premises and conclusion, it is then 
analyzed for cogency. Govier and Ayer conclude that:  
Our work here shows that for many parables it does make sense to extract a message and 
reasons for it. With some twisting and bending, we can construct an argument in 
standardized form. When we have an argument in that form, we can evaluate it. (2012, 
p.25). 
According to Govier and Ayer, the logical core of an argument is comprised of its “premises 
(explicit and implicit), indicators of its line of reasoning, and its conclusion or conclusions” (p. 
6). Other important features of an argument such as emotional indicators, counter considerations, 
jokes or illustrative anecdotes are not considered as part of the core of an argument. The 
problem, as I show in later chapters, is that the whole argumentative context is part of the point 
and message of the story. The point of the story and its argumentative import is grounded in the 
context in which it arises. Deconstructing, bending and twisting the narrative into standardized 
argument form risks misrepresenting the argumentative import and meaning of the story. Tindale 
makes a similar point in response to Govier’s and Ayer’s approach. Tindale points out that 
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Govier’s and Ayer’s approach, and the forceful conversion of narratives to premises and 
conclusion, imposes strict requirements on narrative arguments. As Tindale writes: 
what this illustrates is the problem familiar to proponents of visual arguments: the 
tendency, insistence even, to require that if something is to count as an argument it must 
be possible to frame it in, or “reduce’ it to, propositions. And those propositions can then 
be tested for logical cogency in terms of their internal relations. If we are to resist this 
tendency, we need to widen our understanding of argument, claiming for narratives what 
has been claimed for visuals. (2017, p.14) 
Other concerns that Govier and Ayer have with the idea of narrative argument include the 
question of how can narratives can be epistemic when they, sometimes, are fictive. Specifically, 
they are concerned that narrative arguments cannot be checked or evaluated for truth, or with 
criteria of rational acceptability. With traditional arguments, the arguments are evaluated by 
analyzing whether the premises are true or rationally acceptable, but since some narratives are 
fictive, this criterion does not seem appropriate. In my dissertation, I argue that the traditional 
and dominant models of argument evaluation are not favourable or useful for narrative 
arguments as I understand them, because they rely on an exclusionary and rigid type of 
evaluation that embodies a one-size-fits-all approach, namely, an approach that evaluates 
arguments by criteria of truth and rationality. The account of narrative assessment that I develop 
is rhetorical and does not rely on truth or rationality, but rather, on exchanging arguments 
through a virtuous process. This account respects the fluidity and context-sensitivity of real-life 
arguments. 
Further, Govier and Ayer conclude that narratives rarely present arguments, which is 
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problematic as it relies on a limited perception of good reasons, based on cogency. However, as I 
show in my dissertation, the quality of an argument is not just about cogency; there are many 
accounts of argument goodness that do not necessarily rely on cogency. Govier and Ayer focus 
on and subject narrative arguments to a narrow conception of good reasons, that of validity and 
traditional rationality. This excludes too many persuasive narratives from the scope of good 
arguments. 
However, it is worth noting that the rationality of narrative arguments is more compatible 
with what Walter Fisher calls a narrative rationality, a distinctive type of rationality that is 
different from traditional logical rationality. Fisher’s Human Communication as Narration 
(1987) provides a pioneering work on the topic of narrative and communication. Fisher offers an 
account of good reasons that is based on narrative perspective, i.e., the narrative rationality. 
 
Walter Fisher And Narrative Rationality. In his article “Narration As A Human 
Communication Paradigm: The Case Of Public Moral Argument,” Fisher (1984) argues for the 
benefits of the narrative paradigm in contrast to the rational paradigm. By narration, Fisher 
means a theory of symbolic actions; words and actions that have consequences and meaning for 
those who live, create and interpret those narratives (p. 2). Fisher argues that the meaning and 
significance of life in all of its dimensions requires the recognition of its narrative structure (p. 
3). Fisher further claims that any ethical question, whether social, political or legal, requires 
narrative (p. 3). The narrative paradigm espouses the idea that human beings are storytellers and 
that their essential and most basic mode of communication takes the form of stories, and that 
“one’s life is, as suggested by Burke, a story that participates in the stories of those who have 
lived, who live now, and who will live in the future” (Fisher, p. 6). 
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The narrative paradigm challenges the idea that for communication to be rhetorical it has 
to be in an argumentative form of inference/premise and conclusion and that the mode of 
evaluating rhetorical communication has to be that provided by a rational standard of informal or 
formal logic (Fisher, p.2). According to the rational paradigm the primary mode of human 
communication is arguments with clear-cut inferential structures. However, the narrative 
paradigm does not reject the rational point of view; it just makes it more amenable to other forms 
of human communication and modes of reasoning. And so Fisher’s narrative paradigm “affirms 
that narration as individuated form and as genre--like other individuated forms (such as 
argument) and genre (such as argumentation)--are expressive of good reasons, if viewed 
rhetorically” (1989, p.56). Fisher’s narrative paradigm focuses on good reasons, which he argues 
can be expressed in variety of forms, whether in stories, visuals, or what have you, which 
Govier and Ayer delegate as non-core features of an argument. Akin to Willard, Fisher similarly 
argues that reasoning is to be found in all sorts of symbolic action, in both nondiscursive as well 
discursive (1984, p.1). 
 
Conclusion 
Argumentation theory is already on the path to accepting that arguments do not happen in a 
vacuum, and that arguing is not based just on abstract, linear and structured thought, rather that 
argumentation can include emotion, intuition and physicality, and that those are a crucial aspect 
of our human endeavor and the way that we communicate and interact with one another (Gilbert, 
1997, p. 26). And more importantly, those human and contextual elements are not in opposition 
to reason or rationality; i.e., we can reason emotionally and narratively (Gilbert, 1997, p. 26).  
However, more work is needed in argumentation theory to not only broaden the conception of an 
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argument, to include narrative but also to challenge the whole notion of rational argumentation. 
That is, narrative arguments challenge the idea of rationality as that which is exclusively abstract,  
linear and devoid of emotions or context. As such, in this project I will build on the already 
existing critique of traditional argumentation by adding narrative as a further excluded mode of 
arguing.
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Chapter Two: Feminist Critiques Of Traditional Argumentation 
 
Introduction 
There are many ways that feminists have reacted against the existing styles or practices of 
argumentation. Feminist critiques of argumentation range from critiques about the method of 
arguing (i.e., the adversarial model), the conceptualization of reason, and the exclusionary 
definitions of arguments, to questions about gender differences. In this part of my dissertation I 
will elaborate on feminist critiques of argumentation and contextualize the importance of 
narrative argument in this literature.   
 
Adversariality Of Argumentation 
Many feminist theorists of argumentation criticize the adversariality that is embedded in classical 
approaches to argumentation. This feminist critique focuses on the surrounding context and the 
practice of argument, which is often infused with aggression and hostility that puts women at a 
disadvantage, who, due to socialization, tend to use politer forms of argumentation. Feminists 
such as Janice Moulton (1983) argue that traditional argumentative styles are rooted in the 
“adversary method” which accepts aggressive behaviour as a model of philosophical reasoning. 
Moulton critiques this adversary method because, according to this philosophical methodology, 
aggression takes on positive connotations when it is connected to males or professional workers. 
Aggression is then connected to more positive concepts such as power, authority, competence, 
etc. The conflation of aggression with positive concepts has made it hard to see that polite and 
non-abrupt speech can be just as effective and persuasive (p. 150). Under this paradigm, arguers 
find themselves disagreeing with everything, rather than agreeing on common assumptions and 
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working from there (p. 154). Further, Moulton criticizes the adversarial paradigm of philosophy 
in which the aim of all philosophical research is to find counterexamples (p.153). The aim of the 
adversary method is to show that people are wrong rather than focusing on persuading others to 
shake their cherished beliefs, which was the aim of the Socratic method. The adversarial method 
restricts philosophical issues because it affects the kinds of questions asked and determines the 
answers thought to be acceptable (p. 157). This paradigm allows for the development of rude and 
hostile styles of argumentation where the focus of an argument is on winning rather than 
encouraging the development of good ideas. A major drawback to the adversary method, 
Moulton asserts, is that it  
accepts only the kind of reasoning whose goal is to convince an opponent, and ignores 
reasoning that might be used in other circumstances: To figure something out for oneself, 
to discuss something with likeminded thinkers, to convince the indifferent or the 
uncommitted. (p. 159)  
That is, the adversary method ignores the multiplicity of goals that argument and arguing has for 
people. Further, the adversary method limits and misrepresents what philosophical reasoning is 
(p. 153). Non-adversarial modes of reasoning then become dismissed as non-legitimate modes of 
arguing. 
The adversariality embedded in argumentation has led some, such as Sally Gearhart (1979), to 
argue that all acts of persuasion are an act of violation and that argumentation is an unjust, patriarchal 
attempt to dominate others. While this is a radical position not endorsed by many scholars, nonetheless, 
many assert that adversariality is indeed present in argumentation that functions to silence and dismiss 
those uncomfortable with this method.  
This problem of adversariality and the culture of philosophy is related to the question of 
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the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. It is a well-recognized problem that women are 
underrepresented in philosophy and that women either do not continue to graduate studies or that 
they do not rise to the upper echelons of the profession. Since women in other fields similar to 
philosophy such as history and sociology, who had similar starting points as philosophers, have 
dramatically improved their gender profile over the last 30 years, it is crucial to consider the 
ways in which philosophy’s methodology contributes to the under-representation and 
mistreatment of women (Jenkins &Hutchison, p. 7).  In fact, some feminists claim that it is the 
adversary method that is the cause of the misrepresentation of women in philosophy.  Marilyn 
Friedman (2013), for example, argues that it is the culture and practice of philosophy, rooted in 
adversariality, that is the real cause of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. 
Friedman argues that there are features of philosophy that devalue women and make it difficult 
for women to engage in philosophy. She writes,  
The likeliest aspects of philosophy that might deter or alienate women are (1) the 
contents of philosophy, its distinctive questions, issues, and ideas; (2) the methods, 
broadly construed, that are used in philosophy to deal with that content; and (3) the way 
in which philosophy is taught and communicated. (Friedman, p. 25) 
Such features include the conception of reason and the characterization of females in relation to 
the faculty of reason and rationality (a point made also made by Llyod and Rooney). Other 
features include the way philosophy is taught and communicated, namely the culture of 
philosophy as adversarial. That is, the practice of argumentation is marginalizing women. 
 In their introduction to Women In Philosophy: What needs to Change? editors Fiona Jenkins and 
Katrina Hutchison note that it is only recently that women have appeared as equal in a field whose main 
attribute, the activity of reason, has been conceived in opposition to women (2013, p.  2). This is a point 
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famously made by Genevieve Lloyd (1984). The emergence of women in the field of philosophy, for 
many, is not long lived.  And often women speak negatively of their experience with philosophy as a 
discipline and as a system which has always consigned women to the realm of unreasonable/irrational.  
  Further, some scholars, such as Jennifer Saul and Helen Beebe, looked to psychology for 
an explanation of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. Jennifer Saul argues that 
women’s progress in philosophy is impeded by the presence of two well-documented 
psychological phenomena, implicit bias and stereotype threat (Saul, 2013, p. 39). Implicit bias 
refers to unconscious attitudes and assumptions one has that impact how we act and perceive and 
evaluate others. Stereotype threat refers to the phenomena whereby individuals from negatively 
stereotyped groups underperform in a task when they encounter reminders of their stereotyped 
attributes. So as a result of being anxious about confirming the stereotype, they underperform, 
and hence it is much like a self-fulfilling prophecy where the reminders of the stereotype and 
fear of conforming to it leads them to actually underperform. The notion of stereotype threat was 
first introduced by Steele and Aronson (1995), who conducted several experiments which 
showed that black college freshmen under 
performed poorly on standardized tests when their race was emphasized. Steele and Aronson 
explain this in their own words as such:  
the existence of a negative stereotype about a group to which one belongs, we have 
argued, means that in situations where the stereotype is applicable, one is at risk of 
confirming it as a self-characterization, both to one’s self and to others who know the 
stereotype. (Steele and Aronson,1995, p. 808)  
As Saul explains stereotype threat, “is a very different sort of phenomenon. Rather than affecting 
the way that members of a stigmatised group are perceived or evaluated, stereotype threat affects 
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the way that members of that group actually perform” (Saul, 2013, p. 41).  For example, the 
stereotype that girls are bad at math leads girls to underperform in math whenever they encounter 
reminders of the stereotype (Jenkins & Hutchison, 2013, p. 12).  
Saul (2013) argues that philosophers are not immune to biases and that research shows 
that even those who explicitly express and sincerely hold egalitarian views still display implicit 
bias. Hence, this implicit bias leads to more negative evaluations of women’s abilities, which is 
especially heightened in a field such as philosophy, which is stereotyped as male only (p. 44). As 
pointed out by Saul, 
We really should not be surprised that women continue to be underrepresented in 
philosophy. Until very recently, women had very little real chance to engage in 
philosophy. That legacy of exclusion—combined with a cultural view of women as 
creatures of emotion rather than reason—helped to generate stereotypes that make it far 
more difficult for women to succeed in philosophy. (2013, p. 56)  
This legacy of exclusion continues in argumentation, where women are silenced in many ways, 
including through stereotype threat and implicit bias.  
Helen Beebe (2013) argues that since aggressive behavior is culturally deemed 
masculine, the adversariality of argumentation results in stereotype threat for women (p. 64). 
That is, Beebe argues, “Add in a dose of aggressive—and thus stereotypically male—behavior 
(remember, it doesn’t matter whether or not the stereotype is true), and you make the situation 
worse for the women in the room by drawing attention to their gender, thereby increasing the 
threat” (Beebee, 2013, p. 73). The reason why a combative style of argumentation alienates 
women, regardless of whether there are gender differences or not, is due to the cultural 
understanding of males and females and the association of aggressive behavior with masculinity 
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and politeness with femininity. An aggressive environment triggers stereotype threat for women 
due to the fear of not being good at argumentation and the stereotype that argumentation is a 
masculine endeavor, which results in underperformance and the silencing of women.  The 
adversariality of argumentation poses a stereotype threat for women because in the context of 
argumentation, women belong to a negatively stereotyped group which is perceived as being 
poor at arguing, less rational, and too emotional. Adversariality also triggers stereotype threat 
because women experience anxiety and fear of having to conform to stereotypes about women 
being irrational, emotional and unreasonable in their style of argumentation. Adversariality of 
argumentation is a stereotype threat-provoking situation for women. Further, encouraging 
aggression in argumentation promotes masculine values while denigrating women, and the 
acceptance of this model for argumentation in philosophy triggers stereotype threat. That is, 
aggression silences women through discouraging politer forms of argumentation and promoting 
values associated with maleness. 
As pointed out by Jenkins and Hutchison, “issues of gender representation are not 
unrelated to the frequently narrow and conservative conceptions of the discipline that are 
dominant in many departments of philosophy, as well as the wider society” (2013, p. 14). This 
narrow conception of philosophy also coincides with a narrow conception argumentation, 
reasoning and rationality (as will be shown later in this chapter). Hence, it is important to 
consider what kinds of modes of reasoning are legitimated and fostered by philosophy as a 
discipline and how these impact and shape the dominant discourses of exclusion and dismissal. 
This is precisely the point that feminist critiques of argumentation engage with and make, i.e., 
that there is indeed something problematic with the way argumentation and philosophy at large 
conceptualizes reasoning, what it means to argue and be a rational person. Feminist critiques of 
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argumentation have overwhelmingly argued that philosophy’s model of argumentation has 
negatively impacted women. That is, our conception of knowledge and reason contains implicit 
biases that favor masculine modes of reasoning and stereotypical images and metaphors of what 
a philosopher is.  
This adversarial method has led philosophers to ignore ways in which one may argue 
without being hostile. As such, arguments that are passive and indirect are not considered 
arguments due to the dominance of the adversarial method. The problem with this method is that 
those who are not comfortable with it are shunned from argumentation. Other forms of 
argumentation that are less assertive are also not deemed credible or legitimate forms of 
arguments. And so, the problem is with how argumentation is defined and conceptualized as 
adversarial, assertive, explicit and linear. The adversariality of argumentation limits what is and 
is not credible and stipulates that only the stereotypical masculine mode can be credible and 
legitimate.   
As Daniel Cohen (1995) explains, the idea of argument as war permeates all our 
discourse about argumentation and characterizes how we think of argument (p. 178). Cohen, on 
the other hand, argues that a more pragmatic goal for philosophy and education should be the 
“furtherance of inquiry” (p. 179). Therefore, we need to modify our metaphors and look for 
metaphors of argument that can accommodate both cooperation and competition (1995, p. 179). 
And although argument is often misunderstood, there is still a legitimate place for argumentation 
in class, in the development of clear and careful thinking. Cohen proposes three aims of 
argumentation which are: arguing for but not against, argument as an explanation, and argument 
as justification, which he thinks will be more inclusive of all types of students as well as less 
hostile in nature (1995, p. 182). 
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Other feminist scholars, such as Trudy Govier (1999) argue that adversariality, if kept to 
a minimum, is necessary for controversy. She suggests that persuasion can be a polite and 
respectful enterprise when the means are rational. Govier further states that arguments are not 
necessarily confrontational and that either way, adversariality can be kept to a polite minimum. 
Govier claims that minimal adversariality is an inevitable part of argumentation, but it is not 
entirely negative. However, Hundleby (2013) argues against Govier’s claim that politeness can 
help and ease the adversariality of argumentation. She suggests that politeness reinforces 
gendered social dominance. That is, norms of politeness are different from men to women and 
tend to “be more severe and restrictive for women, requiring greater passivity and conformity” 
(p.239).  As Hundleby notes, it is not as simple as being polite because the idea of politeness is 
gendered and hierarchical and unequally distributed. In relation to politeness, women face a 
double bind where being polite can make them seem less credible, but being less polite makes 
them seem aggressive, arrogant, and inappropriate. As such, women are perceived as aggressive 
and impolite for behaving in ways that are considered acceptable for men; consequently, norms 
of politeness work to deny women and other subordinates the opportunity to engage in polite 
adversarial roles (Hundleby, 2013, p. 245). Likewise, Hundleby (2013) demonstrates that 
Govier’s position ignores the ways that oppression pervades social institutions, shapes the people 
in those institutions, and influences the practices and the reception of their arguments (p. 257). 
As a result, being polite while arguing is not a viable solution to the adversariality of 
argumentation for women. In addition, Hundleby (2013) argues that “Adversarial modes of 
reasoning have neither foundational nor over-riding value as means for rational persuasion. 
Other forms of social engagement and shared reasoning practices deserve recognition as forms of 
argumentation” (p. 258). 
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Burrow (2010) reinforces this argument, stating that neither the ideals of cooperation or 
adversariality in argumentation are equally attainable for women. That is, both endorsing and 
transgressing norms of politeness diminishes the possibility of women succeeding in 
argumentation.  Burrow (2010) posits that women in philosophy are limited in their possibility 
for argumentative success due to oppressive discourse norms and the dominance of both the 
adversarial method and masculine discourse. Burrow also demonstrates that an ideal of 
cooperation is not a better alternative to the dominant practice of adversariality because 
“feminine norms of cooperation in discourse demand deference and subordination, both of which 
undermine authority” (p. 237). Transgressing these gendered norm of politeness is not helpful 
either because it opens women to criticisms that also undermines their authority. Burrow’s 
(2010) essentially argues that “what counts as cooperative discourse differs according to 
gendered stereotypes of politeness in ways that affirm power and status for men, but not women” 
(p. 246). 
This gendered discourse is the result of men and women being socialized to communicate 
differently as evidenced in social norms and values. For example, men’s politeness strategies 
favour status, independence, and competition, whereas women’s politeness aims at cooperation 
through connection and involvement. As such, women’s politeness focuses on the values of 
intimacy, connection, inclusion, and problem sharing (Burrow, p. 247 2010). Women’s 
politeness results in deference and subordination. Hence, Burrow (2010) postulates that it is 
neither reasonable nor rational for women to further cooperation in argumentation contexts 
because cooperation furthers their own subordination. 
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Gendered Reasoning               
Other feminist critiques of argumentation focus on the question of whether there exist gender 
differences in argumentation, i.e., whether females are socialized to think and interact differently 
than males, and whether one sex is socialized to be more comfortable arguing. Many feminist 
scholars have noted gender differences in styles of communication and reasoning. Most notably 
is Carol Gilligan (1982) who argues that men and women reason differently about ethical 
problems, specifying that women reason using an ethics of care. In terms of argumentation, 
Deborah Orr (1991) argues that there are gender differences and that those gender differences 
may hinder women from succeeding in argumentation when argumentation values the masculine 
mode over the feminine. Further, Orr argues that due to socialization women operate within 
different logic systems than men and therefore have a uniquely feminine style of thinking (p. 5). 
However, many have argued that even if such a difference does exist, it is due to gender 
stereotyping and social regulation, i.e., socialization. That is, most of these scholars who observe 
gender differences in communication reject biological essentialism, and believe that these 
gendered differences are a result of social construction, culture, education and socio-economic 
factors.  
The idea of gendered communication has been studied empirically, especially in 
linguistics. One notable scholar is Deborah Tannen, who conducted many empirical studies 
observing how styles of speaking learned in childhood are carried over to the workplace, 
relationships, politics and post-secondary education. According to Tannen, “in every community 
known to linguists, the patterns that constitute linguistic styles are different for men and women” 
(1995, p. 140). Women use language to negotiate how close they are, to establish and maintain 
rapport, whereas boys use language to negotiate their status in the group by showcasing their 
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abilities and knowledge (1995, p. 140). Women’s language is a language of connection and 
intimacy whereas men’s language is a language of status and independence. (1995, p. 140). 
Females learn to focus on the rapport aspect of relationships whereas boys focus on the status 
dimension (1995, p. 140). Men engage in the world as individuals in a hierarchical social order 
as either one-up or one-down and must maintain their independence in order to keep their status 
in this hierarchal order. Because men see themselves as either one-up or one down, entering a 
conversation is like entering a contest where they must display knowledge and power and 
achieve the upper hand (Tannen, 1990, p. 9). Hence conversations for men are struggles to 
preserve independence, to win, and to avoid failure. Women, on the other hand, see themselves 
as individuals in a “network of connections,” and when they enter conversation they seek to give 
each other support and confirmation, as well as reach closeness and consensus (Tannen, 1990, p. 
19). While both genders desire intimacy and independence, Tannen asserts that women focus on 
intimacy while men focus on independence. These differences in perceiving and navigating the 
world for males and females result in disagreement and misunderstanding between the sexes. 
The main problem with these socially constructed gender differences in styles of 
communicating is that society favors and values the masculine mode more. Tannen argues that 
those socially constructed ways of speaking learned in childhood affect how confident we are 
perceived and how much credit we receive. A person’s speaking style, which Tannen defines as 
a linguistic style, refers to “directness or indirectness, pacing and pausing, word choice, and the 
use of such elements as jokes, figures of speech, stories, questions, and apologies” (1995, p. 
139). The problem is that women are taught to speak in ways that discredit and limit them in the 
eyes of society. 
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Language, Credibility And Power                   
A further feminist critique of argumentation that is related to the question of gender differences 
comes from scholars who observe that these socially constructed ways of communicating 
disadvantage and silence women. For example, in her seminal book ‘Language and Women’s 
Place,’ Robin Tolmach Lakoff looks at the ways that gender inequality is played out in language, 
particularly the ways women use language. Although this book was written in 1973, it still 
resonates with contemporary issues relating to the ways that women can be silenced through 
linguistic norms. Lakoff argues that women can be silenced in two ways: one, by being 
prohibited from saying the same words that men use (that is, adopting a masculine mode can be 
harmful to women, as will be shown with the example of Hillary Clinton); and, second, by the 
lack of uptake their words receive, i.e., women’s words aren’t given the same weight as men’s 
(p. 210). Women are systematically denied access to power and are deemed incapable of holding 
it because of their linguistic behavior. And in turn, they are made to believe that they deserve 
such treatment because of inadequacies in their intelligence and/or education (p. 42). Part of the 
problem, as Lakoff perceives it, is that women’s speech sounds politer than men’s. Aspects of 
politeness that Lakoff refers to are leaving a decision open, and not imposing your views or 
claims on others, as indicated by the use of tag questions that do not force agreement or belief on 
the addresser. She uses the example of “John is here, isn’t he?” leaving the addressee more 
leeway to answer, in contrast to the question: “Is John here?” which leaves room for only a 
yes/no answer (Lakoff, p. 48). Society often listens and pays more attention to speakers who 
express their opinions strongly and forcefully. And those who are unable to forcefully state their 
opinions, which is often the case with women, are less likely to be taken seriously or listened to 
(p. 45). 
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Lakoff is not suggesting that these indirect and polite means of expression are innate to 
women; in fact, she argues they may be adopted by any gender or group of people. As noted by 
Keri Hall, many researchers have wrongly claimed that Lakoff characterizes “women’s 
language” as exclusively used by female speakers, but Lakoff’s “women’s language” is not 
fundamentally about gender, but rather about displayed lack of power (Hall, p. 6). Anyone may 
choose to use these linguistic practices that are associated with women. Women are perceived as 
unsure of themselves, unable to make up their minds, and not to be trusted with any real 
responsibility. Lakoff points out that:  
People form judgments about other people on the basis of superficial linguistic behavior 
that may have nothing to do with inner character, but has been imposed upon the speaker, 
on the pain of worse punishment than not being taken seriously. (p. 50)  
Lakoff’s central point is that language use changes depending on the position of the speaker in 
society. The acceptability of a sentence is not a yes-or-no decision. Rather, it is 
determined through the combination of many factors: not only the phonology, the syntax, 
and the semantics, but also the social context in which the utterance is expressed, and the 
assumptions about the world made by all the participants in the discourse. (p. 73) 
A sentence may be acceptable if uttered by women, yet unacceptable if uttered by a man, or vice 
versa. Women’s styles of communication, their displays of emotion, their politeness, and their 
hesitancy when speaking all contribute to the undermining of their words and their perceived 
lack of credibility.  
Another feminist scholar who has criticized how language usage can silence women is 
Marianne Janack.  Janack (1997) notes that assumptions about a perceived class, race, or gender 
are crucial factors in the construction of epistemic authority. She explains that this lack of 
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epistemic authority occurs not only in the realm of public policy but also with respect to “the 
interpretation of social conditions and personal experience” (p. 132). When women give their 
stories and speak about their experiences, their interpretations of events are given less credibility 
than men. She cites cases of her female students who complain that their anger, indignation and 
emotions are dismissed as “ragging out,” i.e., they are menstruating. (ibid.). Janack further draws 
on examples from her own life experiences where her epistemic authority was questioned, 
especially during pregnancy. She explains that her complaints and anxiety about unequal 
household distribution were dismissed by her husband as “pregnancy hormones” (ibid.). 
Epistemic authority, notes Janack, is conferred in social contexts as a result of the judgments 
people make about our sincerity, reliability, and trustworthiness. We often do not have firsthand 
knowledge about the reliability, sincerity and trustworthiness of the speaker, and instead we rely 
on outward signs, which is where women fall prey to judgments of lack of epistemic authority, 
because of gender stereotypes and sexism. And so in relation to argumentation, women speakers 
are often judged by their gender, and their intelligence and credibility are underestimated as a 
result. Further, women’s use of emotion is often dismissed as illegitimate.   
As Sue Campbell (1994) points out, emotions have been attributed to women as the 
ground on which to dismiss women as irrational. Dismissal, according to Campbell, happens 
when what we do or say, as assessed by what we would have described as our intuitions 
in the situation, is either not taken seriously or not regarded at all in the context in which 
it is meant to have its effect.  (p. 49)  
Here, Campbell refers to a situation where women’s display of emotion, such as anger, is not 
taken seriously: women are thus misrepresented as being upset and oversensitive. Women’s 
emotions are characterized as unhealthy, which limits women’s engagement in the world (ibid.) 
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Further, Campbell analyzes how bitterness gets inadequate social uptake which results in 
expressive failures and the silencing of individuals. Calling people bitter is an attempt at 
blocking their anger and shifting the attention from the blameworthy behavior that caused 
bitterness to the speaker’s mode of expression. Critiquing people as bitter is a way of silencing 
them and, as a result, “The expresser cannot account for or defend her intended anger… because 
her interpreters are no longer listening. ‘You're so bitter’ is meant to be not challenging but 
silencing” (p. 51). Campbell argues that people whose bitterness is criticized usually are not in a 
position to influence politicians, bring lawsuits, or make threats. Criticizing people for being 
bitter, argues Campbell, aims to perpetuate the impoverishment of resources; for once people are 
dismissed as bitter, others feel no obligation to empower them. Another consequence of this lack 
of uptake for ones’ emotions is confusion, as it becomes unclear to the accused what he/she is 
feeling (p. 51).  
This silencing and dismissal of women’s emotion is very applicable to women 
participating in politics. For example, during the presidential election of 2008, when Hilary 
Clinton cried, this became a controversial topic and a major moment in the campaign. Many 
people questioned Clinton’s display of emotion and criticized it as calculated, not genuine, and 
said that it was an attempt to “cry her way to the nomination.” Prior to crying, Clinton was 
perceived as cold, remote, and too focused on policy, but when she displayed emotion she was 
criticized as being either weak or cunning. As such, Clinton’s emotions were certainly not taken 
seriously, i.e., her display of emotion was perceived negatively, and this shattered her public 
image.  
Campbell explains that “many people’s emotional lives are, in fact, dominated by a 
confusion that is an inevitable consequence of persistent lack of uptake” (p. 55). This negative 
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uptake of one’s emotional expression, and being called bitter or sentimental, encourages a 
gendered and unequal distribution of expressive resources, and limits the range of expressive acts 
available to women (p. 55). Thus, Campbell demonstrates that women can be dismissed by being 
denied the right uptake to their emotional expression. When women’s emotional acts are denied 
legitimacy, then their voices are also silenced. Further, this dismissal of emotion does not just 
affect women, but anyone who uses emotion as a form of argument. That is because the 
dominant model of argumentation does not credit emotion as a legitimate mode of arguing. 
There is also evidence that women’s words in the courtroom are disregarded and ignored. 
Kathy Mack (1993), looks at the barriers to women’s credibility in the courtroom as a result of 
gender bias and stereotypes. She focuses particularly on women who testify about rape (p. 328). 
Mack argues that the first element in the lack of belief in women’s words has a lot to do with the 
social expectations of how a credible speaker is supposed to sound, which is like a man. Mack 
also refers to some studies which show that certain features of language are associated with 
powerlessness, such as using superlatives, intensifiers (“so” or “such”), fillers (“uhm” or “you 
know”) tag questions, hedges (“sort of”) and politeness markers, all of which make the speaker 
sound hesitant and unsure of herself. Mack argues, as many have, that these features are used 
mostly by women. Women speakers, she argues, are high pitched, smile frequently, and are 
hesitant, all of which are signs associated with powerlessness, and convey lack of credibility (p. 
330). Confidence and assertiveness plays a central role with regard to credibility; the more 
confident you sound, the more credible you will appear. As such, women convey hesitancy even 
when they are more certain. Bringing this back to the courtroom, Mack points out that despite 
law reforms introduced to increase trust in women’s testimony, women continued to be 
mistrusted and their words discounted. Despite law reforms, people continue to hold prejudices, 
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myths, and stereotypes about women (p. 346). And although the law might not support the 
subordination of women, sexism still occurs in more subtle and hidden ways due to entrenched 
gender inequality.  
 
Feminism And Fallacies 
Other Critiques of argumentation focus on analyzing fallacies and how fallacy theories can be 
enriched from a feminist perspective. For example, Catherine Hundleby (2011) argues that the 
existence of a deeply rooted androcentrism in scientific argumentation demands recognition as a 
form of fallacy. Hundleby (2009) defines fallacies as “common forms of argumentative 
reasoning that appear correct but are not,1 which emphasizes both their frequency and deceptive 
nature” (p.1) 
Hundleby (2011) demonstrates that androcentrism is a fallacy through the presence of 
regular errors that violate Grice’s conversational maxims (, p.3). Grice’s cooperative principle of 
conversation gives rise to four maxims demanding: (1) an appropriate quantity of information, 
(2) adherence to norms of truth, (3) relevance, and (4) efficient manner (p.3).  Hundleby (2011) 
demonstrates that each maxim is violated by androcentrism by analyzing Lloyd’s study of the 
case of the female orgasm. All accounts of the female orgasm fail to address the quantity of 
available evidence about female sexuality. Moreover, androcentrism neglects the norms of truth. 
That is, these scientists ignore the overwhelming evidence against their theories, which is 
contrary to accepted norms of research that these scientists themselves employ. Further, they use 
the evidence selectively when they draw on the sex research. Hundleby (2011) establishes that 
because of its broad social influence, androcentrism mishandles many different inference 
schemes. Hundleby’s work on fallacies points to the importance of updating fallacy theory to 
 52 
make it reflexive and progressive rather than static and archaic. Further, Hundleby argues for the 
recognition of androcentric fallacy because “identifying the problem as a fallacy may help to 
eliminate it historically” (2009, p.9).  
 
Feminists Critiques Of Rationality And The Maleness Of Reason 
Other feminist critiques focus on how reasoning has been constructed as a masculine activity 
since the time of Aristotle. Feminists such as Genevieve Lloyd and Phyllis Rooney argue that 
there is a problem with the way reason has been constructed as exclusive and devaluing of 
women. That is, there is a metaphorical and literal exclusion of women from the perspective of 
reason.  In The Man of Reason (1984), Lloyd offers an historical account of the way reason has 
been conceived. In doing this, she surveys major philosophers who have theorized reason, and 
argues that reason has been developed with male ideals of reason, which exclude women and 
devalue femaleness and ways of knowing associated with women. Rather, what Lloyd refers to 
as the maleness of reason is rooted in a deep philosophical tradition which delegates women to 
the body, to the part of the person deemed as irrational, which in turn puts women in opposition 
to reason (1984, xviii). From the beginnings of philosophical thought, femaleness was associated 
with what reason leaves behind, i.e., the dark forces of earth (Lloyd, 1984, p. 2). Since the 
Greeks, femaleness was associated with a vague and indeterminate mode of thought, whereas 
maleness represented a clear and determinate mode of thinking. Similarly, Phyllis Rooney (1991) 
demonstrates that the pervasive thematic dichotomy in Greek thought aligns reason and form 
with maleness and matter and formlessness with the female (p. 79).  In Greek thought, 
femaleness was symbolically associated with the non-rational, the disorderly, and the 
unknowable, which must be set aside to attain knowledge (Lloyd, 1984, p. 11). For example, in 
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the Phaedo, Plato presents the intellectual life as purging the rational soul from the follies of the 
body. Reason must flee from the body and deal only with what is pure, and unchangeable 
(Lloyd, 1984, p. 6).  
With Aristotle, the same picture of knowledge continued along with the distinction 
between form and matter, which Aristotle revised but nevertheless maintained. With Aristotle`s 
system, a dualism remained between what is sensed and what is grasped by reason. Lloyd notes 
that despite Aristotle’s criticism of the division of the soul, he nevertheless represented reason as 
the controlling or subduing of the emotional part of human beings (1984, p. 51). This paradigm 
of knowledge continued to portray the rational mind as free of matter (Lloyd, 1984, p. 9).  Later 
on, Bacon united matter and form, that is, he depicted nature as both the female and the 
knowable, but only to say that the task of science is to exercise the right type of male domination 
over knowable nature (female). As such, Bacon described scientific knowledge in terms of male-
female distinctions where the latter must dominate the former (Lloyd, 1984, p. 11). As Lloyd 
writes, “knowledge is itself a domination of Nature” (p. 13). That is, nature is represented as 
female and needs to be dominated. Lloyd, further, surveys Aquinas’ ideas on reason and shows 
how he, like Augustine, is committed to the idea that reason resides in man; woman is, then, 
subjugated and guided by man because the discretion of reason predominates in man (p. 36). 
Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that women are easily led by their passions, describing them as 
“unstable of reason” and as having a “defect in reason” (Lloyd, p.36).  
 Lloyd then moves on to Descartes, with whom reason gained a special association with 
the realm of pure thought. With Descartes the requirement of truth seeking became separated 
from everyday life, thus reinforcing already existing distinctions between male and female roles 
which perpetuated the idea of a separate male and female consciousness (Lloyd, 1984, p. 50). 
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Descartes’ theory of mind supports the sexual division of mental labour, where women have 
been assigned the realm of the sensuous that the Cartesian man of reason must transcend to attain 
knowledge (Lloyd, p. 50). For Descartes, right reasoning is a struggle away from the sensuous, 
the body, and a detachment from the particularities of everyday living (Lloyd, p. 75).  
Lloyd’s point is that our ideals of reason have excluded the feminine, and that femininity 
has been historically understood on the basis of this exclusion (xix). Lloyd argues that this male 
bias in reasoning is more than just misogynist attitudes in philosophical thought (p. 37), it is in 
fact the way reason has been understood and developed, in opposition to and exclusive of the 
female. 
The absence of women from the philosophical tradition meant that the conceptualization 
of reason is done exclusively by men and for men, for as Lloyd points out, “There has been no 
input of femaleness into the formation of ideals of Reason” (1984, p. 108). These misogynist 
views of reason form the foundation for the way reason has been historically, and is still 
currently, understood. Rationality has been conceived as the transcendence of the feminine, 
emotions, and body, and a move towards clarity, abstract thought, and purity. 
As Phyllis Rooney (1991) explains, this path of reason, knowledge, and truth as involving 
a transcendence of the “feminine” is a well-established theme that informs the imagination of 
most philosophers conceptualizing reason (p. 80). And even when we do not get an explicit 
division of male and female, we still get some sort of exclusion of the private from the public, of 
the particular and the immanent, of the sensuous, emotional, and imaginary, and “it is clear that 
the female is at least symbolically, if not literally, associated with these excluded dimensions” 
(Rooney, 1991, p. 83).  This historical gendering of reason, notes Rooney, does not disappear 
with later philosophers (1991, p. 83).          
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The result of the masculinization of reason is that our understanding of maleness and 
femaleness has been formed within structures of male dominance over women (Lloyd, 1984, p. 
103). This equation of the maleness with superiority dates back as far as the Pythagoreans. 
Characteristics attributed to males have always been valued more and seen as superior to 
supposed female characteristics (Lloyd, 1984, p. 104). Such male attributes include 
aggressiveness and the ability to reason, as opposed to female nurturing skills and being easily 
swayed by emotions. 
Unfortunately, there is no simple solution to this problem, for as Lloyd shows, it is not 
enough to affirm that both sexes are equal in their possession of reason, and that women should 
have equal participation in the acquisition of knowledge. It is not as simple as allowing women 
to be “accommodated into a cultural ideal which has defined itself in opposition to the feminine” 
(Lloyd, 1984, p. 104). Affirming the value and importance of the feminine cannot eradicate the 
underlying normative structures, because even when it tries, “it will occur in a space already 
prepared for it by the intellectual tradition it seeks to reject” (Lloyd, 1984, p. 105). Lloyd 
concludes that our ideal of reason is a male one, and that if there is reason that knows no sex and 
is common to all, then it is something that we can aspire to in the future, but not in the current 
account of reason that is carried from the traditional conceptualization of a male reason (1984, p. 
107).   
In line with this criticism of the masculinity of reason, Orr (1989) critiques informal logic 
for the narrow and often inappropriate conceptions of rationality that do not include everyone. 
She argues that informal logic ought to recognize other models of rationality used by people 
(Orr, p. 2). Orr claims that there is empirical evidence for a feminist style of thinking. Citing the 
work of Carol Gilligan, Orr argues that the ethics of care (based on the premise of non-violence 
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and that no one should be hurt) is empirically associated with women, while the ethics of justice 
(based on the premise that everyone should be treated equally) is associated with men (p. 3). The 
ethics of justice is characterized by formality and abstraction and is based on the logic of 
fairness, while the ethics of care is characterized by a style that is contextual and narrative and 
based on the logic of relationships (Orr, p. 3). Orr argues that Gilligan’s work provides two 
contrasting conceptions of rationality. She does not believe these differences in thinking between 
men and women are innate, but are rather due to “the psychological process of gender 
acquisition,” and Nancy Chodrow similarly claims that these differences are due to the sexed 
division of labour within the home, family and workplace (Orr, p. 6).  That is, the difference is 
social. Nonetheless, it is these gendered differences that ground the differences in rationality 
observed by Gilligan’s work (Orr, p. 6). As such, Orr draws on 
research from a variety of different sources to show first that the feminine mode or style 
of rationality is, in fact, practiced and can be found quite readily in environments as 
different as elite colleges and social agencies, in fields as disparate as genetic research 
and moral practice. (Orr, p. 8)  
The very epistemic foundations of the feminine and masculine mode of rationality are different 
because they rely on different assumptions and have different goals (Orr, p. 8). Because the 
feminine form does not fit comfortably into the standard categories of induction or deduction, 
Gilligan has referred to its form as “'narrative', utilizing the 'psychological logic of relationships'” 
(Orr, p. 8). Others such as Farrell, Orr explains, refer to the feminine form as, 'indirect' while 
Chodorow and Keller refer to it as 'empathic' due to the blurring of boundaries between thinker 
and subject of inquiry (Orr, p. 8). Orr’s central point is that the feminine mode ought to be  
recognized and taught as a part of what humans do when they reason (p. 5);…as the large 
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and growing body of studies of the feminine mode of rationality show, it is time for 
informal logic to take the next step, to expand its understanding of what rationality and 
argumentation are when they are understood as human, not masculine, practice. To 
dismiss the feminine mode of rationality with the stock charge of 'mere psychologism' 
would be at best question begging, at worst prejudice. (p. 7) 
As pointed out by Gilbert (1994),  
the assumptions inherent in the Critical logical approach [the dominant model of arguing] 
are, at core, 'masculine'. They derive from a long tradition and history during most of 
which female input was neither desired or permitted. (1994, p. 103) 
The problem with the masculine mode is that it excludes the emotional and subjective, which are 
favoured by and associated with women (Orr, p. 5). 
Regardless of whether there is something essential about the feminine mode, it is 
certainly a form of arguing that is ignored by the dominant model, as well as something that 
narrative theory of argumentation embraces. Indeed, narrative argument, as I show in chapter 1 
and 2, is a co-creation between the arguer and audience, and hence the boundaries between 
thinker and the subject of inquiry are blurred. And since narrative argument is a co-creation 
between the arguer and the audience, the relationship between them is of paramount importance. 
It is through the relationship between the storyteller (arguer) and the audience that the narrative 
acquires meaning and significance, and as such it relies on a logic of relationships. Hence, 
without essentializing, the feminine mode is included in the narrative model of arguing. The 
feminine mode emphasizes concern for others and respect for the relationship between arguers, 
which is consistent with the narrative model as I conceive of it.  
While the idea of a feminine style of thinking is controversial and has been strongly 
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criticized and debated, Orr’s insights still shed light on the exclusionary practices of informal 
logic. That is, regardless of whether it is true that there is a feminine thinking style and 
regardless of whether it is innate or not, Orr is right to point out that informal logic is 
exclusionary in its definition of argument and rationality. Regardless of whether alternative 
models of rationality are feminine or not, there do indeed exist alternative models of rationality 
and reasoning that are employed by a range of people from different socio-economic 
backgrounds that are not recognized by informal logic. There are also alternative understandings 
of rationality such as rhetorical rationality that are often ignored by the traditional philosophical 
understanding. Further, the result of the masculinity of reason is that women and other minority 
groups are silenced by the dominant model of argumentation. Our conception of reason, 
rationality and argumentation is one-sided and tends to favor men over women and as a result 
disenfranchise and silence women and minority groups. 
The traditional model of argumentation relies on one form of rationality that not only 
does not represent everyone, it is in fact dismissive of emotions, context, and situated 
knowledge. In our conceptualization of reason and knowledge we have privileged a male 
framework that hinders women from advancing in philosophy due to the adversariality of 
argumentation, the masculinity of reason, the linearity of reasoning, and the exclusion of 
different modes of arguing associated with women. 
 
Oppressive Frameworks 
This gendered reasoning and the valuing of masculine modes of reasoning grows out of an 
oppressive conceptual framework. Karen J. Warren (1988) argues that the conceptual framework 
in which philosophical argumentation is based is imbued with bias which is patriarchal and limits 
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women. According to Warren, “insofar as a given framework is biased, the critical thinking 
which grows out of and reflects it will inherit this bias.” (p. 31) That is, the conceptual 
framework in which philosophical argumentation is based is imbued with bias which is 
patriarchal and limits women. Warren explains that each of us operates out of a historically and 
socially constructed frame of reference which she calls a “conceptual framework” (p. 31). A 
conceptual framework is a “set of basic beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions which, shape, 
and reflect our view and our world” (p. 32). Hence, critical thinking and argumentation do not 
occur in a vacuum but always within a conceptual framework which can limit what one sees (p. 
33). The problem is that some conceptual frameworks are oppressive.  
Warren explains three features of oppressive conceptual frameworks: First, an oppressive 
conceptual framework is shaped by value hierarchal thinking which, for example, “puts men ‘up’ 
and women ‘down’…reason or intellect ‘up’ and emotion ‘down’” (p. 32) Second, conceptual 
frameworks tend to support either/or thinking (p. 32).  An example is: either an argument follows 
the traditional form or it is not an argument. Third, oppressive conceptual frameworks lead to a 
logic of domination, which Warren defines as “a structure of argumentation which explains, 
justifies, and maintains the subordination of an ‘inferior’ group by a ‘superior’ group on the 
grounds of the (alleged) superiority and inferiority of the respective groups” (p. 32). Oppressive 
conceptual frameworks are used by those who are deemed as superior, as a means of oppressing 
those deemed as inferior. Patriarchal conceptual frameworks have historically assigned greater 
value to that which is associated with maleness and lesser value to that which has been 
traditionally identified as female (p. 32). As such, a patriarchal conceptual framework 
subordinates women. According to Warren, there is no neutral conceptual framework. Warren’s 
central point is that argumentation takes place within a conceptual framework that is oppressive 
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and patriarchal. This framework values some forms of discourse as legitimate argumentation 
while rejecting others that are just as valuable as illegitimate. 
In relation to my dissertation project, the ways in which oppressive conceptual 
frameworks operate in argumentation is that they limit what counts as a legitimate mode of 
argument and what is seen as rational. Oppressive conceptual frameworks also limit how 
argumentation is conducted. Aggressive argumentation is seen as acceptable and polite modes of 
expression are not always taken seriously. Connecting this with Tannen, it is the hierarchical 
model of thinking, associated with maleness, that is often favored in argumentation and 
communication. Women who attempt to adopt the masculine mode face the dilemma of what is 
referred to in the literature as the “double bind.” The point of Warren’s work is that traditional 
arguments operate within an oppressive framework that is intolerant of alternative modes of 
reasoning, because it conceives of an argument as only that which is linear, explicit, and 
emotionless.  
 
Narrow Conceptions Of Argument 
Another prominent feminist critique is concerned with the narrow conception of argument in 
philosophy, i.e., that way argumentation is set up in terms of the rational paradigm, where an 
argument is only that which is linear and follows a set of premise to a conclusion. This linearity, 
rigidity and formality of argumentation is problematic because it excludes other forms of 
argumentation that are not linear, such as stories, visual representations, emotional appeals, etc. 
Hence, the traditional and dominant mode of argumentation is presumed to be the rational and 
linear. Further, our traditional conception of argument carries with it oppressive frameworks and 
understandings of rationality, as shown above by Lloyd and Orr. Many feminists (e.g., Andrea 
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Nye, Moulton, and Tannen) critique argumentation for being too focused on linearity and 
formalism, i.e., the favouring of linear, abstract thought disadvantages those who, due to 
education, social, or psychological reasons, are not comfortable using this mode of arguing. 
 
Michael Gilbert: Coalescent Argumentation. In his book Coalescent Argumentation, 
Michael Gilbert critiques what he calls the Critical-Logical Model (CL) of argumentation, which 
excludes different modes of reasoning (emotional, visceral, kisceral), and rejects the emotional 
and personal in argumentation. According to the CL mode of reasoning, emotional reactions are 
excluded from business and legal decisions. Facts are what matter, while feelings and intuitions 
are discredited. As such, the CL model of reasoning is dominant, while others are subordinate to 
it (p. 51). Gilbert disagrees with the major premise and goal of contemporary reasoning 
paradigms, which state that one should argue, defend, and justify their claim without any 
recourse to situational, contextual, or personal information (p. 40). This approach to 
argumentation, explains Gilbert, breeds the attitude that the best position is the one that survives 
rational competitive inquiry and scrutiny (Gilbert, 1997, p. 48). Gilbert critiques this approach to 
argumentation because it rejects the alternative modes of arguing, especially the emotional mode. 
Gilbert writes that arguments are connected to their surroundings in a very complex way, for 
there are aspects of language, usage, and style that make it hard for anyone to comprehend an 
argument based on its mere structure, if they are not familiar with the particular history of the 
arguers involved. This means that to fully understand an argument, one needs to look more in 
depth into the context from which an argument springs forth, which may very well include 
emotions.  
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Gilbert argues that the categories of evaluating arguments must extend to include “errors, 
forms, and categories that go beyond the logico-rational and include, systematically, all the 
modalities of human communication” (p. 41). Further, Gilbert criticizes the dominant model of 
argumentation, the CL model, for its forced decontextualization of argument (p. 107), for 
analyzing argument in a vacuum. Hence, Gilbert contends that philosophers should not exclude 
emotive reasoning, physical actions, and intuitional communication from argumentation. The 
problem with the critical logical model is the exclusionary assumption of what counts as proper 
reasoning, which excludes non-CL modes of reasoning that do not abide by the rules of the CL 
model. Hence, alternative modes of reasoning are not seen as proper forms of reasoning. This 
definition of reasoning not only excludes other modes of reasoning, but also silences people who 
use them: “because reasoning has a total grip on power and by excluding non-C L modes, those 
who rely upon them are left powerless” (Gilbert, 1997, p. 111).  
Michael Gilbert is one of the few argumentation scholars to develop an inclusive model 
of argumentation. Gilbert proposes coalescent argumentation as a solution to the exclusionary 
model. Coalescent argumentation is a normative ideal, which involves the joining together of 
two distinct claims via recognition and exploration of opposing positions. As Gilbert states,  
The coalescent approach can be expressed in the very simplest of terms. First, by 
exposing the positions of the dispute partners, second, by finding the points of 
commonality, and finally by beginning from those points, attempt to explore means of 
maximizing the satisfaction of goals that are apparently in conflict. (1997, p. 119) 
This coalescent approach tries to find commonality between arguers so that agreement can be 
reached more easily and disagreement and hostility is reduced to a minimum. Coalescent 
argumentation, as explained by Gilbert, relies on one important assumption: (1) That all 
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arguments are situated and contextual, and one ideal: (2) that arguments begin with an emphasis 
on agreement. First, arguments are situated because,  
No position or belief is held in isolation, and therefore the larger picture of beliefs, needs, 
wants and feelings surrounding the issue must be considered in order to properly 
understand and, eventually, assess it. (p. 108) 
As such, arguments must be understood in relation to the person who holds them.  And so part of 
understanding the argument requires knowing the person and their motivation behind arguing, 
which requires looking beyond just the argument and into the whole process. Second, arguments 
begin in agreement because the goal of coalescent argumentation is not to criticize or defeat the 
alternative view, but rather to find common ground with it, i.e., “to understand, incorporate, 
respect and move toward consensus” (1994, p. 109). This is different than the NLT assumption 
inherent in the critical logical model that the best argument, which is best reasoned and the most 
cogent, will withstand all assault, because the focus of coalescent argumentation is not on “what 
can be attacked, but on how two apparently divergent positions can be reconciled” (p. 109). 
 
Narrative Argument and Feminism 
Feminist critiques of argumentation problematize and question the kinds of work and culture 
philosophy encourages.  They do this by looking at the kinds of biases, culture, and environment 
that traditional models of argumentation promote. Feminist scholarship points to the need for 
argumentation theory to foster pluralism and inclusivity. One way that we can promote a 
conception of philosophy that includes women and marginalized groups is by changing our 
conceptions of what argumentation and reasoning are: that is, by broadening our definitions to 
include more people and more styles of reasoning. Hence, broadening our conception of 
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argument to include narratives, emotions, and visuals allows us to improve our conception of 
what reason and rationality are, because including more modes calls for different conceptions of 
rationality that are not just logical, linear, and detached from emotions and context. Including 
narrative argument and broadening the conception of argumentation leads to a broadening of 
what it means to be successful in argumentation, which in turn will positively impact the 
underrepresentation of women and perhaps help eradicate or mitigate current biases about what it 
means to reason well. That is, expansion in our conception of what argumentation is leads to a 
more flourishing culture in the discipline of philosophy: that is, a culture of acceptance, empathy, 
and understanding.  
  In my defense of narrative arguments, I align myself with the feminist critique of reason, 
rationality, and the dismissal and silencing of women and minority groups in argumentation.  
My account of narrative argumentation is consistent with a feminist stance, in that it rejects old 
and exclusionary conceptions of argument. Further, my account dismantles the assumption that 
an argument has to be verbalized and explicit to be legitimate. Narrative argumentation utilizes 
feminist insights because it also rejects masculine and traditional ideals of rationality that 
understand rationality only in terms of the logical. Hence, accepting narrative argumentation is 
consistent with feminist insights because it is inclusive and impartial. As pointed out by Warren, 
“from a feminist point of view, impartiality requires inclusiveness” (p. 39). 
What is crucial about feminist critiques of argumentation is that they emphasize the 
personal aspect of arguing. As such, narrative argument respects the personal in arguing. And 
regardless of whether there are gender differences or not, the personal has been associated with 
the feminine and it is something that dominant argumentation ignores. Aggression and the 
masculinity of reason and argumentation is problematic from the feminist perspective because 
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the feminist perspective focuses on the people arguing and the relationships between them. That 
is, the personal aspect of argumentation is very important for feminists. Gilbert explains that the 
CL model is different than a feminist approach to argumentation because the critical logical 
model is rule-based and focuses on the content (product) of what is argued, not the persons doing 
the arguing (as is the case with the feminist approach to argument, and a process account of 
argument).  As noted by Gilbert, the feminist model denies the separability of words, arguments 
and persons (1994, p. 101). Similarly, my narrative account adopts a feminist stance because it 
sees argument as a relationship, not a contest where arguers compete to win; and it sees 
argument as a process embedded in a context, not as a decontextualized product.  
The acceptance of narrative as a legitimate mode of arguing does not rely on the idea that 
only women use narrative; it does not need to accept gender essentialism to capture the main 
critiques and insights of feminist theory. Further, regardless of whether there are differences in 
thinking between the sexes, what is important about Gilligan’s, Tannen’s, Gilbert’s and other 
feminists’ critiques of argumentation, is the insight that persons, feelings and context should be 
included in the argument, and are not peripheral to the argument, but are rather an essential part 
of it. While some of these features, such as attention to detail, to persons, and to connection as 
opposed to independence, have been attributed to women, they are reason-giving features of 
argument whether they essentially belong to women or not. That is, we can highlight the 
importance of these modes of argumentation without committing to the claim that they are 
essential to women. Recognizing the value of these modes helps us move toward an inclusive 
and consensus-facilitating model of argumentation.  
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Chapter Three: Defining Narrative Argumentation 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will provide a detailed description of how narrative functions in an 
argumentative setting. This chapter will begin by providing a definition of narrative that is based 
on consensus in the narratology literature. Then I will provide a definition of argument which I 
will be using for my account of narrative argument. That is, I will briefly explain the 
argumentation literature and show where narrative argument fits in—namely, the rhetorical 
camp, and I will build my case for narrative argument by drawing on that notion of 
argumentation. As a result, I will synthesize the two literatures on narrative and argumentation to 
provide a definition of narrative argument. This will include an outline of features of narrative 
argument. In the last part of the chapter I will provide examples of narrative argument and  
anticipate and respond to objections. 
What I will provide in this chapter will, I hope, add to the scholarship in the field of 
narrative argumentation. I will provide a definition that will capture the essential characteristics 
of narrative arguments, i.e., arguing via the mode of storytelling. Disagreement on what counts 
as a narrative argument may arise, for no definition will be exhaustive. My definition of 
argument will provide tentative features because even when these features are all present, an 
audience or interlocutor in an argumentative setting may still disagree on whether what they have 
heard is a narrative, let alone an argument. Misinterpretations are an inevitable part of 
argumentation, as of all discursive acts. For it is possible that someone hearing a story may 
dismiss it as merely an explanation, or contest the idea that the narrative presented is in fact an 
argument.  
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Further, narrative argumentation is a continuation of the debate on multi-modal 
argumentation. The concept of multi-modal argumentation was first introduced by Michael 
Gilbert (1994), and later developed into coalescent argumentation (1997) (Kjeldsen, 2015, p. 
115)). Multi-modal (with hyphen) as used by Gilbert designates four separate and distinct modes 
that do not necessarily work together. Gilbert argues that in most situations one is able to identify 
some aspect of a distinct mode. However, multimodal (without hyphen) refers to an argument 
that uses channels of more than one mode of argumentation. In general, the idea of multimodal 
(with or without the hyphen) refers to the recognition of different modes of arguing that may or 
may not work together in an argument. In 1996 more publications on this topic emerged. Multi-
modal argumentation emphasizes that there are different modes of arguing which may or may 
not require different standards or norms of analyzing and evaluating arguments. Such modes 
include the four pointed out by Gilbert (1997): the logical, emotional, visceral (which relates to 
the physical mode of arguing that can include a touch or any nonverbal communication such as 
body language (Gilbert, p. 84)), kisceral (which is the “mode of communication that relies on the 
intuitive, the imaginative, the religious, the spiritual, and the mystical” (Gilbert, 1997, p. 86); but 
can also include visual argumentation (Groarke 2009), and the musical mode (Groarke and 
Dewey).  Taste, smell, actio (as in action), which is a mode found in facial expression, gestures, 
posture and tone of voice and other non-verbal modes of argumentation have all been identified 
as arguments by some argumentation scholars such as Gilbert, Leo Groarke, Sharon Dewey, 
Marie Gelang and Jens Kjeldsen (Groarke, 2015, p. 134). A multi-modal theory of argument 
significantly expands the boundaries and definition of argument, and perhaps also the appraisal 
and evaluation of argument1.  
                                                 
1 Argumentation scholars defending multimodality do not agree on how the different 
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Further, narrative argumentation may also be considered a multi-modal theory of 
argumentation. As Groarke points out, “A theory that recognizes these different modes (and the 
ways they combine and mix in many real life arguments) is a multimodal theory” (2015, p. 140). 
The concept of narrative argument is a multimodal theory because narrative is a mode of arguing 
that has been traditionally excluded and because narrative argumentation acknowledges the 
legitimacy of such a mode, it is a multimodal theory. Narrative arguments may be said to be 
another mode of arguing along with visual, emotional, visceral and kisceral modes of arguing. 
According to Groarke, a mode of arguing is,  
the ingredients (the ‘material’, the ‘stuff’) an arguer uses and arranges when they engage 
in an act of arguing. In the case of arguing, this way of defining modes suggests that an 
arguer who uses words employs a verbal mode of arguing; that an arguer who uses taste 
as a component of their argument uses a mode of arguing by taste; and so on and so forth. 
(2015, p. 140) 
Thus an arguer who uses stories to make an argument and to provide support for their claim is 
using narrative as a mode of arguing. Some may say that narrative is not its own separate mode 
because when we use stories to argue we are also using body language, tone and emotions. While 
it is true that arguing through storytelling has elements of the visceral, kisceral and emotional 
mode, it is still its own separate mode because it has its own distinctive features which are not 
found in other modes. There are of course overlaps between the modes as, for example, an 
                                                 
 modes of arguments are to be evaluated. Some (such as Groarke for example) would like to maintain the 
traditional way of assessing and evaluating arguments by reducing them and standardizing them through 
identifying the premises and conclusion. Others such as Gilbert argue that other modes including non- 
verbal ones need to have different standards of assessment. In this dissertation I will agree with Gilbert 
and offer an alternative way of evaluating narrative arguments. 
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emotional response is often evoked through different modes. Visual argumentation such as a 
picture often elicits an emotional response but the visual is still it is own unique mode of arguing. 
And similarly storytelling evokes an emotional response in the audience which speaks to the 
power and persuasiveness of such a mode. But narrative is its own separate mode because it has 
distinctive features—namely, plot and an event. Further, as noted by Gilbert, arguers rarely 
utilize one mode alone, for often argumentation is a combination of many modes (1994, p. 166). 
In defending narrative argumentation, I aim to expand the realm of argumentation, as 
have other scholars in their defense of other modes of arguing. However, my particular focus 
will be on the essential role that the mode of narrative plays in argumentation. 
 
Definition Of Narrative 
For the purpose of this dissertation, a narrative will be understood as an act of storytelling which 
could be oral or written. I will not focus on narrative as it is used in novels, but rather on the act 
of dialogical and interactive storytelling, which is essentially communal, social and 
interpersonal. The common elements or features of narratives discussed by narrative scholars are 
event (some prefer the term action), plot, audience, time and space. While most of these features 
are adapted and borrowed from literature on narrative and the novel, they are still essential for an 
understanding of oral storytelling. While these features are literary in nature and were coined and 
discussed by literary narratologists, they are applicable to my account of narrative argument as 
they help illuminate what a narrative in general is. 
The most common understanding of narrative by narrative scholars is: a representation of 
a sequence of events (Gerard Genette, Robert Scholes, Gerald Prince, Susana Onega and José 
Ángel,  García Landa, H.Porter Abott, Mieke Bal). Defining narrative in terms of representation 
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is widely used by narrative scholars and is one of the few methodological constants of narrative 
theory (Rudrum, 2005, p. 196). However, because a representation of events can also be a list, an 
illustration or an instruction manual rather than a story, many of these scholars add a further 
component to clarify what they mean by narrative. To rule out such cases, Gerald Prince adds 
logical relations. Others such as Mieke Bal (2009) introduce the idea of change, causality and an 
experiencing subject. Ryan (2007) further notes that in narrative, “the sequence of events must 
form a unified causal chain and lead to closure” (p. 29). Stories usually contain a beginning and 
an end with events and actions logically connected. Although scholars may not agree that stories 
must have a beginning and end, there is little dispute that a story is composed of action (an event 
or events), characters, and always proceeds forward in time (Abbott, 2007, p. 41).  
Action/Event. Although most definitions of narrative include the term action, some 
theorists prefer the term event (Altman, 2008, p. 11). Action can be defined as the unfolding of 
events in the story (Abbott, 2007, p. 125). There is a strong consensus among narratologists that 
a narrative must consist of an ordered sequence of events. In every story there is a chronological 
sequence and order of events, which is missing in non-narrative texts such as an essay where 
there is no order of events (Abbott, p. 14). While Genette suggests that narrative needs only one 
event, most narratologists insist that more than one event is needed for a story, i.e., a story needs 
to have a series of events linked by causality (Rudrum, 2005, p. 196). Narrative requires action; 
otherwise we are left with just a description or a statement.   
Another way of understanding event and action is through plot. Abbott notes that plot is a 
slippery and polyvalent term that is at best approximate in its meaning, and is so vague in 
ordinary usage that most narratologists avoid it altogether in their definitions of narrative 
(Abbott, 2007, p. 43). Some scholars who omit plot from their definition of narrative instead 
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discuss event and action. Plot as explained by Abbott is “the combination of economy and 
sequencing of events that make a story a story and not just raw material” (2007, p. 43).  
Generally, plot is understood as a chronological sequence of events linked by causal connection. 
Brian Richardson summarizes plot as a “teleological sequence of events linked by some principle 
of causation; that is, the events are bound together in a trajectory that typically leads to some 
form of resolution or convergence” (cited by Abbott, 2007, p. 43).   
Time And Space. Narratives entail movement through time; that is, there is a duration or 
sequence of events which constitutes the plot (Seymour Chatman, as cited by Abbott, p. 14). 
When we read or hear a story we are, on the one hand, aware of the time of hearing or reading 
the story and the order in which things are read/heard, and on the other hand we are aware of the 
time the events in the story take place and the order in which they occur (Abbott, p. 14). As 
Abbott notes, 
The story can take a day, a minute, a life time, or eons. It can be true or false, historical or 
fictional. But insofar as it is a story, it has its own length of time and an order of events 
that proceed chronologically from the earliest to the latest. (p. 15)  
As listeners, we are able to figure out the sequence of events because the story is placed within 
temporal relation. Hence, all narratives take place in space and time.  Time and space refer to the 
when and where of the story. As explained by Teresa Bridgeman (2007), time has always played 
an important role in narrative theory because we tend to think of stories as a sequence of events 
and as such the time and space of the story helps us place the story in its proper sequence of 
events (2007, p. 53). Time and space are more than just background elements in narrative; rather 
they are part of its fabric and affect the way we understand the narrative as well as the way we 
mentally imagine and visualize the story we are told (Bridgeman, 2007, p. 52). Hence, time and 
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space are basic elements in the way we construct the narrative world, and are needed for any 
construction of story. Further, the construction of plot and the reader’s understanding of plot 
requires time and space. Bridgeman argues that our interpretation of narratives is also influenced 
by the temporal and spatial information given in the story (2007, p. 64). Our understanding of the 
plot and what happens in the story is constructed on spatio-temporal patterns. 
Teller (Narrator) And Audience. All stories have a teller, or in other words, a narrator; 
and this person is either an original author of the story or someone telling the story. In general, 
all stories are told or narrated by someone who is the teller but not necessarily the author of the 
story, for the teller can also be someone repeating a story they heard or retelling a story in 
different words.  
The listener is the audience, hearing/reading the story. In terms of oral and interpersonal 
storytelling, the audience members are never passive, but rather are active participants in the 
narrative process. The audience actively interrupt the story, ask questions, make corrections and 
comments; hence one may say the audience are also co-narrators, in that they have an active role 
in the telling of the story. This idea of the audience playing an active role in the story has been 
discussed in the conversational narrative literature. Conversational narrative is always interactive 
telling negotiated among participants.  No matter how the storyteller designs the story to fit the 
local audience and context, the audience will always impose its own designing of the story by 
interrupting, correcting and co-narrating (Norrick, 2007, p. 136). In conversational storytelling, 
the audience become co-authors of the story by assisting the storyteller in determining the 
trajectory, structure and point of the narrative through questions and comments. This makes 
sense since in oral and conversational storytelling, stories are told in response to comments or 
questions that arise in the conversation, which is the same for conversational narrative argument 
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where stories are given as a response to dissensus or difference of opinion between the storyteller 
and the listener.      
While misinterpretation is an inevitable part of narrative reception, especially literary 
narratives due to the presence of gaps in narratives, it is my contention that this happens less 
often with oral and interpersonal accounts of storytelling where the audience plays an active role 
in the construction of the story. This is heavily discussed in the literature on conversational 
storytelling. Oral and written narratives are riddled with gaps and multiple interpretations, 
meaning that the story is rarely completely clear to the reader, for there is always room for 
misinterpretation, multiple interpretations, and questions - which is an inevitable aspect of all 
human communication. No matter how clear or well-constructed the story is, we still have to fill 
things in to make sense of the narrative we read or hear. But this is less the case with oral 
narratives because the recipient or audience can interrupt and interject and ask clarificatory 
questions, and in that way not only help shape the direction and construction of the story but also 
avoid misreading. Hence, while misinterpretation is an inevitable part of narrative and all human 
communication, this problem can be mitigated with oral and interpersonal storytelling. However, 
it may still be true that a single narrative holds different interpretations, and this is not 
necessarily a bad thing, for that is the beauty of narratives: that they can convey multiple 
arguments and points of view through a single story. One story is potentially susceptible to 
different interpretations and no one reading can exhaust the full potential that stories have; and 
each person will fill in the gaps differently, thus excluding other possibilities (Wolfgang Iser as 
cited by Abbott, 2002, p. 85).  
The Act Of Narrative And The Product Of Narrative. Narratives, like traditional 
arguments, have both an act and product component. The product of the narrative is the story that 
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comes out of the act of telling the story, i.e., the act is storytelling; the product is the story 
narrated. (More on this in chapter 4) 
Context. The importance of context to the construction and interpretation of narrative has 
been discussed by the narrative psychologist Jerome Bruner (1991) in his article “The Narrative 
Construction of Reality,” where he offers ten features of narrative. Two of these features are 
context sensitivity and negotiability.  When considering context in relation to narrative, the issue 
of narrative intention and background knowledge becomes important. More precisely, when 
reading or hearing a story we take into account the teller’s intention in light of our background 
knowledge as well as our supposition about the teller’s background knowledge. Our 
interpretation of the story is influenced by the context of storytelling as well as the background 
knowledge that tellers and audience have and share together.  
 
Definition of Argument 
This dissertation will expand the notion of an argument to include narrative since existing 
definitions of arguments typically do not include narrative. That is, many argumentation scholars 
define arguments narrowly. There are three major strands in argumentation theory viz., the 
Logical, Dialectical, and Rhetorical perspectives. Roughly, the Logical approach subjects 
arguments to the standards of deductive logic whereby a good argument is one that is sound and 
valid; the Dialectical concerns itself with the procedures of arguing; and the Rhetorical concerns 
itself with the process of persuading. These three perspectives are not exhaustive, for, as Joseph 
Wenzel notes (1992), there is no single answer to the question of what constitutes an argument, 
and the answer varies depending on the unique approach taken by the diverse scholars on 
argumentation (Wenzel, 1992, p. 121).  
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The logical perspective claims that an argument is a set of statements consisting of 
premises and conclusions, and is a product that is abstracted from the communicative context, 
the purpose of which is to establish standards for sound argument.  
The dialectical perspective claims that an argument must be presented in a clear and 
linear fashion and if it is not, then it should be refined and restructured to fit this model, such that 
the emotional, psychological and contextual factors are excluded (Gilbert, 1997, p. 29). The 
Dialectic (Informal Logic) views arguing as a rational activity, a process characterized by reason 
and explicitly verbal. And so unstructured exchanges are rejected by the Dialecticians because 
explicitness is an important feature of how they define an argument (Gilbert, 1997, p. 34). Some 
of the proponents of this view come from the Informal Logic movement including Ralph 
Johnson, J. Anthony Blair, and Trudy Govier. The dialectical view narrows argument to a 
procedure that is precise, ordered and contained. For example, Douglas Walton says that natural 
argument must be stripped, made explicit and refined such that the underlying argument is 
exposed (Gilbert, 1997, p. 29). The logico-rational essence of the dialectical view narrows down 
the complexity and contextual aspects of everyday arguments into mere sets of premises, 
conclusions, moves and counter moves (Gilbert, 1997, p. 29). The premises and conclusion must 
be identifiable, and as such an argument that is missing these essential parts is eschewed by the 
Dialecticians. Hence, narrative arguments, because they lack linearity of form, are also rejected. 
Narrative as a mode of arguing is unwelcomed because arguing narratively is not always linear, 
and it is not always clear what the premise and conclusion is. Hence, narrative is not likely to be 
accepted in the Dialectic camp.  
The rhetorical view, defended by Wayne Brockriede, Charles Arthur Willard, 
Christopher Tindale and Michael A. Gilbert, is more inclusive and does not see an argument as 
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necessarily logically well-structured. Arguers do not enter a rule-governed discussion, but 
instead use the full range of communicative acts available to them, as opposed to only some sort 
of abstract syllogism or formal logical language (as with the logical perspective). The rhetorical 
view, according to Gilbert, puts no limits on argumentative moves and the notion of an argument 
is unrestricted, and allows anything that happens in an argumentative exchange to count as an 
argument (1997, p. 40). As Brockriede argues, “Arguments are not in statements but in people. 
Hence, a first clue on the whereabouts of arguments: people will find arguments in the vicinity of 
people” (1992, p. 73). According to the rhetorical view, arguments can potentially be found 
everywhere and are what people see them to be; as such, anything can become an argument 
under the right circumstances where the intention to argue is present. Hence, rhetorical theorists 
are interested in the arguments that happen in natural language, not in an ideal formal and logical 
language (p. 127). 
         The rhetorical camp does not say anything about narratives but is more inclusive and 
amenable to narrative arguments because the rhetorical view does not limit argumentative moves 
and allows anything that can happen in an argument to be considered part of it (Gilbert, 1997, p. 
39). There is no limit to what counts as an argument as long as it is part of human interaction and 
activity. Since stories are part of human interaction and are used as a method of persuasion since 
the earliest record of humankind, they are most likely to be accepted in the rhetorical camp. This 
is because the rhetorical view is mostly concerned with how actual arguers argue and what 
methods and techniques they use to argue. While there is still a normative dimension to 
rhetorical argumentation, rhetorical theories of argument are still interested in how actual arguers 
argue. Narrative argumentation fits with the rhetorical camp, although it has so far not been 
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explicitly defended as a mode of rhetorical argumentation. A narrative argument is rhetorical 
because it is a process of arguing couched in the communicative context where it takes place.  
Another way to understand narrative argument is in terms of the three P’s” (product, 
procedure and process) of argument which correspond with the three strands of argumentation 
discussed above: logical, dialectical and rhetorical. Logic is concerned with the product of 
argument. Dialectic is concerned with the procedures and rules required for argumentation so 
that it can be performed correctly and achieve the goal of resolving disagreement and promoting 
critical discussion (Tindale, 1999, p. 3). And rhetoric concentrates on the communication process 
and on the means by which arguers attain adherence/persuasion of an audience (Tindale, 1999, p. 
4). Rhetorical theorists of argumentation view argument as a process and are interested  
in the full communicative act (as opposed to an abstracted syllogism or whatever), in the 
expression in natural language (as opposed to some formal logical language), and in the 
relation of the communicative act to actual speakers and listeners (as opposed to some 
idealized rational being). (Wenzel, 1992, p. 127) 
 My definition of argument in my account of narrative arguments will draw on the 
rhetorical account of argumentation, particularly that of Charles Arthur Willard. Willard defines 
argument as a kind of interaction where participants maintain incompatible or different points of 
view (Willard, 1983, p. 28). The context of argumentation for Willard is dissensus or difference 
of opinion; that is, argumentation arises as a response to dissensus between participants. Willard 
takes a communication perspective toward argumentation. Thus, argument is a type of 
interaction and like any other type of interaction; arguments employ the full array of 
communicative modalities which include the kinesic, paralinguistic and proxemics cues (Willard, 
1983, p. 48). As Willard writes, “the working logics of ordinary argument thus partake of the 
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same materials, discursive and nondiscursive, that all conversation does” (1983, p. 48). Hence, 
Willard’s definition of argument is less restrictive than traditional definitions.  
 Willard offers the following five conditions for defining argument: 
1. “its enabling condition is dissensus, the arguers’ belief that their positions are  
incompatible; 
2. “It is a coorientation based upon mutual attributions of argumentative intent, ‘we are 
having an argument’; 
3. “It is a social comparison process regardless of the motives of the arguers, that is, an 
argument need not be a disinterested dialogue in order to serve epistemic functions” 
4. “Its purposes and meanings cannot for descriptive purposes be abstracted from the 
perspectives of the arguers” 
5. “Definitions of the situation inform the procedures and outcomes of the interaction and 
endow utterances with meaning.” (1983, p. 34) 
The first condition establishes argumentation in the context of disagreement. According to 
Willard, argumentation must have as its starting point disagreement, a point that has also been 
argued by Chaim Perelman and Stephen Toulmin. The second condition suggests an open-ended 
and flexible conception of argument where an argument can be anything that an audience intends 
it to be. For as long as I am using something for the purpose of arguing and the interlocutor 
understands my act as an argument, then that given act succeeds in being an argument; whether it 
is a good or bad one is another matter. However, the intention has to be mutual, for it is not 
enough that I intend my facial expression to be an argument if it is not taken to be so by the 
interlocutor.  
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The third condition suggests that argumentation always produces knowledge regardless 
of the motives of the arguers. When we argue we put our beliefs and arguments in the open for 
scrutiny and as a result of our beliefs being questioned or criticized, we may revise and/or 
change our position (Willard, 1989, p. 112). The act of arguing produces knowledge because it is 
through arguing that we test, examine and modify our beliefs. Fourth, the purpose and meaning 
of argument depends on the perspective of and background knowledge of the arguers. Suppose 
we have an audience who totally reject the use of stories in arguments; when they tell stories, 
they will surely be using them in the descriptive sense. What we do with arguments depends on 
our perspective and overall belief system. Fifth, the context in which an argument takes place 
affects the procedure, style and outcome of the argument.  
 
Definition of Narrative Argument 
My definition of narrative argument includes interactive, dialogical (between at least two 
people), written (for example, those occurring in blogs or chartrooms), oral and interpersonal 
storytelling (although I focus on interactive arguing). Narrative arguments are not what we 
traditionally think of as arguments, i.e., linear arguments with premises and a conclusion (also 
called claim-reason complexes), nor do they fit into deductive arguments. Narrative arguments 
do not fit into the logical model because in using stories to argue we do not use linear arguments 
with premises and conclusions, and the language of storytelling is not always direct and explicit 
in terms of premises and conclusion; but nonetheless the argument presented in the story can be 
just as clearly conveyed and understood by the audience.  
There are two main approaches taken when considering narrative arguments. One is to 
say that from a narrative we can extract reasons that support a conclusion. In other words, by 
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“extraction,” it is meant that stories are reduced to standard arguments.  To do this, we first must 
identify the premise and conclusion in the argument then standardize them and evaluate them. 
The first approach, which I will call the deductive model of narrative argument, denies that 
narrative as a whole is argument.  Trudy Govier and Lowell Ayers follow this deductive 
approach. They argue that some parables contain arguments but deny that the whole narrative is 
an argument.  That is, they extract from parables the arguments by standardizing the parable into 
premises and conclusion and by supplementing premises that are supposedly implicitly stated in 
the story. 
 This deductive approach is common among argumentation scholars and even among 
some multimodal argumentation scholars. While the idea of multimodal argumentation was 
slowly accepted over the years, and proponents of the logocentric view of argument (Ralph H. 
Johnson, Anthony Blair, Daniel J. O’Keefe, Brant Burleson, among others) acknowledge that 
there are non-discursive elements and premises in arguments that can be included in the analysis 
and evaluation of argument, they nonetheless insist that those premises and arguments must be 
made linguistically explicable.  And in order to make linguistically explicable a mode of arguing 
that is non-verbal or discursive in nature, one has to reduce that mode into premises and 
conclusion.  Even some proponents of multimodal argumentation such as Groarke agree that a 
visual mode of arguing such a picture needs to be reduced to premises and conclusion in order to 
be analyzed. This approach assumes that the only way to understand an argument is in terms of a 
product of premises and conclusion.  
Other scholars of the multimodal theses disagree with reduction. Gilbert and Willard 
defend the second approach to multimodal argumentation which resists the move to reduce and 
insists that the whole process of arguing is to be analyzed and understood. Hence, the second 
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approach to understanding narrative arguments is to say that the whole narrative is the argument, 
that there is no separation between narrative and argument; and that is perhaps the radical view 
that is often rejected by argumentation scholars. My account of narrative embraces the second 
approach because reducing stories implies that there is some objective argument out there that 
can be captured; and it misses the complexity of arguing that cannot be reduced to a simple 
statement. It is difficult to reduce a story to an argument because doing so will ultimately miss 
not only the point of the story but also the powerful persuasiveness of it. That is because the 
whole story as process is what makes it persuasive and reducing it to a premise and conclusion 
will not adequately show how and why the story is persuasive. However, reduction raises a 
number of problems, which I discuss in chapter 4.  
 
Features of Narrative Argument. In this section I offer features of narrative argument 
that combine both the features of narrativity (what counts as narrative) as well as features of 
argument.  
Narrative: 
1. One or more events presented in a logical sequence 
2. Movement through time and space 
3. Plot 
4. A teller and an audience 
Narrative argument: 
1. There is a story with the features listed above: a. One or more event 
presented in a chronological sequence, b. Movement through time and 
space, c. Plot, d. A teller and an audience 
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2. Mutual attributions of argumentative intent, ‘we are having an argument’ 
3. Disagreement  
4. Context 
5. Reasons 
6. Arguer 
7. Narrative argument as process not product 
8. Audience 
 
1. Story. A story will have a sequence of events which are chronologically  
connected and happen over a period of time and there is usually a beginning and an end. Note 
that a chronological story does not mean that it is necessarily linear, it can be both fragmented, 
disjunctive and still be chronological.  All narratives have some sort of order and are placed 
within temporal and spatial patterns. All definitions of narrative emphasize the temporally 
ordered sequence of events. Narrative arguments must be stories that are presented in a 
chronological fashion where the audience is able to tell the temporal and causal connection 
between events or actions. 
2. Mutual Attribution of Intention. Narrative arguments require mutual  
attribution of intention which can be understood in two senses. The first intention is the intention 
to have an argument. There must first be the intention of arguing which defines the context of 
dissensus. Both the speaker and the interlocutor must agree, whether implicitly or explicitly, 
through mutual intention that they are having an argument. Otherwise the second sense of 
intention fails, i.e., the story will not be received as an argument. The second intention is the 
intention for the story to be used as an argument and understood to be so. The arguer must have 
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the intention of using stories as an argument and the interlocutor must understand that the story is 
told as an argument otherwise the recipient misses the point of the story.2 
 
3. Dissensus, Disagreement or Opposition. An argument always occurs in 
the context of assumed disagreement, opposition or difference of opinion. Similarly, for narrative 
arguments to function as argument as opposed to just a story or an explanation, they require 
dissensus. The story functions as argument in the context of dissensus. Disagreement is important 
for narrative argument because dissensus or opposition is what sets apart narrative argument from 
mere stories. Without dissensus the story does not function as an argument and may have other 
purposes.  While dissensus is the context of argument it is not the goal. In fact, the goal of narrative 
argument is often the opposite of dissensus. Rather, the aim is to achieve agreement, or to advance 
knowledge or understanding. It should be noted that dissensus does not mean adversarial 
argumentation or a hostile attitude of winning or losing. 
4. Context. There are two senses of context operating in narrative arguments: 
The first sense of context is the immediate situation (what Willard calls the definition of the 
situation) where the argument is taking place. The second sense is context as background 
information. Background information refers to the shared background and common knowledge 
                                                 
2 Willard argues that speech and communication in general is ambiguous and depends on the speaker’s 
intention (Willard, 1983, 34). For example, the statement such as “teacher’s assistants are underpaid” may 
or may not be an invitation to an argument depending on how the speaker is using it, for it is possible that 
the speaker assumes the truth of this statement and is not using it to engage in an argument. Willard’s 
point is that any statements can be viewed from an alternative point of view depending on how we 
interpret the speaker and what the actual intention of the speaker is.  Whether an utterance is an argument 
or not, according to Willard, depends on our attribution of intention to the speaker (Willard, 1983, 34). 
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between speakers that enable successful communication and provide for meaningful interaction. 
Without background knowledge the story cannot make sense or function as a narrative argument.  
Context is both important for the correct interpretation of the story and for the reception 
of the story as an argument. Without context it is difficult to know not only the meaning of the 
story but also the use of it as an argument. Further, what differentiates a narrative argument from 
a mere story is the context in which the story is told. 
Context endows the story with meaning since the story makes sense in the appropriate 
context. Context is an integral feature of all stories; not just stories that function in arguments.  
Narrative arguments cannot be abstracted from the speaker and the situation because both 
inform the meaning of the story. Here is an example of a story that without its context and 
background information would not function as argument nor be fully comprehensible. 
Nancy says to Mary: “I woke up today and had cereal for breakfast and then went to yoga class.” 
This is surely a narrative, and on the face of it, without any background knowledge or 
contextual information, it may seem to be a narrative without an argument. It seems to operate 
like a descriptive/explanatory vehicle. However, when given background information, this 
narrative can be seen to constitute an argument. Suppose that just before Nancy’s statement, 
Nancy’s roommate Mary was wondering out loud where her eggs went. In this scenario, Nancy’s 
story of what she had for breakfast is an argument, conveying that it is not she who ate Mary’s 
eggs. What this narrative implies is that Nancy did not steal the eggs.  The reason why this is a 
narrative argument is by virtue of the shared background knowledge/context and history between 
speakers. Without this shared knowledge, this narrative becomes mere explanation. However, the 
context shows how this narrative claim functions as an argumentative rejoinder to Mary’s 
accusation. 
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5. Reasons. Narrative arguments contain reasons which are unstated 
and conveyed through the story. There is a reason given that is embedded in the story. With 
narrative arguments, like traditional arguments, there is an assertion made that something has to 
be done, changed or believed (Okeefe’s argument1).  
6. Arguer. There is an arguer who is making an argument through the 
telling of a story. 
       7. Narrative argument as process not product. My account of narrative  
argument refers to a process of storytelling (more on this in chapter 4). To help clarify the 
distinction between the process of arguing and the product of arguing, I will refer to Daniel J. 
O’Keefe’s (1982) distinction between argument-1 and argument-2. While argument 1 refers to 
the content and product of argument, i.e., of what is being argued in that particular 
exchange/argument, argument 2 refers to the process, mode, act of arguing (O’Keefe, p. 4). 
Another way to understand argument 1 and argument 2 is in terms of the distinction between the 
process of arguing, and the product of arguing, where argument 1 is the product and argument 2 
is the process. Further, argument-1 also refers to the uses of the verb “arguing that” and 
argument 2 relates to the use of the verb “arguing about.” The examples O’Keefe cites are:  
Argument 1 (Arguing that): “John argued that they should see Citizen Kane” (p.5). 
Argument 2 (Arguing about): “John and Jane argued about which movie to see” (p. 4). 
Argument 2 refers to the activity of arguing as when two people go back and forth in 
arguing which happens in the context of disagreement or as O’Keefe puts it they, “are simply 
interactions in which extended overt disagreements between interactants occurs” (1982, p. 9). 
According to O’Keefe, overt disagreement is a minimal case of Argument 2, for it has to be 
extended overt disagreement where interactants go back and forth for a while.  
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The paradigm case of argument 1 (argument as product), according to O’Keefe, requires 
overtly expressed reason(s) which must both be linguistically explicable and linguistically 
explicit. As O’Keefe writes “a paradigm case of making argument1 involves the communication 
of both (1) a linguistically explicable claim and (1982, p. 2) one or more overtly expressed 
reasons which are linguistically explicit” (1982, p. 14). O’Keefe explains that a paradigm case of 
argument 1 concerns a person making a claim and overtly expressing reason(s) for that claim.  
O’Keefe also explains that “in a paradigm case of argument-making the overtly expressed reason 
must be not merely linguistically explicable but indeed linguistically explicit” (O’Keefe, p. 14). 
My contention is that narrative arguments do not relate to the argument 1 type as products 
because of the problem of reducing narratives to products.  Viewing argument as a product 
requires that we reconstruct the story into a traditional form of argument as product, i.e., into a 
premise and conclusion. This requires that we extract and identify the premises and conclusions 
which not only misses the point of the whole argumentative story but also is difficult since in a 
story the arguer, audience, context and background information are all connected and work 
together as a whole to create the meaning and persuade. Reducing an argument to a product will 
not give an adequate picture of what went on in the whole argument as a complex activity. 
Hence, narrative argumentation should be viewed as an argumentative process not product. 
Narrative arguments are transactional phenomena where the persuasiveness of narratives cannot 
be reduced to just products because their meaning is not isolated units but rather couched in 
interrelations of arguers and audiences and the context and background of the situation. 
8. Audience.  There is an audience/interlocutor to whom the story is directed  
as way to change their belief, come to an understanding, advance knowledge, or whatever the 
goal of argument in that particular case may be. Since this account of narrative argument is a 
 87 
rhetorical, process oriented account of argumentation, much emphasis will be placed on the role 
of audience. The audience plays an important role in the construction and reception of argument. 
Further, the audience also plays a crucial role in the evaluation of argument. The acceptability 
and goodness of narrative argument is measured by the audience. This will be discussed 
thoroughly in chapter five.  
 
Examples Of Narrative Arguments 
In this part I will offer examples of narrative arguments and show how they fit the requirements 
of both narrativity as well as arguments, thus making them narrative arguments. 
Example One. Mona and Sarah were discussing the homeless situation in Toronto, and 
Sarah suggested that any homeless person who has schizophrenia should be involuntarily 
hospitalized or at least put on medications so that they are able to function better or stay out of 
the harsh cold winter. 
 
Sarah: I really feel bad for homeless people suffering from schizophrenia, who are running around 
in the cold talking to themselves. They should be hospitalized or forced to take medication. 
 
Mona responds: That’s not always the case…I had a friend whom I met at university.  He was 
involuntarily hospitalized for over a year, and during that time he tried to commit suicide four 
times. Because he was a mental patient, he was cut off from the community, couldn’t make friends, 
and couldn’t get a job. But when he was finally discharged into the community, he functioned 
much better, made friends, and even went on to do a Bachelor’s degree. And worked in three 
science labs. 
 88 
 
Sarah: Hmmm…Maybe we shouldn’t hospitalize everyone but the ones in the streets are clearly  
dysfunctional and should be hospitalized.   
 
Mona: You would have to live in the hospital and maybe those homeless people still enjoy being  
outside rather than imprisoned indoors. I have another friend with schizophrenia who got 
outpatient treatment and only had to go to the hospital once a week and after a few weeks 
he became much more functional. He started working out and applied for jobs.  
 
Sarah: Well my friend’s cousin was also schizophrenic and was left in the streets and one day they  
found him dead from sleeping in the cold. But I see your point maybe outpatient treatment 
is sufficient. 
 
In this conversation, the argument used was narrative, but there were also parts of the 
story where they used direct serial arguments (traditional arguments). But the bulk of argument 
was in narrative mode. It is not always the case that narrative as a mode of arguing is used alone; 
that is, stories are used in conjunction with other argument modalities including serial 
(traditional) arguments. In interpersonal, interactive argumentation, arguers go back and forth, 
using different modalities of arguments to make a point.  Narrative arguments take place 
alongside other argumentative modes such as the Claim-Reason Complex [CRC]. It is possible to 
find narrative arguments along with explicit, direct and linear arguments. However, it is also 
possible to find narrative arguments used alone in an argumentative context.  My point is to 
accept these stories alongside other forms of arguments and recognize them as legitimate forms 
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of argument. We should not expect people to argue in only the serial, linear, direct and explicit 
form as the dominant argumentation accounts would have us do. 
Further, applying Willard’s requirements of argument, the narrative told by both 
participants does count as an argument because both participants have the intention of making an 
argument through storytelling and both understand the story as an argument. Hence there is 
coorientation and mutual attributions of argumentative intent because both know that they are 
having an argument by telling stories. And both interpret the stories to be functioning as 
arguments. 
 
Example Two. Dina is having a conversation with John about the importance of being 
close to your family whereas john is arguing that a biological bond is not enough to establish a 
relationship. This is a complex argument and has sub arguments such as that family bond is not 
about blood, it is about the treatment one receives from their parents.  
 
Dina says: It is important to make effort and be close to your father. I don’t understand  
why you don’t talk to your father.  
 
To fully respond to Dina’s argument John needs to tell a story of his life, his childhood 
and what happened between him and his father. But only a story can make Dina 
understand the argument John wishes to make, and only a story can fully change Dina’s 
mind about familial ties. To respond, John does not give a direct answer, rather he pauses 
and starts by narrating his story and one story leads to another (However, I will only 
include parts of it here). 
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John: My mother married my father because she was desperate to be with someone and  
to have children. After they had children, the family moved in with my father’s 
mother because my father didn’t have enough money to have his own home…. 
My grandmother disliked my mom and turned my dad against my mom. [sigh] 
My father who was very close to his mother always sided with his mom which 
really upsets me because they were both unfair to my poor mother. I always sided 
with my mother because I saw how unfair things were for her…and [long pause] 
he didn’t care for us either and….[another long pause]  the family became 
polarized… there was resentment on both sides…[of course the story goes on 
and on]… 
 
One must note that this written narrative argument does not capture all of the content of 
the narrative argument that was told in a one to one personal interaction between 
friends/familiars who share a background knowledge and context. Rather this written 
narrative argument is but an approximation of what took place in that specific context, 
time and place and hence it does not capture the tone, gesture, physical, visceral, kisceral 
and emotional (Gilbert) elements that were conveyed in the narrative as it was told in 
that interaction.  
Another point to be made is that the story does not start with a direct response to 
the argument made by Dina which is often the case when people sit together and argue 
through stories. The arguments are not made explicit from the get go; rather they unfold 
as the story unfolds. John’s story does not merely illustrate a point or an argument; it is 
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the argument. No parts of it alone can be taken to be adequate on their own. It is only in 
the full story, in the way it is conveyed with the tone and body language and so on that 
it can function and be understood as that argument that John wishes to tell (that 
biological bond is not enough to establish a relationship). And that story surely cannot 
be reduced to just the product, (i.e., the argument told in the story) because the act of 
storytelling is just as important as the product of the storytelling. What narrative 
arguments show is that sometimes it is difficult to separate the product (what is being 
argued) from the process (the whole communicative and social act of arguing).  
 
Example Three. Two friends are having an argument about Saddam Hussein and whether Iraq 
was better with or without Saddam (this is a typical argument Iraqis have about politics). 
 
Ahmed: Iraq has been destroyed since the overthrow of Saddam. Saddam was better for Iraq, we  
benefited greatly under his rule. 
Zeina: Well, when I was 15 years old, I remember dad leaving at 5 am in the morning because he  
was terrified that Saddam’s men would come after him. He left to see my other relatives 
in another city and we didn’t hear from him for two months. My uncle came the next day 
and told us we had to leave because my brothers were also on the wanted list for Saddam. 
We had to leave without my dad and my whole neighborhood was in the same situation. 
Many families fled fearful for their lives.   
Ahmed: Ya hmm. Well you know my brother Ali. I remember during that time in the ‘90s my  
family was battling with my brother’s health issue and we didn’t have the money to pay 
for his surgery. My dad wrote a letter to Saddam asking for help and he responded with 
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generosity and offered to pay for all the expenses. There are so many stories like this 
about families being helped by Saddam. He was loved by many. 
 
This debate is usually based on stories. People usually share stories about their experience with 
Saddam and that is how the argument proceeds with competing stories, each side demonstrating 
their point of view with a story and the better the story is the more convincing one’s point of 
view is seen to be. 
 
Example Four. A husband and wife are arguing about their families. The wife (Sandra) feels 
that her husband (John) does not respect or care about her family. And so they are arguing about 
whether that’s true or not, that the husband doesn’t care for the wife’s family. When Sandra tells 
John that she wishes that he would spend more time with her family and that he loved them 
more, he responds with this story: 
 
John: Your mom was sick for two years and I was the only one taking care of her. Even her  
family didn’t show as much affection as me. The day your family called to tell you about 
her situation, I was the one that offered to pick her up. And I went at 2 in the morning to 
get her. When she came to stay with us, I took time off of work to spend time with her. I 
let you keep your job because they didn’t give you time off, so I stayed with her.  
 
Sandra: Yes, but we haven’t had a real family gathering for over two years, and whenever I had  
asked you to come with me, you refused.  
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John: No, you forgot about Nancy’s birthday when I bought her that bracelet from the mall and  
met you there.  
 
Sandra: But that’s still once in two years. 
 
John: yes…when is your mother’s dinner? 
 
At the end, the disagreement is resolved and they come to an agreement that John will go to his 
mother-in-law’s dinner with Sandra. 
 
Objections and Response 
One of the objections to narrative is that there are no narrative arguments, only arguments/points 
embedded in narratives. That is, one may object that there is no need to accept narrative 
arguments wholesale, but rather it is better to deconstruct narratives into arguments, i.e., extract 
arguments from stories. My response is that the deconstruction of narratives into a traditional 
linear explicit argument with premises and conclusions misses the point of narrative arguments. 
Forcing a narrative into a traditional form would distort the argument told in the story and would 
not fully reflect what the speaker meant. Further, the point is that narrative arguments serve a 
different function than traditional modes. Some arguments or points are hard to convey in an 
explicit linear way, and doing so misses the ultimate point behind the story: that is, the story as 
the whole process is the point. When people argue they do not always give direct arguments or 
respond directly to an argument that the interlocutor puts forward; rather in the context of 
narrative argumentation, speakers go on telling stories. Nonetheless, speakers seem to get the 
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point that these stories are more than just explanations; speakers understand the argument and 
idea behind the narrative. Sometimes it is the case that you simply cannot give a direct answer 
nor respond directly to an argument without giving a story, i.e., only a story about what 
happened will capture what the speaker wishes to argue.   
Another objection that may be raised concerns the indirectness of narrative arguments 
and how they lack linearity or form, which, as the objection goes, creates more ambiguity in 
meaning. According to this objection, narrative arguments may potentially be ambiguous or 
indeterminate. My response is to point out that all forms of communication are indeterminate. 
This objection is not particular to narrative arguments. For all communication is ambiguous and 
indeterminate.  Even explicit, serial and linear arguments exhibit ambiguity in meaning. We are 
often unsure (and at times confused) about the meaning of a philosophical work or a 
philosopher’s points of view or a system of thought. Even arguments displayed in the traditional 
model of premise and conclusion are endowed with indeterminateness. That is the fact of all 
communication. All you have to do is look at the philosophical debates about a certain 
philosopher’s meaning and you will see that even a clear and well thought out body of work is 
ambiguous (an example given by Gilbert). More on this objection in chapter four. 
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Chapter Four: Narrative Argument, A Process Account 
 
Introduction 
I argue that narrative must be seen as a process. To do so, I will briefly explain the three different 
accounts of argument: product, rhetorical, and dialectical. A product account of argument is 
interested in both written and oral arguments, but in either case, it depicts the argument as a 
linear, explicit, and discursive form of argumentation that includes premises and a conclusion, 
often called a CRC, claim- reason complex.  The rhetorical account, by contrast, treats 
argumentation as a process and is interested in the “means by which arguers make their cases for 
the adherence of audience to claims advanced” (Tindale, 1999, p. 34). This model denies that 
arguments can be reduced to a rigid formula. Proponents of the rhetorical model include Gilbert 
(2007) and Willard (1982, 1989). The dialectical approach attempts to reconcile the product and 
rhetorical accounts of argument (Tindale, 1999, p. 6).  In some sense, it follows a process 
account; however, it differs from the rhetorical because the rhetorical is interested in all the 
means that arguers use to persuade an audience, and, unlike the dialectical, does not focus on the 
rules/procedures for resolving disputes and promoting a critical discussion. Therefore, the 
dialectical approach still retains the idea that an argument has to have a linear structure. 
My focus will be only on the two senses: product and process because, since the 
dialectical marries the two approaches, product and rhetorical, it inevitably retains some 
problematic aspects of the product account that I am steering away from. I will argue that the 
product account is inferior to the rhetorical model because arguments—and particularly narrative 
arguments—lose some of their persuasive force if reduced to standardized arguments. Thus, 
while narratives can be reduced to products in principle, this transformation cannot be done 
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without diluting the argument’s warrant, and thus misrepresenting the argument as less 
persuasive than it is in practice. Hence, in this chapter I will further elaborate on the definition of 
narrative argument and demonstrate how it ought to be understood as a process rather than a 
product. First, I will offer seven reasons as to why narratives cannot be reduced to a product. 
Finally, I will respond to objections as to why narrative resists translation into premises and a 
conclusion. 
 During the 1970s significant attention was given to the different ways of defining an 
argument, in particular the difference between the sense of argument as product and as process 
(Zarefsky, 2014, p. 61).  Since then, it has been hotly debated whether the product account (also 
referred to as argument1) or the process account (argument2) should be the primary definition of 
argument informing research (Zarefsky, p. 62).  David Zarefsky explains that viewing 
argumentation as a product favors the view that arguments are necessarily discursive, whether in 
written or oral form. In addition, the argument as product must have premises and a conclusion, 
must be linear in form, and must implicitly or explicitly have a propositional structure (Zarefsky, 
p.  64). In contrast, viewing argument as process favors the view that argument does not have to 
be discursive, or may be non-discursive by its very nature. A major difference between the two 
senses of argument is that argument as product is devoid of context because products are 
considered timeless, whereas the process notion of argument relies on context (time and place) 
for its meaning and argumentative import. There is no consensus as to which perspective of 
argumentation should take precedence; however, the definition that most scholars seem to favor 
frames argumentation as linear and explicitly taking the form of premises and a conclusion.   
Joseph Wenzel (1980) argues that all arguments have all three perspectives, and each 
perspective depends on the arguer’s priorities. As Wenzel points out, while these three 
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perspectives observe the same phenomenon of argumentation, they focus on and highlight 
different aspects of argument. Nonetheless, their boundaries are obscured and the three 
perspectives inevitably overlap with one another. Wenzel argues for a synthesis of the three 
perspectives, while others insist that the product (or for others the rhetorical) must be the starting 
point or foundation of a theory of argumentation. Tindale, for example, argues that the rhetorical 
account is better suited for the synthesis of the three perspectives (1999, p. 7). He asserts that the 
rhetorical approach avoids the limitations and problems of the logical and the dialectical. That is, 
Tindale states that the rhetorical account, with its focus on the context where argumentation 
takes place and the personalities of those engaged in argumentation, offers the most complete 
account of what arguing is and what it is like to argue and engage in argumentation (1999, p. 7).  
Tindale’s view is compelling, especially with regards to narrative arguments, which, as I 
define them, are interactive and interpersonal, and thus resist reduction to closed, linear products. 
This is because narratives are rooted in social interactions between people, and written 
narratives, such as narratives as product, are derivative upon and secondary to these real-time 
social exchanges. In this dissertation, I am committed to the specific claim that narrative is a 
process, but whether all argumentation is a process is a question I will have no need to pursue 
further because it falls outside the scope of the project. I offer seven reasons for what makes 
narrative a process, and although the features I discuss are not specific to narrative and apply to 
other arguments, especially other non-traditional and multimodal arguments as shown by Willard 
and Gilbert, I am still only focusing and arguing for the specific claim that narrative arguments 
should be seen as a process. Argumentation scholars disagree as to whether all argumentation is 
a process, but in this chapter I do not want to enter this debate. Rather, I am using scholarship on 
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argumentation to make a specific point about narrative, and to make broader claims about 
argumentation in general is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Narrative arguments should not be seen from the product perspective; rather, reducing 
narratives to products artificially depletes the argumentative force that they have in the 
procedural mode. Moreover, the process view of argumentation is best suited to interpret 
narrative argument because narratives are interactive and interpersonal in their original and 
natural format. Product reductions are secondary, weak replications of narratives-in-practice. 
That is, the process of narrative arguments is situated in the interaction between arguers, and this 
interaction includes the audience as rhetorically understood, the relationship that forms between 
them, the background, and the context of the argumentation. My account of narrative argument is 
thus defined in terms of the process-oriented perspective of the rhetorical argumentation, where 
an argument is seen as a process and not a product. In support of this thesis, I will show how 
reducing narrative into premises and conclusion is problematic. 
 
Why Narrative Should Remain a Process 
There are seven claims in support of the position that narrative should be seen as a process.  
First, the form of narrative argument is naturally a process and does not follow the 
traditional model. 
Second, narratives involve contextual features that are not reducible to products, as well as 
multi-modal contents, such as emotional or physical.  
Third, narratives are first and foremost dynamic and fluid interactions between arguers and 
are a co-creation of the arguer and the audiences.  
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Fourth, even with the most sophisticated diagramming tools, we cannot capture the 
cognitive processes through which arguments exert persuasive force on audience members, 
and these processes are arguably a component part of the argument (viz., Willard 1976).  
Fifth, arguments contain paralinguistic contents and complex ‘messages’ that cannot be 
reduced to linguistic formulae (as argued by Willard and Gilbert).  
Sixth, translations of arguments (i.e., the product account) randomly privilege a single 
‘analyst’s’ perspective thereby cutting off other relevant interpretations of the 
argumentative exchange (Willard, 1976).  
Seventh, when translating an argument, under-representation and misinterpretation are 
inevitable (Willard, 1976).  
 
1. Nature of Narrative Argument. Narrative, as found in natural argument, is not a 
product, but rather a process. This means that reasons are not stated explicitly in narrative, nor 
does narrative have an argumentative linear form. Willard claims that during argumentation, 
reasons slowly emerge in the argumentative utterance, and the reasons are not linked to the 
claims from the outset. The same is true of narrative arguments; the reasons are not explicitly 
stated, nor are they made explicit in the exchange, rather they are implied.  In order for one to 
approach narrative as a product, one has to translate it, which means taking it out of context and 
picking out certain features as components of the argument.  Thus, in order to read narrative as 
product, one would have to reduce it and remove it from its natural habitat.  Narratives pose a 
unique problem to product accounts of argument because narratives are especially messy. The 
contents of narrative arguments are more likely to be implicit than in other forms of 
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argumentation, because narratives convey messages through metaphors, similes, and other 
indirect expressive modalities compared to classic argumentation forms.  
Reducing narrative into a product removes the real argument—part of which is implicit—
from its context, its unique situation, and its complex social setting. The dominant account of 
argument, which includes the logico-deductive model, states that an utterance is an argument if 
and only if the claims and the reasons are explicitly stated. This dominant account is restrictive 
because it requires that at least one reason be given explicitly, and it assumes that an utterance is 
not an argument if no reason is explicitly given. If this is the case, then many utterances that 
convey reasons are not arguments because arguers do not always explicitly state reasons.   
Furthermore, reducing narrative reasoning, as Willard (1978) points out, encourages the 
analysis of argument in a vacuum (p. 123). Hence, traditional accounts of argument do not model 
real argumentation, such as narrative reasoning. So one of the main reasons why we should favor 
a process-oriented approach to narrative reasoning is that it is more faithful to everyday 
interactions. 
 
2. Narrative Arguments: Multimodal and Contextual Elements. Since a narrative 
argument is contextual, the different elements of its context contribute to its meaning, i.e., 
meaning is elicited through a variety of contextual elements. Hence, narrative meaning is 
contextual. As such, extracting an argument from narrative will result in the loss of embedded 
contextual meaning. Contextual elements would be lost or seriously modified if they are reduced 
to a CRC. Thus, the meaning would be seriously compromised. 
Narrative arguments exist among and employ a range of argument modalities such as 
emotion, tone, gesture, and body language and are couched in contextual factors.  
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We cannot look at the narrative alone as a way of understanding its meaning or argumentative 
import because, in the first place, narrative as an argument does not exist alone without other 
argument modalities being used to convey its message. This account of how narrative argument 
works is consistent with Willard’s definition of argument. Willard suggests an argument is a type 
of interaction, and that like any other type of interaction, they employ the full array of 
communication modalities (1983, p. 48). As Willard writes, “the working logics of ordinary 
argument thus partake of the same materials, discursive and non-discursive, that all conversation 
does” (1983, p. 48).   
Second, because narrative arguments do not arise in isolation and are always part of a 
larger argumentative exchange, the context of the narrative becomes a central element of the 
persuasiveness of the narrative.  So it is misleading to reduce the persuasiveness and 
argumentative import of the narrative into a statement of premise and conclusion without 
acknowledging that narrative becomes argumentative through context and in conjunction with 
other multimodal arguments (such as emotional arguments). For example, a narrative told 
without emotion, which is also a type of argument mode, will have a different point than a story 
told with a strong display of emotions. Also, the type of emotions displayed will affect the 
meaning and argumentative aspect of the narrative. Furthermore, a narrative told without 
emotional display, depending on the context and participants, is often not as persuasive as a 
narrative told with strong emotions, and the same is true with the tone of the story when it is told. 
That is, the tone of the speaker changes the meaning of the story as well as where emphasis is 
placed in the story. When the story is told, the tone of the speaker plays an important role in not 
only the meaning, where emphasis is placed, but also the trust and credibility of the story.  The 
tone and character of the speaker can positively or negatively impact the reception of the story 
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and the type of relationship that forms between the argumentative partners, which can in turn 
establish character and establish trust. Looking at the example of Donald Trump in the American 
2016 presidency campaign, it is reasonable to think that, in light of his bad character and track 
record of lies and deception, an otherwise persuasive story coming from him would not be 
received well by many listeners. While the opposite may also be true: a bad story and perhaps a 
lie may be believed by an audience that blindly trusts the speaker. Speaker credibility is nuanced 
and context-sensitive, and cannot be translated into a linear argument product—at least, not in 
the way envisioned by proponents of the logico-deductive model. 
A story is not the same without embedded modes of arguing and contextual factors. All 
these other contextual factors enrich and impact the whole argumentative exchange. Hence, the 
meaning of the narrative is not just found in the explicit content of the story, but also in the 
emotional display and body language of the speaker. Meaning cannot just be found in the verbal 
and expressive. Rather, meaning is to be found in the context, audience reception and the 
intricate and subtle relationship between those engaged in argumentation. Narrative argument 
derives its meaning from the background and context in which it arises and the argument modes 
that it employs.  As such, narrative arguments are contextual. The story functions and has 
different meanings depending on the context and background information surrounding it. As a 
consequence, the arguments offered in the process of argumentation are embedded in the process 
and inseparable from that context because they are intertwined. Specifically, the context, 
background information, and relationship between the arguer and the audience are all part of 
the argument.  
Moreover, the meaning of an argument is contextual and fluid. As Willard (1983) points 
out, reducing or diagramming arguments does not capture the process of arguing where arguers 
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constantly shift and invent different argumentative strategies (p.49). Willard’s point is that 
ordinary talk is contextual and implicit, and it is those implicit assumptions that endow an 
utterance with meaning (1983, p. 49). Arguers often leave reasons unstated in the background of 
their overt claims. 
That is, looking at the discursive and spoken narrative alone will not tell us the true 
meaning of the narrative nor the argumentative import of the narrative because there is more to 
the argument than its discursive parts. Narrative arguments cannot be abstracted from the 
situation and the process of communication in which they occur, and hence one should not think 
of them as products, but rather as a process. Reducing narratives into premises and conclusions 
will not give an adequate picture of what went on in the whole argumentative exchange. The 
main persuasive features of the argument, such as the emotional and physical modes, as well as 
the context, cannot be conveyed through a set of premises and a conclusion. 
 
3. Narrative Arguments: A Co-Creation of The Arguer And The Audience. Narrative 
is not isolated: story-making involves an arguer and an audience. This is because narrative 
argument is a co-creation between arguer and audience. Narrative arguments are rhetorical-
oriented processes because rhetorical accounts view argumentation as a cooperative act where 
both the arguer and the audience are involved in its development and outcome (Tindale,1999, p. 
69). That is, narrative arguments are transactional phenomena whose meaning cannot be reduced 
to products without remainder as their meaning is not a set of isolated units, but rather couched 
in interrelations between (i) arguers, (ii) audiences, and (iii) the context and background of the 
situation. To reduce narrative to product is to remove it from the process.  This would 
decontextualize it and frame it as an abstract entity devoid of contextual background and 
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relationships in which it is embedded. According to the logical perspective, the meaning of a 
statement and the relationship between the premise and conclusion is  
conducted without reference to the background—the circumstances in which it arises, 
including the occasion and consequences; the arguer and her or his intentions in arguing; 
and the audience, with its background of beliefs and expectations. (Tindale, 1999, p. 29) 
From the logical perspective, arguments are seen as things or products that may be abstracted 
from the communicative context, and to view narrative arguments as products is to also subject 
them to an abstraction and reduction that fails to capture the full communicative process of 
arguing via narrative. Since narrative is a co-creation between arguer and audience, it is 
misleading to attempt to find the meaning and argumentative import of it solely in the content of 
the story without looking at the relationship between the interactants as a central part of the 
persuasion that takes place in the argumentative exchange. Reducing narrative to the content 
misses the point of the narrative argument, which is first and foremost a relationship that people 
enter, where stories are told, and where trust is (ideally) built and maintained. To reduce a story 
to just premises and conclusions is to misconstrue its purpose and meaning—the dynamic 
meaning built between arguers.  
Willard’s concept of co-orientation helps to explain why the relationship between the 
audience and the arguers adds to the complexity of narrative, in a way that poses a difficulty for 
faithful and accurate translation. ‘Co-orientation’ is a concept that Willard uses to explain how 
arguments take their coherence from speakers’ plans and goals (1989, p. 49). What becomes 
argumentative depends on the intention, understanding, and the uptake of those involved in the 
argument. The relationship between arguers ‘co-orients’ them in such a way that they know 
whether they agree or disagree, and whether this disagreement is worth entering an argument for 
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(Willard, 1989, p. 54) Hence, an example of co-orientation in argumentation would look like the 
following assumption:  
I assume that we disagree; I assume that you assume we disagree; I assume that I am 
arguing and that you agree that I am arguing; you assume that you are arguing and that I 
would agree that you are arguing. (Willard, 1989, p. 53) 
Co-orientation is a concept Willard uses to explain that people come to argue when they have a 
disagreement, know that they disagree, have an intention to argue, know that they are arguing, 
and understand that the modalities used within that exchange, such as a sigh, are used to argue. 
This co-orientation inherent in argumentation adds to the complexity of argumentation in that it 
is a unique kind of relationship between the arguer and the audience that cannot always be 
understood from an outsider’s perspective—such as that of someone attempting to translate the 
argument. It might not be apparent to an outsider or a translator what gesture counts as an 
argument, though participants might have a better idea what they are trying to convey. That is, 
what a critic decides is an argumentative gesture or mode may in fact not be one from the “inside 
perspective,” and what a critic excludes as an argumentative mode may in fact be one. We 
should not assume that outsiders have privileged critical status. 
 
4. Cognitive and Psychological Aspects and Process of Persuasion. Narrative 
argument is permeated with complex psychological and cognitive processes that cannot be 
adequately translated into the dominant model of argumentation. Reducing narrative would 
require various kinds of translations and simplifications. This point was thoroughly argued by 
Willard in 1976 specifically in relation to translating arguments into the Toulmin model. 
According to Willard, an accurate translation of an argument would have (at a minimum) three 
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parts: (1) the process occurring in the mind of the source (arguer) that results in the verbalized 
claim, (2) the symbolic cues sent out by the arguer, and (3) the cognitive processes of the 
receiver as they hear the argument (1976, p. 310). These parts would require elaborate 
diagrams—diagrams that we can’t chart in practice because we don’t have access to the relevant 
information. As such, it is impossible for one diagram to capture all the required translational 
content.  As argued by Willard, argument diagrams cannot represent the complex and to some 
extent mysterious cognitive process that allow persuasion and communication to take place.  
Argument diagrams cannot give us a structural representation of the cognitive processes that 
have produced an argument (Willard, p. 312). Further, Willard writes, “the Toulmin diagram 
cannot serve as a structural representation of human cognitive processes given the complexity of 
those processes and the state of human knowledge about them” (1976, p. 311). Hence, according 
to Willard the most important factors that guide and shape an individual’s inferential processes, 
such as one’s attitudes, beliefs values, and emotions, cannot be represented in a diagram (1976, 
p. 315). And without this complex inferential process an argument diagram is inadequate 
because it does not show us how the argument is cognitively represented, nor how it becomes 
persuasive to the audience. One can only use the Toulmin diagram to represent a speech text, not 
the cognitive process of representing and processing the argument (1976, p. 312). That is, 
argument diagrams do not adequately represent cognitive paradigms. The same is true of 
attempts to deconstruct narratives into premises and conclusion: the reconstructed argument does 
not tell anything about the psychological force of the narrative on the hearer, its persuasiveness, 
or the inferential processes as experienced by the hearer. Thus, diagrams are psychologically 
inadequate.  
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Further, Willard argues, 
the difficulty with this approach [diagramming and translating arguments] is that 
many of the forces that impel speakers to certain modes of persuasive behavior 
(and auditors to certain kinds of behavior) are not expressible in language. Indeed, 
many fundamental propositions about which people “argue” are not linguistically 
expressible. (1976, p. 315).  
The motives behind making arguments such as the arguer’s attitudes, beliefs and values that 
underlie the inferential leap from data to claim are not included in the product of argument. 
Hence, it is difficult to reduce the argument motives which include an arguer’s beliefs, attitudes 
and values.  Willard cites Susanne Langer, who argues that many aspects of our sensuous, mental 
and emotional life cannot be captured in words (1976, p. 315). Langer, as cited by Willard, 
argues that this subjective reality is not only beyond the reach of language, but is impossible in 
the essential frame of language (p. 315). As such, art, music, dance, sculpture, and painting are 
symbolic and express modes of human feelings that cannot be expressed linguistically (Willard, 
1976, p. 315). Even the arts such as poetry express feelings only indirectly (Willard, 1976, p. 
315). Hence, just as we cannot reduce into words our aesthetic experience, we similarly cannot 
reduce our argumentative exchanges as conveyed in interactive narratives into a linguistic 
product.  
And so the problem with reducing narratives is that a group of propositions and the 
diagram they are placed in do not fully capture the actual interactions amongst people. The 
resulting translation of the narrative does not tell us the psychological process of how the 
argument is produced, how it is received by the recipient, or convey the extra-linguistic contents 
of the exchange. This is because the psychological and persuasive aspects of argumentation are 
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too complex to represent in either a diagram or a traditional, explicit, discursive, and linear 
argument. 
 
5. Narrative Argument as Complex Message Design And Reception. Narrative 
argument, like any other type of argumentation, is a type of communication, which means that 
the complexity of message design and reception plays a role. The translation of narrative into 
premises and a conclusion does not take into account the complexity of how a message is 
produced and received. As Willard (1976) point out, a diagram with a set of propositions does 
not represent the dynamic and complex interaction that takes place when one person formulates a 
set of propositions and transmits certain symbolic cues to another person, who then interprets 
and constructs these cues (p. 310). The arguers’ perception of the situation, of symbol meanings, 
and of the other person’s motives all come together to determine the choice of one proposition 
over another. Willard argues that paralinguistic, kinetic, and proxemic cues all have an important 
role in how the audience receives and understands the message/proposition (1976, p. 313). So, 
Willard’s point is that when person A sends person B a message, a myriad of complex variables 
take place and must be accounted for in order to describe what happens; but these variables 
cannot be captured through the deconstruction and diagramming of arguments. Narrative 
arguments, like other arguments, employ complex messages that are not captured in the reduced 
product.  
This attempt to re-interpret all argumentative modes into the logical is what Gilbert calls 
“prejudiced reductionism” (1997, p. 79), which is a prejudiced assumption that the only way to 
understand, assess, and analyze an argument is through the logical mode.  This assumption 
misses a crucial point about argumentation. Argumentation is a form of communication that uses 
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messages, and messages “contain more than words, they contain information, nuance, flavor, 
tone of voice, body language…” (Gilbert, 2014, pp. 2-3). Gilbert argues that people do not 
communicate in sentences or propositions, but rather in messages. And because arguments 
contain messages, we cannot translate their parts into the familiar symbols of deductive logic.  
 
6. Translation and A Single, Limited Perspective. Translating narrative into premises 
and a conclusion runs into the problem of a single and biased perspective. When translating, it is 
not clear whose perspective to adopt. Those analyzing the narrative ‘from the outside’ may have 
a different interpretation of the argument’s content, meaning, and import, compared to those 
actively engaged in the argument. A similar point is raised by Willard in relation to the 
translation of arguments into diagrams. Willard argues that the deconstructing and diagramming 
of arguments runs into “the problem of perspective.” Willard asks whose perspective will define 
the argument, and concludes that there are many different perspectives that can be taken, 
however none of which may be faithful to the actual interaction. That is, it is impossible to 
capture all of these perspectives in one diagram—especially given that it is impossible to 
translate even one perspective, including the relevant cognitive and paralinguistic elements, into 
a single diagram. As Willard (1976) asserts,  
the critic is encouraged (and, in a sense, forced) to impose the form of a diagram on that 
which s/he seeks to describe. The diagram greatly limits the critic’s ability to construe the 
various perspectives of the people who are ‘arguing’ in a social context. (1976, p. 315).  
This is especially the case because, as pointed out by Willard, argumentation and 
communication in general are enthymematic, and so the analyst must make educated guesses 
about missing data, warrant, and backing that the arguer did not verbalize. And hence the analyst 
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must distinguish between the “perspective of the source and the receiver as they ‘fill in the 
blanks’” (Willard, 1976, p. 311). As such, we cannot know for sure what the arguer draws on in 
terms of data, warrant and backing. While we could give priority to one person’s perspective, 
this would artificially limit the content of the argumentative exchange, which included multiple 
interactive perspectives.   
Similarly, as pointed out by Gilbert (2014) (in his correspondence with David Botting), in 
attempting to translate a message into a product, the communication becomes that of the analyst, 
not the speaker, because it is the analyst who will decide what is and is not important, and what 
is and is not to be included (p. 3). If instead, Gilbert argues, we look at communication and 
argument as a whole without deciding what to include and what to exclude (as premise and 
conclusion), we then see the whole process as important, rather than excluding potentially crucial 
elements. This is why Gilbert insists that the whole argumentative communicative act must be 
considered and analyzed holistically, not reduced to parts (p. 3). 
 
7. Distortion and Misinterpretation. The reduction and translation of narratives 
inevitably leads to misinterpretation. This is because, as shown above, (1) there are many 
perspectives on an argumentative exchange, and (2) translating a narrative into a deductive form 
requires an enormous amount of interpretation on the part of analyst, and no matter how careful 
the analyst is, there will always be something excluded from the narrative that is important to the 
argument. (This is because arguments are eminently complex and analysts have finite 
knowledge—indeed, sufficient cognitive models to represent the cognitive encoding of 
arguments is entirely lacking). Misinterpretation is a problem for all argument translations, even 
arguments that follow a linear, explicit style, but the problem is compounded by complex, 
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contextual argumentative exchanges. As pointed out by Gilbert, (2002) all communication 
requires clarification, and as such, misunderstandings happen as a matter of course, even in 
linear arguments (p. 25). And because narrative arguments rely on different argument modalities, 
are audience-oriented, rely on co-orientation and complex cognitive and message design, they 
are too rich to translate into premises and a conclusion. 
Willard (1976) also points to the problem of distortion and misinterpretation that results 
from deconstructing/diagramming arguments (p. 309). Willard argues that fitting a persuasive 
argument into a diagram requires that we reduce and translate the argument, which requires that 
we reformulate symbolic cues into analytically explicable premises, and this is ultimately an act 
of distortion. It is likely that those making the argument diagram will misinterpret the actual 
argument, and fill in different data, warrant, and backings for the argument (assuming they are 
using the Toulmin model) than those used by the arguers. That is, arguers may rely on different 
data and backing than may be apparent to the analyst. Hence, it is inevitably arbitrary what the 
critic decides to extract as a reason. As a result, when we reduce a narrative argument, we are 
making a lot of assumptions, many of which may be inaccurate and different from those of the 
arguers. And since there are many processes, both cognitive and communicative, embedded in 
argumentation, it is inevitable that lapses and misinterpretations will occur. Misinterpretation is 
bound to occur when translating a complex, multi-perspectival, and obscure process such as 
narrative.  
Translation always misses parts of the narrative, and oversimplifies the complexity and 
richness of the narrative. Narrative arguments, as shown above, are multimodal, contextual, 
audience-oriented, and utilize complex messages designs and cognitive processes, and hence 
 112 
they are bound to be under-represented or misinterpreted by a translator with limited, context-
bound knowledge. 
 
Objections and Response 
Objection One: Clarity And Meaningfulness. Some argumentation scholars might 
insist that in order to make sense of the argumentative act, the narrative must be reduced to a 
product. The first objection to maintaining narrative argument as a process relates to the clarity 
and meaningfulness of narrative as an argumentative form.  One objection against maintaining 
the narrative form claims that narrative is not meaningful unless it is made into premise and 
conclusion. Narrative form, some argue, is difficult to understand argumentatively and in order 
to understand the argument embedded in the narrative, we need to extract the reasons from the 
narrative. As a result, some argue that the narrative form is less clear than linear, logical 
arguments because it is hard to know what the argument is in the form of stories because reasons 
are not stated clearly. This assumed problem of clarity leads to the demand for reducing 
multimodal arguments into a product. What this assumes is that logical arguments are more clear 
then multimodal arguments. In response to this objection, I will discuss three features of 
narrative that will explain how narratives are argumentatively clear. 1. They arise within a 
dissensual exchange where disagreement is present, and 2. Narrative arguments are contextual, 
processual and interactive, 3. Narrative arguments operate within a rhetorical audience that is 
already interactive, engaged and co-creating the narrative.  
First, the distinctive defining characteristic of narrative arguments is that they occur 
within a disagreement, otherwise they do not function as an argument. Narrative argument 
requires the appropriate context to be taken up and understood as an argument and that context is 
 113 
disagreement. Stories arises in response to claims made or to disagreement. So, when the story is 
told, it is already clear by then what is the issue being disputed. My account of narrative 
argument stipulates and requires that they function within dissensus. The requirement of 
disagreement allows the story to make sense within that exchange.  
Second, another defining characteristic of narrative is that it is processual. As such, the 
narrative form is contextual and embedded in the situation. The story told is part of the whole 
interaction. And so, when a story is told it is a response to an issue discussed and the teller is 
telling the story to demonstrate the reasons for his/her claim that may be told before the story is 
given or as part of the story. Stories are not solitary occurrences and are interactive, which means 
that the story as an argumentative act is never solitary or static but is formed within the 
interaction and is shared between those engaged in argumentation. Since narrative is a 
communicative process, it attains its meaning from that process. As such, it is the context that 
endows narrative with meaning and makes it argumentative. The answer to how narrative 
becomes argumentative is in the context, process and relationship between arguer and audience. 
Because narrative relies on the whole communicative interaction for it is meaning, the argument 
will be found in that process.  Hence, the audience understands the argument through the whole 
process of arguing, i.e., the narrative argument is understood through the way the story is told, 
the tone, intonation, context and the mutual attribution of intention which cannot be articulated in 
the discursive form of the premise or conclusion. This brings us to the third feature of narrative, 
that it takes place within a rhetorical and interactive audience where the meaning and 
argumentative import of narrative is clear and understood.  
Since narrative argument is audience oriented, this means that the audiences engaged in 
narrative argumentation are rhetorical audiences which involve both the arguer and the 
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respondent. That is, the concept of rhetorical audience means that the audience is actually 
involved in the construction of argument: the concept of rhetorical audience includes both the 
arguer and respondent. Also, the literature in narratology also shows that stories are shaped by 
the listener and that stories are often not passively told but rather the listener is an active 
participant. And since the listener is involved in the construction of story then surely they must 
understand the meaning and argumentative force of the narrative. Since narrative arguments are 
rhetorical, contextual and processual, they are indeed meaningful and their meaning is fairly easy 
to determine.  
Hence, given that narrative arises in an argumentative context with an interactive 
audience, it seems wrong to assume that they would not be clear, or less clear than logical and 
traditional arguments. In fact, narrative arguments are just as clear as any other form of arguing. 
Unless we are assuming that people are not as equipped and competent to understand or decode 
messages in communication, then it is inaccurate to assume that narrative arguments are less 
clear. Further, if we observe communication in general, we will recognize that people are very 
good at decoding and understanding messages, even ambiguous messages. 
Hence, there are two ways to respond to this objection, 1. to point to the nature (features) 
of narrative arguments as rhetorical and contextual whose meaning is embedded in the process 
between arguers and the audience. And 2. point out the nature of communication and messages 
as defended by Gilbert.  Gilbert (2002) gives a compelling response to this demand for clarity in 
his article, “Effing the Ineffable,” by pointing out that all of communication, including written 
and verbal, is often unclear and that when we communicate with one another we often require 
further clarification. This is even more so when communication is more complex and when there 
is disagreement (p. 25). Written language is not any clearer or precise than verbal language. And 
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in fact, we also disagree about the interpretation and meaning of a written text. Gilbert’s point is 
that if the written and verbal is more clear, then we wouldn’t have miscommunication and 
disagreement in interpretation. Hence, Gilbert argues most communication requires clarification 
and that is not only the case with multimodal argumentation.  
Gilbert argues that the demand to reduce narrative into the logical mode to make it more 
clear commits the logocentric fallacy. This fallacy is committed when we assume that only in the 
logical mode can arguments be meaningful, clear and argumentative. Gilbert’s overall criticism 
relates to the assumption that only in the logical mode can arguments or communication make 
sense (2002, p. 30).  Although Gilbert discusses multimodal arguments that are not verbal or 
discursive, his discussion also fits with the narrative form (which is oral and verbal) because 
Gilbert’s discussion of the logocentric fallacy deals with non-discursive as well as non-logical 
based arguments. That is, Gilbert’s general point relates to the assumption that an argument or 
message is only argumentative or meaningful when it is broken down to linear and explicit 
arguments of premise and conclusion. As Gilbert writes, the “logocentric fallacy is committed 
when language, especially in its most logical guise, is seen to be the only logical form of rational 
communication” (2002, p. 32).  Gilbert’s point is that “tonality, body movement and facial 
expression are an integral part to understanding a position and an argument” (2002, p. 32). 
Gilbert’s criticism relates to not only the exclusion of non-discursive forms of argument but also 
non-logical based argument, which may or may not be discursive.  
Even if we assume that the narrative form is not clear, reducing narrative will not make it 
more clear what the argument is because there will be the issue of misinterpretation as discussed 
above.  
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Objection Two:  Evaluation of Arguments. The requirement that narrative be reduced 
comes from the demand that in order to evaluate an argument we need to reduce it. And so the 
other main objection against maintaining the narrative form of argument centers around the idea 
that we cannot evaluate narrative argument in its original form and that it needs to be reduced to 
be appraised. David Botting (2014), for example, in his article “Why Modal Pluralism Does Not 
Require Normative Pluralism” provides two reasons for why narrative argument ought to be 
reduced to be analyzed. According to Botting, a theory of analysis needs assertives as inputs, 
meaning we need to extract from non-logical moves the assertive they make and analyze what is 
not an assertive into an assertive (p. 172). Botting’s point is that in order to analyze an argument 
you need to analyze the premises and conclusions of that argument. He argues that since a theory 
of appraisal concerns whether an argument is rationally persuasive, it is reasonable to reduce all 
argument modalities including narrative to a single mode, that is the logical. Hence, Botting 
argues, that in evaluating the rational goodness of multimodal arguments, that is their power to 
rationally persuade, then it is perfectly reasonable to reduce them to the logical mode (p. 173). 
So, the objection is that if you want to know whether an argument is rationally persuasive or not, 
one has to reduce it to the logical mode of premises and a conclusion in order to look at the 
relationship between the premises and conclusion. In other words, the objection speaks to the 
claim that we need to reduce it to appraise it. But that is only necessary if the type of appraisal 
we were interested in was rational persuasion because, of course, we can appraise an argument 
without reducing it. And so the issue is whether rational persuasion should be the only or 
primary goal of persuasion. 
According to Botting’s argument, appraisal should focus on the goal of rational 
persuasion, and while he admits that other goals of argument may be important to argumentation, 
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they are not, he argues, the focus of argument appraisal. Gilbert, on the contrary argues that since 
there are a plurality of modes that arguers use to argue (including emotional, physical, intuitive), 
argument evaluation should account for the multiplicity of modes and the goals that accompany 
them (Gilbert, 1997, pp. 142-3). For example, the mode of emotional argument has a different 
goal than say the logical mode. Botting “concedes that an argument in one mode will have 
different properties bearing on its satisfaction of these multiple goals from the ‘equivalent’ 
argument in another mode” (p. 173). However, Botting argues that a multiplicity of norms would 
work 
if what we are trying to [do is] evaluate an arguer’s performance, his selection of best 
strategies and rhetorical devices for his purposes. But I aver that this kind of evaluation is 
not what a theory of appraisal is trying to capture. (p. 173)  
Botting argues that other goals of arguments are not normative and relate to an arguer’s 
performance and not the actual goodness of argument. In other words, Botting believes that any 
other goal of argument, aside from rational persuasion, is not the proper object of argument 
appraisal (p. 174). He argues that the proper task of argument appraisal should be rational 
persuasion. Botting asserts, “when we sometimes make judgements that seem to appeal to other 
goals we are (a) evaluating the performance and not the argument, and (b) not making a 
normative judgment in the relevant sense” (Botting, p. 182). However, this is where Botting gets 
it wrong in his claim that argument goodness, should not include arguer’s performance: arguers 
are real people who are affected, moved and changed by the practice of arguments and so 
argument goodness should indeed include argument practices. And in fact, normative standards 
of argument goodness should not just relate to the arguments as isolated from the practice of 
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arguers, but rather should emphasize that the practice of argumentation is part of the goodness of 
argument.  
Indeed, Botting is wrong in his claim because other goals of arguments such as the 
performance of arguers is both normative and crucial to good argumentation. Botting’s point is 
that other goals of argument are not normative in the relevant sense, and that rational persuasion 
is the only relevant sense of normativity. However, any normative standard can become relevant 
depending on what we are doing when we are attempting to evaluate an argument. There is not a 
particular norm that trumps all other norms, which is what Botting is assuming with rational 
persuasion. If arguers enter the argument with the goal of achieving understanding and empathy, 
then why should rational persuasion take precedence over the goals of real arguers. Rational 
persuasion is one among many goals of arguments. Botting seems to reserve argument appraisal 
only to rational persuasion. However, argument appraisal should indeed relate to an arguer’s 
performance. Why should we privilege and prioritize rational persuasion over other argument 
evaluation? Why should argument goodness be only about rational standards when arguments 
serve many functions and have many goals?  
Botting assumes that the only way to evaluate an argument is to see whether it is 
rationally persuasive. The problem with Botting’s objection is precisely the type of analyses he is 
interested in, i.e., rational persuasion, which excludes any other types of appraisal. The problem 
with this type of analysis that requires reduction is that it favors a specific type of argument and 
goals of and motives of arguments. Botting is wrong to assume that we can only talk about good 
and bad arguments in terms of rational persuasion and not any other standard. The function of 
argument is not always to rationally persuade, a point also made by Gilbert (2014) in his 
correspondence with Botting published in Argumentation and Advocacy. An argument can be 
 119 
bad in that even though it upheld rational standards it was not ethically conducted/performed. 
Argument goodness should speak to the process of argument evaluation not just the product. 
Further, an argument could be very rational and not serve the emotional needs of its arguers. 
Rational arguments, as rationality is understood traditionally, do not serve all of arguers needs, 
for sometimes our emotional or intuitive life cannot be explained by traditional rationality alone.  
Gilbert argues that we can appraise arguments in ways other than being rationally 
persuasive; we can assess and appraise arguments for being fair, reasonable, justified, 
considerate and even compassionate (2014, p. 186). Arguments can have functions other than 
rational persuasion and hence can be assessed and appraised in a myriad of ways. Gilbert further 
responds to Botting by stating that,  
My point as an argumentative descriptivist is that understanding arguments and, yes, 
assessing and appraising them needs to go beyond deductive correctness and include both 
actual argument standards applied by real people and argument assessment related to the 
forms of argument used. (Gilbert, 2014, p. 2) 
There are two main issues with Botting’s objection: argument appraisal is not just about 
rationality; it should include other goals (a point made by Gilbert). Second, even if we were to 
assume that rationality is the standard, because of course sometimes it is, there is still the 
question of why we should favor traditional rationality, when there is also rhetorical rationality. 
Hence, the two problems with Botting’s claims are: 1. the goal of argument is not always rational 
persuasion, and neither should that be the only goal of analysis, 2.  An argument can be 
rationally persuasive without being reduced to the logical mode. That is, rational persuasion does 
not have to be understood only in the logical Mode. Rational persuasiveness can relate to 
rhetorical rationality. Rationality understood traditionally sees an argument as being rational 
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when the premise and the conclusion have a certain type of relationship. However, rhetorical 
rationality is consensual. What is rationally persuasive from the rhetorical perspective is different 
from what is rationally persuasive from the traditional logical models. However, Botting assumes 
that other types of persuasion such as emotional persuasion are not rational. And that’s where 
Botting gets it wrong because other goals of arguments are not only normative but also rational. 
For example, rhetorical persuasion is indeed both normative and rational.  
Further, it is unnecessary to reduce alternate modes into a single logical mode to either 
understand or analyze the narrative, for example. That is, narrative arguments along with the 
other modalities can give reasons and function as reason giving arguments without being reduced 
into a standard argument form. Alternative modes of argument do provide reasons and they give 
it in a unique way that is different from the logical mode, and they do not need to be reduced to 
be understood.  The problem with Botting’s objection is that it assumes that the only way an 
argument can give reason is in the traditional logical mode, and that it is only in the logical mode 
that reasons can be assessed.  
Hence it is unnecessary to 1. Reduce the narrative into the logical mode to understand it 
because the narrative is understood by the audience as an argument; and 2. It is unnecessary to 
reduce the narrative to be analyzed because narrative arguments require an alternative method of 
analysis that does not see narrative as only serving the purpose of rational persuasion understood 
in the traditional sense. Rather, narrative arguments ought to be analyzed from a process-oriented 
perspective that takes account of narrative as a process without being translated. In the next 
chapter, I will argue that narrative arguments can be analyzed through a virtue rhetorical 
approach, which I call the virtuous audience. 
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Chapter Five: The Evaluation of Narrative Arguments and the Virtuous 
Audience 
 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the question of how to evaluate narrative arguments. I will be discussing 
how to evaluate narrative arguments as process as opposed to arguments as product, the latter of 
which is assumed by dominant accounts of argument appraisal such as informal logic. The first 
part of this chapter will show that dominant accounts of argument evaluation are not suitable for 
the evaluation of narrative arguments because they focus on the product of argument. The second 
part of the chapter will develop a method for evaluating arguments as process, which combines 
the rhetorical understanding of audience with virtue argumentation. I call this model the virtuous 
audience. More specifically, I will focus on the evaluative principles that help us cultivate virtues 
that avoid the acceptance of dangerous stories such as racist or misogynistic narratives. In the 
latter part of the chapter I will respond to some of the criticism against virtue argumentation and 
the virtuous audience. I will conclude by discussing the notion of ‘virtuous consensus’ that 
comes out of the virtuous audience. Virtuous consensus is the result of a rhetorical process 
informed by the cultivation of virtues.   
 
Preliminaries 
Before proceeding, some preliminary clarifications are in order. I define a narrative argument as 
a story told in the context of dissensus or disagreement. The type of narrative I will be discussing 
is a form of oral and interpersonal storytelling, which takes place in conversations between at 
least two people, and hence is dialogical.  I will not discuss narrative as it is used in novels, but 
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will restrict my attention to narrative as the act of dialogical and interactive storytelling, which is 
essentially communal and interpersonal. Since my account of narrative argument focuses on 
interactive personal narrative, rather than written and/or novel argument, my focus will be on 
argument as process, not argument as product. By “narrative process”, I refer to the whole 
interaction in which the story is used as an argument, including such components as body 
language, tone, context, audience, background and shared history. Narrative arguments do not 
arise in solitary monologues, but are usually part of a larger interaction. Narrative argumentation 
is a dynamic and interactive process that happens between the arguer and the audience.  
Narratives arise in conversations in response to something said or an argument made, and so they 
are integrated into the whole interaction. Narrative is often used alongside other modes of 
arguing such as the visceral (physical), kisceral (intuitive) and emotional mode discussed and 
developed by Michael Gilbert (1997, p. 75).   
By product and process of argument, I am referring to the old and contested distinction in 
argumentation literature which was first introduced by Daniel J. O’Keefe in 1982. O’Keefe 
distinguishes between the concept of arguing (which is the process) and the argument that results 
from the process of arguers engaged in arguing (which is the product of arguing). O’Keefe calls 
these two features, i.e., the product and process of argument, ‘argument 1’ and ‘argument 2.’ 
Argument 1 is what one person makes, gives or presents, while argument 2 is something that two 
or more people engage in (as in two or more people are having an argument, the content of 
which is argument 1) (O’Keefe, 1992, p. 79). As such, argument 1 refers to the content, what is 
being said in the argument, which is the product of arguing, and argument 2 refers to the process, 
mode, or act of arguing (O’Keefe, 1982, p. 4). The product of argument is also sometimes 
referred to as a thing or an object, whereas the process of argument is referred to as an 
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interaction. This distinction has been both popular and controversial among argumentation 
scholars, but it is an intuitive and helpful distinction, and I will assume it in what follows. This 
distinction is helpful in explaining how argument evaluation has been divided in terms of 
evaluating the product of the argument or the process of arguing as in the rhetorical tradition. I 
will be discussing only narrative arguments as process—a dissensual and dialogical exchange 
between two or more people, with multiple integrated but conceptually distinguishable modes 
built into the argumentative context. I will argue that narrative as process cannot be evaluated 
using traditional methods—it calls for a distinct evaluative framework, i.e., the virtuous 
audience.  
 
Dominant Account of Argument Evaluation 
In this part of the chapter, I will explain dominant accounts of argument appraisal and show how 
they are not useful for assessing narrative arguments.  
Traditionally, argument evaluation was taken to refer to normatively evaluating whether a 
conclusion is acceptable or whether the reasons provided are sufficient to warrant the acceptance 
of the conclusion. There are several such theories of argument evaluation, two of the main ones 
being the informal logical perspective and the pragma dialectical perspective. The informal 
logical perspective focuses on evaluating the product, i.e., the argument as consisting of premises 
and a conclusion. Informal logicians evaluate arguments based on three requirements that an 
argument must satisfy to be good, namely relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability (RSA) 
(Johnson, 2000, p. 191). However, because most of the criteria for the RSA model focus on 
premises and their relationship to the conclusion, which requires that we extract premises and 
conclusion from the narrative, it cannot be applied to narrative arguments. This is problematic 
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because once you reduce the narrative to premises and conclusion, it loses some of its persuasive 
power. This is partly because when reduced to a product narrative arguments lose important 
evidential content, such as emotional and physical content. This affects the perceived legitimacy 
of the argument. Also, the narrative argument becomes a different type of argument once it is 
taken out of its original form and structure. Once the argument is translated into the form of 
premises and conclusion, it does not tell us anything about the process of arguing, and often 
omits important features of the argument in an effort to reduce and capture the ordinary 
argument into a rigid form of premise and conclusion.  
Another prominent approach to argument evaluation comes from the dialectical 
approach, an example of which is the pragma-dialectical theory of Frans Van Eemeren, Rob 
Grootendorst and the Amsterdam school. The pragma dialectical approach investigates the 
procedures that are involved in the argumentative exchange and looks at whether the 
argumentative rules have been followed. The pragma dialecticians are interested in testing theses 
through critical discussion.  Hence, according to pragma dialectics, a good argument is a well-
regulated critical discussion, which involves four stages: the confrontation stage, opening stage, 
argumentation stage and the concluding stage. The discussion is governed by a code of conduct 
in the form of argumentative rules.  This approach stipulates that if arguers ignore or violate 
argumentative rules, the argumentative exchange can result in fallacies (Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, and Henkemans, 2002, p. 182). Some of the rules for critical discussion include 
the following: 
 
Freedom rule: Parties must not prevent each other from putting forward standpoints or 
casting doubt on standpoints. 
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Unexpressed premise rule: A party may not falsely present something as a premise that has 
been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that he himself has left implicit.  
Argument scheme rule: A standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively defended if the 
defense does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is 
correctly applied. 
Validity rule: The reasoning in the argumentation must be logically valid or capable of 
being validated by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises (Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, and Henkemans, 2002, pp. 182-183).  
 
Most of the rules are difficult to apply to narrative arguments because the pragma dialectical 
rules relate to argumentation that is structured and rigid in form, whereas narrative argument is 
not. Further, the narrative argument would have to be turned into a critical discussion in order to 
apply the rules of critical discussion to it. However, narrative argument is a complex activity that 
cannot be narrowed down into the four stages of a critical discussion without losing its 
persuasive and powerful force embedded in its narrative form. Narrative arguments are not 
structured and therefore cannot follow the four stages of critical discussion. Further, changing 
narrative into a critical discussion runs into the same problem of reduction that the informal logic 
approach poses.  
 It must be acknowledged that both informal logic and pragma dialectics provide worthy 
accounts of argument appraisal and are surely useful for evaluating many kinds of arguments, 
especially traditional types of arguments, however these approaches are not applicable or 
suitable to narrative arguments as process because they require dissecting the narrative into 
argumentative parts. My approach to narrative arguments avoids compartmentalizing narrative 
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argument because 1. the whole narrative is an argumentative act, and 2.  narrative parts are all 
interlocked and cannot be broken down into separate parts. And as mentioned earlier, this 
division risks changing the argument and reducing its persuasive power.  
 While there is a tendency among argumentation scholars to ignore the process of arguing 
when assessing arguments, rhetorical approaches and the recent developments of virtue 
argumentation do attempt to evaluate an argument in terms of the process and practices of 
argument; yet they also have their setbacks. For example, while virtue argumentation theories do 
look at the process--though in a very limited way, as I will later show--they ignore the audience. 
However, it is both the arguer and the audience that form the full dynamic of argumentation. The 
dynamic of narrative argument requires an interactive approach. This is because narrative 
arguments cannot be reduced to traditional forms of arguments without losing important 
evidential and contextual information. The deconstruction of narratives into a traditional 
argument form of premise and conclusion misses the point behind narrative arguments3. Forcing 
a narrative into a traditional form would overlook the message in the narrated story.  Traditional 
arguments consisting of explicit premise and conclusion would not reflect what the speaker 
argues through the story. Some arguments or points are hard to convey in an explicit linear way, 
and doing so misses the ultimate point behind the story; that is, the story as a whole is the point. 
When people argue they do not always give direct arguments or respond directly to an argument 
that the interlocutor puts forward; rather, in the context of narrative argumentation, speakers go 
on telling stories. Nonetheless, speakers seem to get the point that these stories are more than just 
explanations; speakers understand the argument and idea behind the narrative. Sometimes it is 
                                                 
3 By the term deconstruction, I am not referring to the form of philosophical and literary analysis developed by 
Jacques Derrida. 
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the case that you simply cannot give a direct answer nor respond directly to an argument without 
giving a story, i.e., only a story about what happened will capture what the speaker wishes to 
argue.  Also narrative arguments follow a rhetorical process that include the arguer and the 
audience and such a process cannot be reduced to just a premise and conclusion.  Hence to 
evaluate narrative we must retain and maintain its natural form as a rhetorical process. Because 
narrative argument evaluation focuses on the process of arguing and the cultivation of virtues, it 
will combine insights from both the rhetorical and virtue theories of argumentation.  
Moreover, the account of virtuous audience that I offer can apply to other argument 
forms, and is not exclusive to narrative. In fact, it is useful for all types of arguments. However, 
my primary point is that while other arguments with the traditional argument form are 
susceptible to other analysis modes (such as informal logic or pragma dialectics), narrative 
argument is not. That is, I argue that the only useful way to analyze narrative is through a 
rhetorical (combined with virtues) analysis.  Hence, the virtuous audience is a rhetorical 
audience that has cultivated argumentative virtues. 
 
The Virtuous Audience 
To define the rhetorical features of the virtuous audience, I borrow from the rhetorical 
understanding of audiences, most notably Chaim Perelman’s account, which is the most 
thorough and renowned account of audience in rhetorical argumentation. The virtuous audience 
is rhetorical in three important ways: 
1. Argumentation Adapted to The Virtuous Audience. The virtuous audience is 
rhetorical because the audience of the story must be taken into account.  That is, stories are often 
adapted to the audience. What this means is that the arguer (storyteller) often tries to begin a 
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narrative argument in agreement, i.e., with a point shared with the audience. And so the virtuous 
audience assessing the narrative argument has been presented with a story where they agree with 
the starting point of that narrative. When we tell stories, if we want them to serve as arguments, 
we do so by ensuring that our stories are going to be accepted by the audience. Of course it is 
true that not all narratives are adapted to the audience. But in order for a narrative to serve an 
argumentative function, it needs to be adapted to the audience. In an argumentative setting where 
disagreement has arisen, stories are usually introduced in response to a point made or question 
asked and are thus integrated with ongoing talk and debate. Since stories are very much 
integrated and woven into the whole interaction between arguers, they often are adapted and rely 
on background knowledge shared by the disputant in the interaction.  To do this, we must begin 
an argument with an agreed and shared starting point. To explain how stories are adapted to the 
audience, I will refer to the concept of cognitive environment. That is, adapting one’s argument 
to the audience requires an understanding of the beliefs and tolerances of the audience, which, in 
turn, requires an understanding of the audiences’ ‘cognitive environment.’ The cognitive 
environment is a concept that Christopher Tindale borrows from the cognitive psychologists Dan 
Sperber and Deirdre Wilson and applies it to argumentation. Tindale draws six helpful points 
from the work of Sperber and Wilson on cognitive environments that relate to argumentation, 
some of which I will also apply to narrative arguments:  
1. “A cognitive environment is a set of facts manifest to us”: 
One way to explain the cognitive environment is to think of the visible environment 
manifest to us, like a room full of people.  The cognitive environment, then, is the set of 
facts that are manifest to us and that we can infer and perceive. That is, something may 
be cognitively manifest to us and we are still not necessarily explicitly aware of it. 
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Further, individuals share a cognitive environment when they share the same facts. And 
so stories assume a shared cognitive environment and allow participants in the 
argumentation context to begin in agreement and to understand the stories’ background.  
2.  “Our cognitive environments differ”: 
Although we share the same physical environment, this does not mean that each 
individual’s cognitive environment is identical to the other’s. While we share a physical 
environment our cognitive abilities differ, much like our visible abilities. This is 
important because our ability to infer other facts from those we directly perceive varies 
from person to person. Also our personal history and memories affects how we come to 
interpret manifest phenomena. That is, “knowledge previously acquired affects our ability 
to work with a present set of facts” (Tindale, 1992, 179). Although we share the same 
physical world, we still construct different mental representations out of it. As such, our 
mental representations are different due to differences in our perceptual and cognitive 
abilities, as well as our unique history and memories. 
This feature of the cognitive environment helps us understand how and what a 
virtuous audience might come to accept, that is, what facts or points of the story the 
arguer and the audience share or differ about. What this shows is that even though, when 
telling a story, an arguer and audience may share a cognitive environment, this does not 
mean that they will see everything the same or agree about everything. They will still 
have different interpretations and understandings of events.  
3. “Cognitive environments include assumptions which may be false”: 
Just as cognitive environment includes manifest facts which are true or probable, it also 
includes manifest assumptions which are false (Tindale, p.179). This means that what is 
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manifest to us includes not only facts which are true but also assumptions which are false 
and hence the cognitive environment refers to all that is manifest to us whether it is true 
or not.  
4. “Overlapping cognitive environments give rise to a shared cognitive environment with 
mutual manifestedness”.  
Although individuals have similar cognitive abilities, but differences in memories, they 
never share a total cognitive environment. However, when the same facts and 
assumptions are manifest to individuals, they are said to share a cognitive environment.  
5. When we share a cognitive environment with others we know what assumptions or facts 
are manifest to us both. Hence, a cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts 
that are manifest to them. A fact is manifest to an individual at that given time if and only 
if she is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as 
true or probably true.  Further, Sperber and Wilson expand on manifestedness in two 
ways. First, they extend manifestedness by including assumptions not just facts. What is 
manifest includes our personal assumptions whether true or false. Second, manifestedness 
comes in degrees. Sperber and Wilson state, “to be manifest, then, is to be perceptible or 
inferable” (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 39).  Manifestedness refers to not only what is 
available to inference but also what an individual at that time is capable of understanding 
and representing.  It consists of not only the facts that an individual is aware of but also 
all the facts that she is capable of becoming aware of. Of course, what is manifest to us 
varies in that what we are aware of and can become aware of is influenced not only by 
our personal history but also our perceptual and cognitive abilities. What Sperber and 
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Wilson refer to as the cognitive environment is the intersection of what is manifest to a 
group. 
 
Since narrative argument evaluation is audience oriented, it becomes important to consider the 
beliefs and tolerances of audiences, which leads us to consider the cognitive environments of 
such audiences (Tindale, 1992, p. 178). Understanding the cognitive environment of audiences 
helps us begin in agreement with the audience. That is, sharing the same cognitive environment 
is one way in which the audience begins in agreement.  
The concept of the cognitive environment sheds some light on how audiences come to 
believe and accept certain stories and reject others. One of the reasons that some stories (or part 
of stories) are rejected is that they are too far-fetched and fall outside of one’s cognitive 
environment, what is deemed reasonable. Further, when a story is not part of the audience’s 
cognitive environment, they cannot understand or assess it. And similarly, certain stories or part 
of the stories are immediately accepted without doubt because they are part of the audience’s 
cognitive environment that they share with the arguer. The storyteller knows that if a story is far-
fetched and does not rely on a shared conception of reasonableness, it risks being rejected by the 
audience. When we tell stories we do so within a shared conception of reasonableness. This 
shared conception of reasonableness is related to one’s cognitive environment. What is 
rhetorically acceptable and relevant is within one’s cognitive environment.   
 
2.Virtuous Audience as Interactive. Similar to Perelman’s rhetorical account of 
audiences, the virtuous audience is interactive and is very much involved in the construction and 
outcome of the argument. The virtuous audience essentially includes both the arguer and 
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interlocutor. What this means is that the notion of audience in fact includes the arguer. This 
means that the person who is an arguer at one time can also become an interlocutor (audience) at 
a different time, because these roles are dynamic.  In other words, the arguer will also be 
positioned as audience in a dialogical exchange. The virtuous audience is involved with the 
arguer and is not this remote, distanced and detached entity that only listens to or receives the 
argument. Rather, the virtuous audience is an active participant in argumentation and is never 
passive or merely a recipient of the argument. Narrative arguments are co-created between the 
arguer and the audience. That is why the storyteller also needs to adapt her story to the audience 
and the context and situation as he /she sees fit. And because arguers begin with agreement that 
is shared with the audience, and the audience plays a role in how the argument begins and ends, 
this makes the virtuous audience interactive.  
 
3. Virtuous Audience as The Measure Of Argument. Another aspect of the rhetorical 
account of audience that I apply to a virtuous audience is that the audience is the measure of 
argument, and are the ones evaluating the argument, much like Perelman’s understanding of 
audience. Narrative arguments are assessed by the listener, that is, the audience. Depending on 
the audience, different stories may be accepted or rejected. From the rhetorical perspective, a 
good argument is one that is effective and persuasive to an audience. This is why the rhetorical 
approach is interested in adapting arguments to audiences in order to gain their agreement and 
adherence. According to Perelman, an argument is as worthy as its audience. Since not all 
audiences are the same, Perelman draws a distinction between two types of audience: the 
particular and the universal. While the particular audience addresses segments of society, small 
or particular groups, the universal audience addresses all of humanity, more importantly all 
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rational human beings. As such, Perelman makes clear that a discourse that appeals to reason is 
one that appeals to the universal audience because such an audience is a reasonable and rational 
one (1982, p. 17). The difference in these audiences is actually a difference in the goals of 
argumentation. Discourse addressed to small groups (specific audiences) aims to persuade; 
whereas discourse aimed at larger groups, i.e., the universal audience, aims to convince 
(Perelman, 1982, p. 18). The appeal to a particular audience is an appeal to particular 
characteristics and situations occupying a particular space and time whereas the universal 
audience relates to argumentation that transcends all those particularities and makes a broader 
appeal (Crosswhite, 1989, p. 158).   
Perelman argues that the construction of the universal audience requires certain 
argumentative moves, including the following four features:  
1. Arguers must start with the particular audience and move to the universal by performing 
“certain imaginative operations on [the particular audience] in order to give it a universal 
character” (Crosswhite, 1989, p.163), for it is always the universal of the particular 
(Crosswhite, 1989, 167). Perlman argues that the universal audience can be understood as an 
imaginative tool that we can use to move away from our particularities to achieve more 
universal argumentation. To do this, one must set aside all the particular and local features of 
the audience and instead consider its universal features.  
2. Arguers must exclude from the particular audience those members who are prejudiced, lack 
sympathy and imagination, and who are irrational and incompetent at following 
argumentation. This means that the universal audience includes “only those who are 
unprejudiced and have the proper competence” (Crosswhite, 1989, p. 163). To have the proper 
competence means to be “disposed to hear” the argument, “submit to the data of experience,” 
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and have the proper information and training and to ultimately be “duly reflected’ 
(Crosswhite, 1989, p. 163). Hence, this move from the particular to the universal, which is a 
change in understanding and perspective, requires rational and competent individuals. What 
really seems to allow for the possibility of moving from the particular to the universal is that 
rational human beings are compelled to do so by the force of better reason. Perelman seems 
to acknowledge that the construction of the universal audience is not an easy task and that it 
requires a particular attitude towards knowledge acquisition. 
3. Arguers must add particular audiences together, and make sure that their argumentation 
appeals to not only one particular audience but to many more or all particular audiences. 
4. Finally, arguers must imagine their argumentation addressed to other similar audiences at 
other times, with different histories and situations. As such, arguments appealing to the 
universal audience appeal to history and ask their audiences to imagine themselves in their 
historical roles, or outside of their current situation and time. 
 The instructions Perelman gives on how to construct the universal audience sheds 
important light on what type of arguments are more inclusive. For example, it helps demonstrate 
that racist stories cannot be universalized because they cannot apply to more than one audience, 
which is the audience that accepts racist beliefs. The universal audience shows that arguments 
that cannot be universalized and applied to more than one audience are not the best type of 
arguments and, in fact, are exclusive and too narrow. Hence the universalizing technique allows 
us to see that if the story cannot apply to other audiences with different histories and situations 
then it must be limited. Stories rely on shared histories and background assumptions of what is 
reasonable, and this standard of reasonableness varies from the particular to the universal 
audience. We can draw the comparison between particular and universal audiences to evaluating 
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narrative in that some narratives have a more universal appeal as they speak to a common human 
experience, such as narratives of loss or grief. But other narratives may be particular in nature, 
such as narratives that appeal only to a narrow and dangerous ideology and may be said to be 
particular in that they only appeal to a small segment of humanity, perhaps the segment of 
humanity that is misogynistic or racist. Hence, adding particular audiences together and 
imagining whether one’s argument can have universal appeal is no doubt helpful for not only 
inclusivity, but also for avoiding dangerous narratives. As such, I do not deny the merit of 
Perelman’s techniques of moving from particular audiences to the universal one in that they 
allow us to achieve universality, inclusivity and the avoidance of narrow and limited point of 
views. While it may be true that Perelman’s claim that the universal audience is preferable to the 
particular audience, I do not think that this model of evaluation fits all argument types, 
particularly narrative arguments. This is because Perelman’s model allows us to rule out 
radically objectionable arguments, but doesn’t let us evaluate the relative strengths of arguments 
that don’t fall below this threshold; and it doesn’t adequately explain how we can become better 
arguers.  
 On further scrutiny, there are three main difficulties with applying Perelman’s account of 
the universal audience to narrative arguments. First, most stories are particular in nature and so 
the distinction Perelman draws between particular and universal does not apply to most 
narratives. Once universalized, narrative arguments lose their significance and value. Most 
narrative arguments cannot be universalized because they deal with subjective individuals with 
unique experiences and particular situations and contexts. Stories are often about localities and 
are couched in one’s history and specific context. We need an evaluative framework that can 
apply to most narratives and not just dangerous ones. And even though the goal of assessment is 
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to avoid dangerous narratives, the techniques Perelman offers cannot apply to narrative 
arguments because stories are particular and contextual and unless we have a virtuous audience 
they will not be able to discern between good and bad particular stories. Perelman does not 
demarcate between the different ways that an argument can be particular: on the one hand, it can 
be narrow and limited, and on the other, it can be subjective, personal or local. Additionally, the 
universal audience does not distinguish between a merely particular narrative and other harmful 
narratives.  The notion of the particular as used by Perelman to demarcate between types of 
audiences is vague and does not distinguish between types of particularities. For example, some 
narratives are particular in being racist; however, all narratives are particular in that they deal 
with particularities of a situation. Perelman’s account does not discuss this distinction. The 
virtuous audience, on the contrary, will exclude racist arguments, but it won’t necessarily 
exclude all particular arguments.  
 The second difficulty with applying Perelman’s distinction between the particular and 
universal is that it does not deal with everyday argumentation and personal storytelling. That is, 
Perelman suggests that to avoid dangerous arguments, one needs to conduct techniques that 
achieve the universal audience, the highest form of argumentation. Arguments do not need to be 
the best to be good. Everyday argumentation and narrative arguments are not always interested 
in achieving the highest standard of argumentation. In fact, narrative arguments do not need to 
meet this high aspiration of universalism to be good. Perelman’s universal audience is limited 
because it deals only with an ideal audience that cannot apply to everyday arguments that are 
particular in nature. However, a virtue approach to argument appraisal applies to all types of 
arguments because the cultivation of virtues will be useful for all contexts, and not just to ideal 
arguments and to the assessment of dangerous arguments.  
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The third difficulty in applying Perelman’s universal audience to narrative arguments is 
that it does not really help us cultivate practices where the audience can be more critical in their 
judgments of stories. While Perelman’s account of the particular and the universal may help us 
understand that dangerous stories are accepted by some people because they appeal to limited 
and narrow audiences, it does not give us a compelling story about how we come to adopt the 
universal stance. Perelman offers the universal audience as a heuristic, but says nothing about 
how to apply and internalize it. More must be said about what allows an audience to move from 
the particularities of the situation to a more universal stance. Moreover, the distinction between 
the particular and the universal audience is too general and does not discriminate amongst 
arguments that aren’t ‘dangerous,’ but may or may not be convincing. We need a more nuanced 
approach to achieve this level of discrimination. I think that the virtuous audience does this. If 
audiences cultivate argumentative virtues, they become more discriminating and more critical of 
their judgments.  
 There are similarities between the virtuous audience and the universal audience, but the 
virtuous audience is more robust than the former. Perelman says that the universal audience must 
be ‘reasonable,’ and reasonableness is a matter of having “judgment and conduct [that is] 
influenced by common sense” (Fisher, 1986, p. 89). He also claims that the universal audience 
has proper competence, which means being “disposed to hear” the argument, “submit to the data 
of experience”, and have the proper information and training to ultimately be “duly reflected” 
(Crosswhite, 1989, p. 163). Reasonableness is an argumentative virtue, but it’s only one amongst 
many. And further, it’s not clear what proper competence entails. I argue that the ‘proper 
competence’ Perelman suggests ought to be understood in terms of the argumentative virtues. 
This will give us guidance on how to become better arguers and better audiences, and it will 
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provide a more fine-grained evaluative framework for assessing the convincingness of 
arguments. Hence, while Perelman’s account of the universal audience has the merit of 
attempting to attain more inclusivity, it does not tell us how one can come to develop the skills or 
competence to achieve more universality in arguing. I argue that it is through virtues developed 
by the audience that one can become more discerning and reject dangerous narratives. Having 
good argumentative practices allows us to argue well, which reduces the probability of accepting 
bad narratives. 
 Hence, the instructions Perelman gives for constructing the universal audience are for the 
most part useful but must be supplemented by virtues. Virtues are more applicable to narrative 
arguments because virtues address the situatedness of narrative arguments. Although the concept 
of the universal audience has the merit of seeking greater inclusiveness, it does not have enough 
practicality. What is needed is not just theoretical inclusivity but also applicability. Without 
rejecting Perelman’s overall goal in argumentation, I aim to add to Perelman’s understanding of 
audiences by constructing an account of the virtuous audience.  
Next I will explain the virtues that an audience needs to cultivate in order to be able to 
reject dangerous narratives. The virtuous audience evaluating narratives (and other process 
arguments) are not passive recipients, but are, in fact, critical participants, and have virtues that 
aid them in differentiating between acceptable and unacceptable arguments. To discuss the 
virtues that must be cultivated by the audience, I now turn to virtue argumentation. 
 
Virtue Argumentation. Virtue ethics is a new, burgeoning approach to argumentation 
that concerns itself with the ethical character of arguers. A virtue approach to argumentation was 
proposed by Daniel Cohen and Andrew Aberdein in 2007, and has since expanded. Virtue 
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argumentation is concerned with the relationship between a good argument and the virtuous 
arguer, i.e., what virtues are needed in order to produce good arguments (Gascon, 2015, p. 467). 
A virtue theoretic approach to argument focuses on agents rather than actions (arguments), and 
so it places more focus on the arguers rather than the arguments.  One way to understand this 
distinction is to see that in act-based theories of argumentation, such as informal logic, a good 
arguer is explained in terms of their argument so that a bad arguer is an arguer who consistently 
puts forward bad arguments. However, from an agent-based perspective, the quality of an 
argument is influenced and is the result of the agent’s (arguer’s) virtues or vices (Gascon, 2015, 
p. 468).  And so the distinction between an act-based argument appraisal and an agent-based 
argument appraisal is in terms of whether a good arguer is someone who puts forward good 
arguments (product/action) or someone who has a virtuous character. Virtue argumentation 
scholars, then, define a good argument in terms of the virtuous arguer. That is, virtue theorists 
think that what makes an argument good is that the person presenting it has argued well 
(virtuously). Further, this idea that a good argument is defined in terms of the agent’s mode of 
argumentation is consistent with virtue ethics, which similarly defines a right action in terms of 
the virtuous agent. That is according to Hursthouse, “an action is right if it is what a virtuous 
agent would characteristically (i.e., acting in character) do in the circumstances” (1999, p. 
23).  As to the question of what is a virtuous agent, Hursthouse responds that, “A virtuous agent 
is one who has, and exercises, certain character traits, namely, the virtues” (p. 24). And so this 
virtuous agent is defined as an individual who embodies and acts based on virtues. So in order to 
know what is the virtuous action one must think of what an exemplary virtuous person would do 
and act based on that knowledge. Since virtue argumentation is linked to virtue ethics, it gains 
from whatever independent plausibility the latter has.  
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What I will do is propose an amendment to current accounts of virtue argumentation. 
These accounts have, for the most part, focused on the arguer cultivating virtues, while ignoring 
the crucial role of the audience, which is also needed for, not only the production, but also the 
evaluation, of good arguments. That is, the virtues developed by Aberdein and Cohen relate only 
to the virtuous arguer. Aberdein’s list can of course be applied to the audience, as for example, 
willingness to listen to others is clearly a virtue that belongs to the listener, not the arguer, 
however, Aberdein does not say that this is a virtue of the audience but rather discusses virtues 
only in relation to the arguer. Further, Aberdein does not specifically mention that the audience 
is also required to cultivate virtues. Nonetheless, it’s fair to say that virtue argumentation theory 
has at least begun to take the virtues of the audience into account, although not explicitly. Daniel 
Cohen (2013) for instance in his article, “Virtue, In Context,” argues that in order to understand 
what a fully satisfying argument is we have to expand on the notion of arguer to include 
everyone who is relevant to the judgment of an argument, which includes the audience. After 
expanding the notion of arguer to include the audience, Cohen says that these varieties of arguer 
roles require their own skill sets and accompanying virtues, however Cohen does not say 
anything more about the role of audience in the cultivation of virtues. While it is true that Cohen 
expands the notion of virtuous arguer to include the audience, which in some way automatically 
includes the audience in the cultivation of virtue, he does not explicitly discuss the audience. 
Indeed, Cohen hints at the importance of an audience cultivating virtues, by default of including 
the audience in the concept of arguer, but what is needed is a more elaborate account of the 
virtuous audience.  
As such, I build on the current development of virtue argumentation by introducing and 
emphasizing the role of the virtuous audience. I argue that argumentative virtues need to also be 
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developed by the audience because it is the audience that is judging the argument, and therefore 
needs to have a certain set of virtues in order to reject bad narratives in the case of storytelling. 
That is because focusing solely on the virtues of the arguer to the exclusion of the audience will 
not help us in evaluating the argument. Further, the emphasis on virtuous audience highlights the 
importance of argumentation as a dynamic process and a shared responsibility between the 
speaker and the audience. 
Virtues of Argumentation. The list of Argumentation virtues is not exhaustive 
and it is still being developed simply because virtue argumentation is a new component 
of argumentation theory.  Most of the virtues developed by Cohen and Aberdein can also 
be applied to the virtuous audience such as: 
 
Willingness to engage in argumentation 
Being communicative 
Faith in reason 
     Intellectual courage  
Sense of duty 
Willingness to listen to others 
Intellectual empathy 
Insight into persons  
Insight into problems 
Insight into theories  
Fair-mindedness 
Justice 
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Fairness in evaluating others’ arguments 
            Open-mindedness in collecting and appraising 
evidence 
            Recognition of reliable authority  
           Recognition of salient facts  
Sensitivity to detail  
Willingness to question the obvious 
Appropriate respect for public opinion 
Autonomy 
Intellectual perseverance  
Diligence 
Care  
      Thoroughness (Aberdein, 2010, p. 175).  
Other virtues that I will add to this list relate to the audience in particular as for example having a 
fair intention which is the intention to take the other person seriously and not to think of them as 
idiotic or insane. In other words, it means having the intention to view one another as intelligent 
and capable by giving them a fair chance and not dismissing them immediately. Fairness in 
intention is similar to an already existing virtue developed by Aberdein and Cohen which is 
fairness in evaluating others’ arguments. What is different between those virtues is that one 
focuses on the evaluation of another’s argument, while the other, i.e., the virtue of fair intention 
focuses on having a good intention when entering arguments, which includes both evaluating the 
argument but also how one perceives another as either intelligent or incompetent.  But this virtue 
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also needs to be balanced with another virtue which is critical trust.4 This virtue requires that one 
look for cues of coherence and intelligibility in the story and credibility in the teller. Hence, the 
two virtues I would add to the list include fair intention and critical trust.  
 In his book Arguing with People, Michael Gilbert (2014) describes some of the main 
characteristics of the ideal arguer. And although Gilbert does not describe them as virtues, they 
nonetheless fit nicely with a virtue account of argument evaluation. Some of the characteristics 
and corresponding rules of Michael Gilbert’s ideal arguer include the following: 
 Reasonable: This is a person who understands that evidence is important and that 
arguments matter and who values truth and does not just believe things to be true just 
because he/she wants them to be true. Hence this is a reasonable person because he/she 
weighs the evidence fairly and is not biased toward one belief or another. (Gilbert, 2014, 
p. 94).  
 Non-Dogmatic: a non-dogmatic person is someone who is open to changing their minds 
when the circumstances permit and is open to new ideas and challenging beliefs (p. 94).  
 Good Listener: A good listener is someone who is interested in hearing the other person’s 
position and is engaged and wants to understand another's position (p. 94). 
 Empathetic: an empathetic arguer as defined by Gilbert is one who recognizes that 
arguing involves emotions that must be taken into account when arguing (p. 95). 
Empathy is required in seeing that people argue for reasons that are important to them 
and it enables one to see things from the point of view another arguer.  
                                                 
4 A similar virtue relating to trust is discussed by Jose Angel Gascon (2015) which he calls 
willingness to trust in his article “Willingness to trust as a virtue in argumentative discussions”. 
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And these four characteristics, Gilbert argues, should also be present in the audience. That is 
every arguer “wants to be listened to carefully by reasonable, open minded, and sympathetic 
people” (p. 95). As such, Gilbert provides a golden rule of argumentation: “Argue with someone 
as you would want to be argued with” (p. 95).  According to Gilbert, then, an arguer should 
imagine an ideal audience and from there judge an argument by whether or not it would meet the 
standards of this ideal audience. And so when judging an argument one should ask themselves 
whether this is the kind of argument they want to be presented with. 
 The cultivation of virtues by the audience is inherently valuable because virtues help 
audiences reach critical consensus. Trust, for example, is required not only by the speaker, but 
also by fellow audience members. If individual audience members don’t trust each other, they 
might not be able to reach a consensus about the acceptability of the speaker’s argument, 
creating an impasse. Hence, the virtue of trust should be applied to audience members to 
facilitate agreement. 
Assessing the narrative through the virtuous audience allows us to maintain the form of the 
narrative as narrative without having to reduce it to premise and conclusion as with act based 
argument appraisal that focuses on the product of arguing. It is only through assessing a narrative 
as process that we can avoid the reduction problem associated with act based argument appraisal.  
Act based argument appraisals such as informal logic fits more with the notion of arguments as a 
product. That is because in order for one to assess whether an argument is cogent, one needs to 
reduce it into premise and conclusion. And assessing cogency also requires looking at the 
relationship between the premises and the conclusion.  
The contribution of virtue argumentation is not limited to just evaluating and assessing 
good arguments from bad arguments. Virtue argumentation also contributes to the ethical 
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environment of argumentation and has many other benefits such as creating a more cooperative 
and congenial environment for arguers and easing the hostility extant in traditional 
argumentation.   
 
Objections and Response to The Virtuous Audience 
In this section, I will anticipate, explain, and respond to potential objections against virtue 
argumentation. Many of these responses will help clarify my account of the virtuous audience and 
so in answering the objections, I will elaborate on the concept of the virtuous audience.  
Objection One. Critics of virtue argumentation (such as Tracy Bowell and Justine 
Kingsbury) argue that what makes it the case that the arguer has argued well should not be about 
the arguer but rather that they have presented good arguments. A good argument according to them 
is one whose premises provide sufficient justification for believing its conclusion to be true or 
highly probable. (Bowell and Kingsbury, p. 23). And so the distinction between virtue theorist and 
its contender is that arguing well is defined by the former in terms of the person arguing and the 
latter by the arguments presented.  
Aberdein (2014) responds to this objection by noting that Bowell’s and Kingsbuy’s 
criticism focuses on a conception of argument evaluation that evaluates argument as a product 
rather than as a process or activity.  This conception of argument evaluation, he argues, is not 
representative of all argumentation scholars or approaches to argumentation evaluation, such as 
the rhetorical or dialectical, which are in fact the most congenial to a virtue theoretical approach 
(p. 78). Further, the account of the virtuous audience that I develop avoids this problem of 
whether arguing well should be about the argument itself or the person presenting the argument. 
That is because the concept of the virtuous audience does not totally commit to the claim that 
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argument goodness depends on the virtues of its arguer, because narrative arguments are 
accepted and rejected by audiences and so argument goodness also depends on the audience.  
Hence, argument goodness is not just about the arguer but also the audience. That is, an 
argument is as worthy as both its arguer and its audience (those judging the argument), and, as 
such, the whole interaction needs to be virtuous for an argument to be good. Both the arguer and 
the audience need to be virtuous for successful argumentation. That is, good arguments are not 
just the result of good arguers but also good audiences and virtuous rhetorical processes. Arguing 
well in the account that I develop includes both the arguer and the audience. Hence good 
argumentation is not just about good arguers but also good audiences. And so the audience also 
needs to exercise virtue to ensure good and successful argumentation. This helps to mitigate the 
force of Bowell’s and Kingsbuy’s objection by strengthening the reliability of the argumentative 
process: an audience is better placed to evaluate the acceptability of a speaker’s argument than a 
single person, since they can correct each other’s errors. This doesn’t ensure 100% reliability, 
but it ensures a greater degree of reliability.  
Objection Two. Another objection against virtue argumentation is that virtues do not 
prescribe rules for how one should argue. So the criticism centers around a seeming gap between 
good arguers and good argumentation (Thorson, 2016, p. 1). It is claimed that while we can 
concede that being a charitable arguer is virtuous, this virtue still does not tell us how to argue 
successfully (Thorson, 2016, p. 1). Hence it is assumed that virtues do not give us specific 
guidance in sticky situations (Thorson, 2016, p. 29). Virtue ethics, like virtue argumentation, 
faces the same criticism. Virtue ethics has been criticized for not providing action guiding rules 
that enable one to determine what is the right action to follow (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 29). This 
objection is still a commonly voiced criticism against virtue ethics. It is argued that virtues 
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express character traits and that it is concerned with being rather than doing, i.e., virtues tell us 
how to be but not what is the right action to follow in each case (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 29). 
Further it is argued that the rules should be stated clearly so that any non-virtuous person could 
understand and apply them. Similar to virtue argumentation, it is claimed that there is a gap 
between being virtuous and doing the right action.  
To this objection (that virtues lack rules) it was Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) who first 
argued that virtues are thick concepts and that every virtue in fact does generate a moral rule 
which she calls V-rules. (cf.  Julia Annas). Virtues do indeed generate action guidance because 
they have corresponding rules for us to follow and these rules guide one’s action. In terms of 
argumentation, there are also V-rules that can guide one in arguing successfully, and that can 
help both the arguer and the audience to utilize virtues and to ensure that the virtues have the 
correct application. These rules function as guiding principles for how the argumentation and 
assessment unfolds in the process of arguing.  These rules correspond to the virtues so that each 
virtue has a corresponding rule. For example, honesty as a virtue points to the v-rule that one 
should “do what is honest and do not do what is dishonest” (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 29). This 
means that not only does each virtue have a corresponding rule, but similarly has a 
corresponding prohibition (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 29).  It must also be pointed out that while it is 
true that these V-rules correspond to virtues, it is also the case that some of these V-rules overlap 
between virtues. As for example the V-rule of “interpret with charity” can fall under the virtue of 
critical trust, fair intention, and fairmindedness. All the virtues and their corresponding rules 
interconnect. These argumentation V-rules that I develop are based of Cohen’s and Aberdein’s 
list of argumentative virtues. Some of these rules are also borrowed from J. K. Thorson (2016), 
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who uses Brockriede’s concept of arguing lovingly to develop V-rules for argumentation. These 
V-rules apply to both the arguer and the audience.  
And so in terms of argumentation virtues the following rules correspond: 
Intellectual courage: 
 Be willing to be criticized and challenged 
 Willingness to concede to a point. 
 The courage to concede to point when you might be wrong or to admit that you are 
wrong. 
 Be willing to change your beliefs especially beliefs that we have strong aversion towards 
and ones which we have not given a serious hearing. 
 Be willing to address beliefs fairly. 
 Be motivated by an open exchange of ideas (Thorson, 2016, p. 6) 
Good listener: 
 Listening with compassion and empathy (also listed in Thorson’s list) 
 Listening without bias and prejudice. 
 Listening with an intention to understand and see another’s perspective. 
 Listen carefully (borrowed from Cohen, 2009, p. 54). 
Intellectual Empathy: 
 Be empathetic in your reading and interpretation of another’s point of view.  
 See things from another perspective by trying to reason from their point of view. 
Fair-mindedness 
 Be Fair in evaluating others’ arguments 
 Be open-minded and fair in collecting and appraising evidence 
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 Be willing to question the obvious 
 Interpret with charity (Cohen, 2009, p. 54) 
Intellectual perseverance  
 Be diligent in your effort to gather evident and assess another’s argument 
 Be thorough in your effort to understand another’s perspective and search for information 
to help you understand their point of view. 
 Exercise care in trying to understand and interpret another’s perspective 
Critical Trust 
 Be trusting enough not to doubt based on prejudice or bias but not naïve to accept anything. 
 Be mindful and critical of what you trust. 
 Be trusting enough to give another a fair and charitable hearing but critical so that you are 
not naïve and too trusting. 
Fair Intention 
 Enter an argument with the intention to listen, respect and understand another’s 
perspective. 
 Don’t assume from the get-go that the interlocutor is wrong or presenting fallacious 
arguments 
 Give the interlocutor a fair hearing 
 Have the intention to take the other person seriously and not to think of them as idiotic or 
insane 
Respect: 
 Respect the opinions and arguments of interlocutor 
 Be respectful of your co-arguer’s humanity (Thorson, 2016, p. 6). 
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 Present your argument in a way that respectfully responds to your co-arguers background 
(Thorson, 2016, p. 6) 
These V-argumentation-rules also have a prohibition rules, such as the V-rules that correspond to 
intellectual courage may have a prohibition of “do not be dogmatic” or “do not be afraid of ideas 
that do not correspond to your beliefs.” And for example the virtue of good listening may have 
the prohibition of “do not be hasty in your judgment” and “do not listen with preconceived 
notions of the arguer.” Hursthouse argues that much invaluable action guidance comes from 
courses of action that one must avoid such as “actions that are irresponsible, feckless, lazy, 
inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, indiscreet, incautious…and etc.” (Hursthouse, 
1999, p. 33). As such, virtues not only have V-rules but also prohibitions, and both of these guide 
arguers and the audience in becoming better in argumentation. Hence, virtues of argumentation 
do provide rules and, as will be shown later, the cultivation of virtues coupled with experience 
and practical wisdom does provide arguers with action guidance. 
 
Objection Three. The third objection that I anticipate may come up is similar to an 
objection given to virtue ethics. The objection is that different virtuous audiences can come to 
different and at times even opposing conclusions. I agree that the exercise of virtues does not 
guarantee agreement by the audience nor is it always the desired outcome. That is, the point is 
not that the virtuous audience must come to a single conclusion, but rather that they come to their 
conclusions with the exercise of virtues and with proper and good argumentative practices. The 
concept of the virtuous audience admits that different and at times opposing conclusions may be 
reached because the goal of the virtuous audience is not to reach objective truth but rather to 
have a virtuous process of arguing.  
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A similar criticism is made against virtue ethics, which states that the cultivation of 
different virtues can lead to a conflict in the application of virtues, and to moral dilemmas, and 
that sometimes different virtues point in opposite directions. For example, the virtue of honesty 
prompts one to tell a hurtful truth to a friend but compassion prompts one to remain silent. As 
such, different virtues can offer us conflicting paths (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 35).  To this objection, 
virtue ethicists say that a real understanding of virtue does not actually lead to conflict because a 
virtuous person will have practical wisdom and know what is the best virtue to apply in sticky 
situations, and this knowledge comes with experience. Further, virtue ethicists such as Rosalind 
Hursthouse (1999) claim that the cultivation of virtues coupled with experience results in 
practical wisdom which then guides individuals in prioritizing and choosing the right virtue. 
Further, Hursthouse’s response to the alleged vagueness of what a virtuous agent is or 
would do, is that just as we seemed to have a clear idea of what is the best consequence is with 
regarded to utilitarianism, we similarly possess acknowledge of what is the best moral conduct 
that a virtuous agent embodies (1999, p. 25). And as such we do know what the correct moral 
rules or principles are that a virtuous agent acts based on. Further, we all have some idea of what 
a virtuous agent would do because we are all brought up in a society where such virtuous people 
have been honored or praised and her point is that we all have that knowledge accessible to us. 
And supposing that at times we may not know what the correct action is or are unsure of what a 
virtuous agent would do, then as Hursthouse points out one the best thing to do is to go and ask 
those we deem virtuous. Hursthouse adds that  
This is far from being a trivial point, for it gives a straightforward explanation of an 
important aspect of our moral life, namely the fact that we do not always act as 
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‘autonomous’, utterly self-determining agents, but quite often seek moral guidance from 
people we think are morally better than ourselves. (p. 28) 
And so when one is unsure of what the right moral conduct is, one should go to people they 
respect and admire for moral guidance, those one considers kinder, more honest, just and wiser 
than oneself and ask them what in that situation they would do (p. 29). That is when confronted 
with a situation where one is unsure of what the right moral conduct is, what a virtuous agent 
would do, one should seek advice from virtuous people. And so her point is that although one 
may be confused or not sure, it is not totally true that some people have no idea of what a 
virtuous agent would do, for most of us, if not all, have some idea of how a virtuous agent would 
act in such and such situations. Similarly, while it may be true that there is never really a single 
right choice to make, or single virtue to utilize, V-rules of argumentation along with practical 
wisdom enable the arguer to make a decision informed by the application of virtues. 
Hence, neither virtue ethics or virtue argumentation prescribes an absolute moral 
principle to appeal to, for it is always a judgment exercised by virtuous individuals facing moral 
dilemmas. What virtue ethics says is that this exercise of judgment should be a virtuous exercise 
of judgment, and it is the same with argumentation. The concept of the virtuous audience cannot 
tell us in advance what is a good narrative argument, for that is a choice made by the virtuous 
audiences who decide virtuously and rhetorically on a case by case basis. And it is true that the 
cultivation of virtues does not give us clear answers of what the virtuous audience will accept 
because that is a choice that emerges out of a process and can never be known in advance. The 
virtuous audience has to exercise good judgment, and if they have these argumentative virtues 
then they are more likely to be a better audience. And while it may be true that practical wisdom 
and experience along with the V-rules can give an arguer a reasonably good idea of what virtue 
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to apply, it is nevertheless possible that we can come to a situation where no agreement is 
possible. In Perelman’s rhetorical model of argumentation, he likewise acknowledges that 
mutual agreement is not easily attainable and that the universal audience can be difficult to 
achieve.  Such may be the case when audiences measure argumentation differently, for as 
Crosswhite explains,  
…one writer may appeal more to the ‘competence, training, and knowledge’ criteria, and 
make them very strong criteria, while another may appeal to the criterion of adding 
audiences together, or letting ‘everyone’ decide. (Crosswhite, 1989, p. 164) 
In such situations, Perelman recommends that argumentation be postponed until we can come to 
agreement and mutual understanding through dialogue or explanatory discourse of question and 
answer.     
A similar point regarding the virtuous audience is made by Paula Olmos in her 
commentary on my paper presented at the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation 
(OSSA) conference, 2016, where she argues that it is unrealistic to assume that the cultivation of 
virtues can control or be the deciding factor for what the audience will accept. She writes, “I’m 
not sure we can control that [judgments of the audience], somehow beforehand, by identifying a 
small set of virtues allegedly required of any agent taking part in any argumentative practice” 
(2016, p. 3). Olmos’ objection deals with the idea that the cultivation of virtue by the audience 
cannot ensure that the audience will accept only good arguments and reject bad ones. I agree 
with Olmos’ point in that the cultivation of virtues alone cannot ensure good argumentation, 
what is required is also a rhetorical process of knowledge production that is informed by virtues 
(this rhetorical process will be discussed in the next section of the chapter: virtuous consensus). 
While misogynistic or racist stories provide clear cases of what the virtuous audience would 
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reject, it is by no means suggested that these verdicts are easily achieved. Rather, they are the 
product of long argumentative processes. Hence, the concept of the virtuous audience admits 
that, with regard to controversial issues, it is possible that the issue remains unresolvable, and 
results in disagreement. And it may remain unclear what the outcome is because the outcome of 
argumentation depends on those engaged in and listening to the argument. The virtuous audience 
as a concept admits disagreement, because the goal is not agreement at any cost; while virtuous 
arguers have agreement in mind, the agreement must arrive through a virtuous dialogical 
process. This differs from non-virtue-ethical accounts in which agreement is the goal, without 
procedural constraints; by contrast, the aim of virtuous argumentation is virtuous agreement (if 
possible), as well as the cultivation of the argumentative virtues, and other ancillary goals. 
Agreement should be abandoned if arguers cannot reach this goal without slighting or harming 
other arguers; in that case, peaceful dissent may be the correct path. So while agreement is 
important on the virtuous audience approach, it’s not more important than the process. As a 
result, it is possible that different virtuous audiences can come to different conclusions because 
what the concept of virtuous audience ensures is not unanimous agreement but rather a virtuous 
process of argumentation. This is in fact consistent with rhetorical understanding of knowledge 
production as not being static and consensually based. The virtuous audience ensures virtuous 
consensus, which is discussed in the next section of the chapter. 
 
Virtuous Consensus  
Theories of virtue and rhetorical argumentation offer us a better process of argumentation, but 
they are not absolute or bullet proof methods for achieving the best arguments. This is because 
such arguments are the result of good processes and arguers who take seriously the cultivation of 
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virtues. What the account of virtuous audience offers is an ideal audience that after cultivating 
virtues can exercise good judgment. But the conclusions they draw are not born in a vacuum and 
are formed with a rhetorical method of consensus. To explain this rhetorical process of 
consensus I will first use Perelman’s distinction between fact and values to explain how narrative 
acceptance is negotiated by the audience and is bounded by the standard of what is communally 
accepted and, second, borrow Richard Burke’s concept of rhetorical rationality to explain how 
the consensus arrived by the audience is rational and reasonable. Further, virtuous consensus also 
relates to what the audience deems as believable. Stories must also be believable to be good.   
However, the way I define believability is not in terms of truth.  
The boundaries of narrative acceptability are audience oriented. That is, once the frame 
of narrative is set and the audience accepts the starting point of narrative then the parameters can 
be renegotiated and are often renegotiated in the process of arguing. Once the audience accepts 
the narrative, if the story goes too far then the arguer may begin to lose the trust and credibility 
of his/her audience and that is where negotiation happens in the form of question or objection 
from the audience. A similar process is discussed by Perelman when he makes a distinction 
between facts and values. Fact and values are always negotiated by the audience that decides 
what a fact is and what is a value. Facts become facts through the agreement of that audience.  
Perelman’s perspective on rhetoric is that the facts do not speak for themselves and that facts 
become facts when an audience consents to them. However, it is important to point out that once 
facts become fact we don’t usually argue about them because we agree that they are facts. But 
there may come a time when we question certain facts and decide on different types of facts.  As 
noted by Dan Gross, “facts have a privileged status in argumentation that easily can be lost; if 
justification is called for, the data loses its status as a fact” (Dan Gross, p. 110). Once we 
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question a statement it loses its status as a fact and will no longer have universal agreement. In 
other words, facts lose their privileged position as fact when they become the conclusion rather 
than the starting point of an argument. Perelman does not give fact or truth the status of 
objectivity (Perelman, 1982, p. 23).  As noted by Perelman as soon as the fact or truth is 
contested by a member of the audience the speaker cannot take advantage of it as a starting point 
of argumentation (p. 23).  According to Perelman, "from the standpoint of argumentation, we are 
confronted with a fact only if we can postulate uncontroverted, universal agreement with respect 
to it” (p. 67).  This means no statement can enjoy the status of a fact definitively. There are two 
ways in which an event can lose the status of fact, either the audience raises doubt to the 
argument presented or new members are introduced who may question the status of a fact (p. 
67).  
Perelman does not believe in any absolute criterion which can guarantee its own absolute 
infallibility, rather he believes in intuitions and convictions in which we place confidence until 
there is reason to doubt and reject them (Perelman, 1963, p. 117). Reason, writes Perelman, is 
not an eternally invariable or fully developed faculty whose results are self-evident and 
universal. Rather, the rationality of our opinions cannot be guaranteed once and for all, for they 
are ever changing. Perelman asserts,  
It is in the ever-renewed effort to get them accepted by what in each field we regard as 
the universality of reasonable means that truths are worked out, made specific and 
refined—and these truths constitute no more than the surest and best tested of our 
opinions. ( 1963, p. 133) 
 In this rhetorical model of argumentation, the tested opinions and conclusions adopted are not 
obvious; rather they represent what, in a given milieu, is considered the best and soundest 
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opinion. Hence, argumentation becomes a dialectical exchange between the speaker and his/her 
interlocutor, where the interlocutor is not merely expounding their point of view, but also 
expressing the opinions of their society and what is accepted.  And once these opinions are 
challenged and a controversy arises concerning these opinions, then this disagreement bring 
about a modification in the field of the reasonable.  This rhetorical model of argumentation is the 
best method for revealing the imperfect and incomplete aspect of any philosophical knowledge, 
and doing so without relying on the so called irrefragability of intuitions and self-evident truths 
(Perelman, 1963, p. 167).  Accordingly, there is no criterion for judging arguments, save in the 
philosophical vision of the interlocutor (Perelman, 1963, p. 167). Narrative arguments similarly 
rely on facts and values to negotiate what is agreed upon and what can be assumed to be a fact by 
the audience. Narrative arguments must always begin in agreement and then boundaries of what 
is acceptable can be renegotiated. And so what is assumed to be accepted by the audience can 
always be negotiated once the audience questions it. That is because the status of the fact and 
truth in narrative arguments are also not guaranteed unless we assume the existence of an 
infallible authority that could guarantee facts and truth for us.  But since we do not have absolute 
guarantee or self -evident truths then facts and truth are always open to question. But this does 
not mean that an audience can question everything without sufficient reason. Since there is 
agreement about the purpose and meaning of fact that is sufficiently widespread which means no 
one can reject them without appearing foolish unless he or she can give adequate reason to 
justify his skepticism regarding the accepted facts.    
In line with the rhetorical tradition, the reasonableness of stories and arguments is 
constantly being renegotiated in the process of telling stories. This means that what the virtuous 
audience accepts is arrived at through a rhetorical process. The type of rationality and 
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reasonableness that narrative rely on is a rhetorical rationality. To fully understand how a 
virtuous audience comes to agree and accept certain stories and reject others, one has to 
understand the way knowledge and rationality is formed rhetorically. That is what is considered 
reasonable and rational from a rhetorical perspective. Understanding how narrative 
reasonableness is formed rhetorically helps us understand what the virtuous audience accepts. 
Reasonableness of narrative is couched in terms of rhetorical reasonableness, which is 
based on rhetorical rationality. This type of rationality “is not associated with the probability of 
correctness but rather with plausibility in the circumstances” (Burke, 1984, p. 17). As Richard 
Burke explains,  
This criterion of plausibility is what a rational person would accept in the circumstances: 
from this speaker, with these kinds of available evidence, this amount of time in which to 
decide, this degree of importance, etc. (p. 21) 
And hence what the virtuous audience accepts after cultivating virtues is a story that embodies 
the best reason available. The stories that get accepted are the stories that are socially accepted 
and one where the hearer has no reason to doubt after exercising critical trust and diligence in 
understanding, interpreting and assessing the story. What the virtuous audience accepts is what a 
rational person would accept given the limited resources and capacity one has in doing further 
research or investigating of the story. Burke distinguished between rhetorical rationality and 
traditional rationality. Traditional rationality is defined in terms of logic and scientific method. 
This distinction between these two types of rationality is essentially a distinction between 
reasons for belief (rhetorical rationality) and evidence for truth (traditional rationality). While 
traditional rationality often demands evidence for truth, rhetorical rationality is a rationality 
couched in the consensus of communities and where decisions and beliefs are formed on the 
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basis of appeals to authority and experts. Hence, rhetorical rationality refers to the best reason 
available (Burke,1984, p.18).  
Hence, according to rhetorical rationality, it is perfectly rational to accept what people 
generally believe about a controversial issue. However, the more important the decision is and 
the easier it is to get information, the less rational it is to just act on the basis of common belief. 
Burke’s point is that common belief and the reliance on expert opinion is perfectly rational 
because it is all that one can do given the limited time and resource one has (p. 18).   And 
similarly the virtuous audience, while critical, also relies on expert opinion and accepts and/or 
rejects stories that its fellow citizens generally believe in or reject. The virtuous audience also 
relies on rhetorical rationality and accepts arguments that fall within its community’s standard of 
reasonableness and common belief.  
Burke’s notion of rhetorical rationality is consistent with feminist work in science and 
objectivity (Sandra Harding, 2015 and Helen E. Longino, 2002) and Thomas Kuhn’s work in 
The structure of scientific revolution (1962). Kuhn similarly concludes that consensus of the 
community of scientists is important for the practice of science (Burke, p. 22). For there is no 
higher standard than the assent of the relevant community (Kuhn qtd. by Burke, p. 22). Hence, 
Burke along with others argue that science also has a rhetorical dimension in that the choice 
between paradigms is not based on logic or scientific experiments but is rather chosen through 
the consensus of community for a variety of reasons (p. 22). 
And similarly, the acceptance of narrative arguments by a virtuous audience is based on 
the consensus of community. The same story may be accepted by one community and rejected 
by another. What distinguishes one community form another is the virtuous process of that 
community because there is no one single truth that all communities will accept. And my account 
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of the virtuous audience does not pose such absolute truth. Hence in rejecting that there is one 
absolute good story that one can appeal to, we leave it in the hands of the community to accept 
and reject stories they deem good or bad. But what ensures that stories that violate human rights, 
for example, get rejected is at the end the virtuous and rhetorical process of negotiating and 
renegotiating what is acceptable in that community which always changes. What ensures that 
dangerous stories don’t get accepted is not the inherent truth of the story but the practices of that 
community. Drawing on Perelman’s distinction between fact and values is helpful in showing 
how stories are accepted and negotiated in communities. What is today a fact (or an acceptable 
story) maybe tomorrow an unacceptable or contested story if society questions it. However, it is 
only through a virtuous and critical audience that we can ensure such processes do not end up 
being corrupt and too volatile. 
The acceptance of narrative arguments by a virtuous audience is both a rhetorical and 
virtuous assent to the theses presented in the story. By that I mean the story is never static and 
automatically accepted. The arguer is in the relationship with the audience and this relationship 
consists of negotiation and renegotiation of what is acceptable. The decision that the virtuous 
audience comes up with is also guided by rhetorical knowledge producing mechanism. This 
knowledge producing mechanism is explained by Burke in his discussion of rhetorical rationality 
and Perelman’s distinction between fact and values. That is, the virtuous audience’s acceptance 
of stories is bounded by the exercise of virtues and also what is communally and consensually 
agreed upon. Not all stories are accepted because the virtuous audience is unable to accept 
anything as they are bounded by their community’s standard of what is acceptable. The 
cultivation of virtues alone of course does not guarantee that the audience will only accept good 
arguments, what is needed, rather, is a virtuous rhetorical process. What the virtuous audience 
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accepts and understand is arrived at through a rhetorical process but it is a rhetorically process 
that is virtuously formed. Hence, the conclusions reached by the virtuous audience are the result 
of the cultivation of virtues and good rhetorical process which includes the rhetorical negotiation 
of the boundaries of what is reasonable. The rhetorical method results in consensus through the 
negotiation of fact and values.  
 
Believability and Good Stories 
The virtuous audience requires stories to be believable and probable. Walter Fisher’s (1987) 
narrative paradigm (as discussed in chapter one) emphasizes the importance of narrative 
probability and narrative fidelity. According to Fisher’s narrative paradigm, human 
communication is seen as stories competing with other stories constituted by good reasons, and 
such stories are deemed rational when they fit the demands of narrative probability and narrative 
fidelity. The rationality of stories is determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings who 
are: (1) aware of narrative probability, which is what constitutes a coherent story (whether a 
story hangs together), and (2) constantly checking for narrative fidelity, that is, whether the 
stories being told ring true with the stories they know to be true. Narrative probability relates to 
the consistency of characters and actions, and in epistemological terms this would refer to 
whether a story satisfied the demands of a coherence theory of truth (however, this is not a 
position that I endorse). Rationality in Fisher’s narrative paradigm involves narrative probability 
(coherence) and narrative fidelity (truthfulness and reliability) (p. 8). Stories are governed by the 
rules and limits of what is accepted, believed, questioned and criticized to be false or fabricated. 
I agree that stories must be believable but not in terms of a coherence theory of truth (as I will 
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show below). Further, according to Fisher the coherence of stories also depends on character 
consistency: 
central to all stories is character. Whether a story is believable depends on the reliability 
of characters, both as narrators and as actors. Determination of one’s character is made by 
interpretations of the person’s decisions and actions that reflect values. (1987, p. 47)  
Character consistency, as Fisher explains it, “is an organized set of actional tendencies” (p. 47), 
and when these character tendencies contradict one another or change significantly, or in other 
words, when one behaves out of character, this results in the questioning of the character. Fisher 
writes that, “coherence in life and in literature requires that characters behave characteristically” 
(p. 47). And so,  
to view communication through the perspective of narrativity is to focus on messages, on 
the individuated forms that constitute it, and on the reliability, trustworthiness, and 
desirability of what is said—evaluated by using the tests of narrative rationality. (Fisher, 
1987, p. 143) 
Fisher does not negate traditional rationality for he believes that it has a special role to 
play in specialized fields, but even in those arenas, he believes that narrative can still be useful 
and relevant (p. 10). According to the narrative paradigm, good reasons are embedded and 
woven into the stories we tell each other, and the production and practice of good reason is 
determined by history, biography, and culture, and hence our rationality is defined in terms of 
these stories as well (p. 7). This means that our rationality and knowledge is situation-specific, 
historical, contextual and, unlike the rational paradigm, does not aim for objective, ahistorical 
knowledge that is disembodied. Unlike the traditional rationality that is defined in terms of 
argumentative competence, knowledge of issues, appropriate modes of reasoning, deliberation 
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and a high degree of self-consciousness, narrative rationality is a capacity we all share (p. 9). The 
important point that Fisher’s work raises is that our conception of good reasons and rationality 
needs to be expanded if we want to understand how narrative and other alternative modes of 
arguments offer reasons. Further, Fisher’s account shows that there are alternative conceptions of 
rationality that are more inclusive and better suited for understanding many types of arguments. 
Traditional rationality espouses a hierarchal system in which some people are qualified to judge 
and lead those who are positioned as followers in this unequal community of knowledge 
production; whereas narrative rationality is inimical to elitist politics because everyone can tell 
stories and thus no one is excluded from this system of knowledge sharing. Everyone has the 
capacity and opportunity to be rational in the narrative paradigm (p. 10). I agree with Fisher that 
argumentation should be less elitist and more inclusive, and in chapter two, I showed why we 
should take seriously feminist critiques of the classic argumentation paradigm, an elitist and rigid 
model.  
However, because we all share the capacity to tell stories, it does not mean that all stories 
are equally good. One cannot deny that some stories are better than others for it is true that some 
stories are more coherent and believable. And this is why Fisher introduces the notion of 
narrative fidelity and narrative rationality. Fisher’s requirement of narrative probability ensures 
that not any story is acceptable, which means that that the audience will stop listening (reject the 
story) when the story ceases to be coherent and consistent.  According to Fisher, narrative 
consistency and fidelity is what makes a narrative good and also believable. While I agree that 
believability requires probability, I reject that a narrative is required to be true (narrative 
fidelity). In terms of narrative believability, I endorse Plumer’s account of believability because 
his account drops fidelity out of the picture. Plumer (2016, 2017) argues that the believability of 
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stories depends on the internal and external coherence of stories. Citing Robert A. Schultz 
(1979), Plumer borrows the idea that internal coherence is a matter of when, 
the events [are] motivated in terms of one another. In most, if not all, cases, motivation 
amounts to this; either one event is a causal (or otherwise probable) consequence of 
another; or some events happening provides a character with a reason or motive for 
making another event happen. (Schultz, p. 233) 
As explained by Plumer, the story is not believable if things keep happening for no reason and 
where events are inadequately connected (2017, p. 73). But that is not all that is required for the 
believability of stories, because even when events cohere together and are fully connected, the 
narrative may still not be believable because the connections do not cohere together with our 
widely shared basic intuitions of how human psychology and society works. And so what is 
needed is external coherence, where the believability of stories depends on how the story in 
general with its plot and characters conform to our shared intuitions about human nature 
(Plumer, 2017, p.73). However external coherence is not about truth or what Fisher terms 
narrative fidelity.  
In terms of fictional narratives, Plumer argues that believability is not about the truth of 
the stories. A story, can be far-fetched and unrealistic and still be believable. As for example, the 
events depicted in science fiction and allegorical narratives are not real but believable (Plumer, p. 
73). And believability here refers to how the events are reasonably well-connected and how the 
story respects and maintains our shared assumptions about human and physical nature. Even 
when the story has substantial alterations in physical reality, but if the author does it in such a 
way that the development of these alterations is internally consistent, coherent, and the 
characters are depicted as believing what is going in the story as normal, then this can make the 
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story seem believable. That is, if the characters in the story are depicted as believing what is 
going in the story as normal then the audience are more likely to believe the story as well. As 
Plumer notes, this is a kind of transference of the suspension of disbelief from the characters in 
the story to the audience listening to the story (p. 74). The characters in the story act like a reality 
check for the audience, and the believability of the story then is based also on the trust of the 
characters. So Plumer’s point is that although sometimes narratives can be slightly far fetched 
from our shared conception of reality, we still believe the story because we trust the characters in 
it. This is also true of my account of narrative arguments in that sometimes a story that is slightly 
far-fetched, but well-structured, is received as credible due to the trust and credibility of the 
characters and narrator. 
And so Plumer explains that believability is experienced by the auditor as simple, 
unanalyzed datum, or as the measure of the narrative. Plumer believes that although we may 
disagree on what is believable, in general, 
there is no fundamental relativity of believability because there is such a thing as human  
nature, which we all share and to which we have significant introspective or ‘privileged’ 
access, or at least psychological attunement. (p. 75) 
 And so a believable stories taps into these facts about human nature (p. 75). Stories resonate as 
believable when they are true of human nature. While I agree that there is a general sense of 
believability that taps into a shared human psychology, however, I also believe that believability 
is context and audience sensitive. Believability is related to narrative acceptability and that is 
audience and rhetorically oriented (as I show above). 
Plumer’s account of believability is similar to Fisher’s narrative probability and 
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narrative fidelity. The only difference, as noted by Plumer (2011) himself, is that believability 
(as opposed to fidelity and truth) works better for novels because while Fisher’s notion of fidelity 
requires that the story ring true with what one knows to be true in one’s life (p. 1555), 
believability does not require truth.  And so while fidelity requires truthfulness, believability 
does not, but only requires that a story maps onto our shared assumption of human nature and 
psychology. Stories presented in novels must be believable but not necessarily truthful or real, 
and so, according to Plumer, believability works better for novels. That is, for a novel to be 
believable it need only cohere with our shared assumptions of the world, not to have actually 
happened. 
From Fisher’s account of narrative fidelity and narrative probability, I borrow the general 
idea that good narratives are required to be coherent, probable and have character consistency. 
Since my account of narrative argument does not talk explicitly about truth, but rather 
virtuous and good argument process, and so similarly my account of good narratives will also not 
include narrative fidelity. Like Plumer, I also avoid discussion of narrative fidelity because the 
notion of believability is more faithful to what actually happens in argumentation. When we 
argue using stories we do not check with whether the story actually happened but rather we 
check how believable the story is. So Plumer’s account of believability is more compatible with 
my account of narrative arguments. But I disagree with Plumer that believability only works for 
fictional stories. That is, an important distinction that Plumer makes in his account of 
believability is that believability is a useful measure for the goodness of fictional narratives but 
not for non-fictional narratives such as biographical or historical narratives, where he argues the 
veracity and truth of the narrative is what is important. However, I disagree with Plumer’s 
account because I think believability in terms of argumentation also applies to both fictional and 
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nonfictional narratives. However, the difference lies in how one conceives of truth. The truth that 
Plumer thinks is important for biographical and historical narratives is a correspondence notion 
of truth where the events of the story have to be checked for whether they have actually 
happened. Further, Plumer sees that the point of non-fictional argument is veracity, i.e., sticking 
to the facts and telling what happened. But non-fictional stories may be used in an argumentation 
setting without needing to be checked for whether they actually happened or not. That is, in 
argumentative exchange one may tell a story about events that happened but for other purposes 
other than veracity. 
Along with Plumer’s account of believability, I also rely on the virtues of the speaker for 
my account of narrative arguments. That is, the narrator, exhibiting virtues, is also the measure 
of believability. The experience of the narrative believability does not only depend on the 
narrative internal and external coherence, but, I argue, is also based on the narrator's 
believability. Plumer does not focus on the narrator’s believability but rather on the characters 
being believable because his account of narrative arguments is based on novels whereas my 
account is about the use of oral storytelling in interpersonal argumentative exchanges where the 
credibility and believability of the person telling the story (narrator/arguer) is crucial to how the 
narrative is received by the audience. Furthermore, the believability of narrative arguments also 
depend on how good the argumentative exchange is, i.e., the process of arguing and how the 
narrative argument is to be conducted. And so since I focus on a process and rhetorical account 
of argumentation, I have shown (in this chapter) that narrative arguments are to be assessed by 
the virtuous audience and that having a virtuous process ensures good narratives as well good 
arguments. Good narratives are required to be not only believable, in terms of Plumer’s sense, 
but also need to have believable narrators and a good argumentative process. My account of the 
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virtuous audience demonstrates that the goodness of narrative arguments depends on the 
goodness of the process of arguing as rhetorically understood. 
My account of truth is rhetorical and is not based on correspondence account of truth. 
Truth can be accommodated into believability but not in the way Plumer discusses, where the 
truth of a non-fictional story is based on sticking to the facts and checking for whether the event 
did happen, but rather in an argumentative exchange the truth of the narrative is taken into 
account in terms of the believability of and trust for the narrator/arguer. In an argumentative 
exchange when the narrative is told, arguers do not often check the truth of the narrative by 
seeing whether the events actually happened. The truth of a narrative in an argumentative 
exchange, at least from the rhetorical and process account of argumentation, is measured by the 
credibility and trust for the narrator and the goodness of the argumentative exchange. From the 
perspective of rhetorical argumentation, believability is both context sensitive and audience 
based, where the audience is an interactive one involved in the construction of argumentation. 
And in such terms believability, is then, both the responsibility of the narrator and the audience 
receiving the story and that is where the exercise of argumentative virtues becomes integral to 
ensuring good argumentation. Both the narrator (arguer) and the audience are responsible for the 
construction of a good story. And both are required to cultivate and exercise argumentative 
virtues. What is believable depends on what the virtuous audience, after exercising virtues, 
deems as a good story. The virtuous audience is the measure of what is believable and credible. 
But of course the virtuous audience, is also checking for whether the narrator is also virtuous 
(and by that I mean credible, honest and trustworthy), and so the virtuous audience trusts only 
stories that are believable. Believability is a virtue that the virtuous audience is sensitive to and 
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checks for. A story that is conducted with virtuous process and virtues speaker is one that is 
believable and a good story. 
 
Conclusion 
The virtuous audience is a rhetorical audience who has cultivated virtues. The rhetorical 
audience includes both the arguer and the audience because narrative is a co-creation between 
those engaged in the argument. My concept of the virtuous audience combines insights from 
Perelman’s account of audience and from virtue theories of argumentation. While bad narratives 
do get accepted by people, it is only through the virtuous audience that we can hope such stories 
get rejected. The virtuous audience being critical is less likely to accept bad narratives. Bad 
narratives are more persuasive and powerful than one would like to imagine and that ultimately 
depends on the type of audience that accepts them. Hence, good narrative arguments are those 
that are accepted by a virtuous audience. Ultimately, though, for good argumentation to take 
place and to avoid the production and acceptance of bad narratives, virtues must be cultivated by 
both the arguer and the audience.   
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation developed a narrative account of argumentation which defends narrative as a 
legitimate mode of arguing. This view combines insights from feminist philosophy and 
argumentation theory, specifically feminist critiques of argumentation that centre on the 
adversariality and hostility embedded in argumentation, and the exclusion of alternative modes 
of reasoning. Dominant models of argumentation view an argument as containing premises and a 
conclusion, and as either discursively or linguistically explicable. Therefore, the dominant model 
rejects non-traditional models of reasoning that are non-linear and/or non-discursive. Narrative 
arguments diverge from this traditional understanding of argument in two important ways: they 
do not follow the traditional model of an argument as consisting of premises and a conclusion, 
and they are not reducible to explicit or linear argument form. Hence, my dissertation builds on 
the already-existing critique of traditional argumentation lodged by feminist philosophers and 
argumentation theorists, by showing that narrative is a further excluded mode of arguing. The 
main goal of this dissertation has been to defend the legitimacy of narrative argumentation and to 
provide an account of how narratives function in arguments.  
My dissertation also contributes to argumentation theory, which lacks an analysis of the 
place of narrative in argumentation.  Throughout this dissertation, I maintain that narrative 
arguments must be seen as a process and not as a product of arguing. That is, I argue the whole 
act of storytelling is an argument and that we should not attempt to reduce the narrative and 
extract from it premises and a conclusion. Accordingly, I argue that narrative argument should be 
evaluated using a process account of evaluation using the concept of the virtuous audience that I 
developed, which maintains the form of the narrative as a narrative without requiring it to be 
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reduced. Hence, in this dissertation, I reject the reduction and extraction of premises and 
conclusion from the narrative and argue that the whole act of storytelling can be a powerful 
persuasive argument. 
Recognizing narrative arguments requires flexibility and open-mindedness as well as the 
ability to contextualize. That is, acknowledging narratives as arguments requires further 
recognition that narrative arguments are pervasive, complex and various in kind.   
In narratives, arguments are not direct, so they do not jump out at you in the way traditional 
arguments do, but this does not mean that they do not give reasons. It is important to consider 
that though not every narrative or act of storytelling has an argument or can be considered as an 
argument, some narratives do function as arguments, and more importantly, certain cultures and 
ethnic groups incorporate narrative as both a form of argumentation and a transference of 
knowledge.  However, the idea that telling stories can have persuasive power tends to be met 
with resistance, for we often demand that arguers be direct and succinct, and to get to the point. 
As such, narrative argumentation is a challenge to dominant models of argumentation that 
exclude alternative modes of arguing. 
The acceptance of narrative argumentation is ultimately a rejection of exclusionary 
practices of argumentation. Further, broadening our conception of arguments by accepting 
narrative as a legitimate mode of arguing makes argumentation more inclusive. Hence, this 
dissertation dismantles the assumption that an argument has to be verbalized and explicit to be a 
legitimate mode of arguing.  
Acknowledging narrative not only opens up the space for other modes of arguing but also 
broadens our conception of reason and rationality, because alternative modes rely on an 
alternative conception of rationality. This doctoral project rejects masculine and traditional ideals 
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of rationality that exclude narratives as reason-giving. So a celebration of narrative is also a 
celebration and acceptance of alternative conceptions of reason and rationality.  
This broadening of our conception of arguing and rationality ultimately results in better 
representation of minority groups and others who may be uncomfortable with traditional and 
standard models of arguing. Acknowledging narrative in turn recognizes the equal status of 
minority groups and women, that are associated with alternative modes of reasoning. By 
including narrative, we give representation to marginalized groups including women and cultures 
where storytelling is an integral part of their heritage and mode of reasoning. This dissertation 
has important implications for feminist concerns, particularly the interest in making 
argumentation more inclusive and acknowledging the legitimacy of alternative ways of arguing. 
Further, this dissertation promotes feminist ideals in the profession, as it encourages a culture of 
philosophy that is based on inclusivity and acceptance. This improvement in the representation 
of minority groups results in a flourishing culture in the discipline of philosophy. 
Further, narrative as a mode of arguing is less hostile than the traditional model because 
narrative arguments are indirect. The style of storytelling is generally not hostile, because the act 
of telling stories often elicits empathy, compassion and understanding. The telling of stories is 
often associated with empathy, compassion and understanding. There is also empirical research 
that suggests listening to stories makes us more empathetic (as shown by Raymond A. Mar, 
Keith Oatley, Jacob Hirsh, Jennifer dela Paz, and Jordan B. Peterson, 2006). Emotions play a 
large role in storytelling. It is hard to listen to a story, especially to a story well told, without 
having one's emotions invoked.  And so a further area of investigation would be how narrative 
arguments may engender more empathy and understanding. 
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